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INTRODUCTION
Most comprehensively viewed, the international law of the sea comprises
two very different sets of principles. One set of principles, establishing
certain basic, overriding community goals, prescribes for all states the
widest possible access to, and the fullest enjoyment of, the shared use of
the great common resource of the oceans. The other set of principles, com-
monly described as jurisdictional, expresses certain implementing policies
designed economically to secure the basic community goals of shared use
by establishing a shared competence among states in a domain largely free
from the exclusive public order of any particular state.1 The main out-
lines of the overriding principles prescribing shared use have long with-
stood the attacks of exclusionary national egoism: the great bulk of the
oceans are communis juris, not subject to exclusive appropriation by any
particular state; in the interest of the fullest, peaceful, conserving use for
the benefit of all mankind, all states are free in complete equality, upon
* This article is a by-product of research aided by the Rockefeller Foundation, for
whose assistance the authors express their thanks.
' Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea 537-603 (1911); Gidel, Le Droit International
Public de la Mer (3 vols., 1932-1934); Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (3d ed.,
1959); Colombos, International Law of the Sea (3d ed., 1954); Jessup, The Law of
Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927).
The theme of complementarity in the prescriptions of the international law of the
sea is developed in McDougal and Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective:
Lawful Measures for Security," 64 Yale Law J. 648, 655-661 (1955); McDougal and
Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives versus National
Egoism," 67 ibid. 539, 558-567 (1958).
The principles expressing the basic, overriding community policies about shared use
may be observed, further, to exhibit their own special subordinate complementarities.
The degree of shared use established by international law is the outcome of a weighing
process which explicitly seeks, in the common interest of ali states, appropriately to
protect and balance both the inclusive interests of the general community of states and
the exclusive interests of particular states in protecting their internal value processes.
This accommodation of the two types of interests is implemented by complementary
prescriptions which both state the broad community policies of protection and point to
and weight the specific, detailed factors in the processes of use and claim which must
be taken into account for rational balancing in particular contexts. For further discus-
sion and illustration, see the articles cited above.
HeinOnline -- 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 25 1960
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
condition of making necessary accommodation for the like freedom of
others, to participate to the utmost extent of effective capability in the
shared use of this great common resource; the exclusive competence of
states is strictly confined to that assertion of authority which is reasonably
necessary to protect both their inclusive interest in the shared use of the
oceans and their exclusive interest in securing their internal processes from
invasions and deprivations originating at sea.2
JURISDICTIONAL PRINcinEs BUILT ABOUT NATIONAL CHARACTER
The implementing, jurisdictional, principles by which the general com-
munity of states seeks to make effective its overriding policies of shared use
have long been built, in response to the omnipresent imperatives of
harmonious and economic co-operation, about certain allocations of com-
petence which require high certainty and easy precision in identification
of the national character of ships.3 For interactions upon the high seas,
each state 4 has imposed upon it responsibility under both customary inter-
national law and by many explicit agreements for the lawful conduct of
ships to which it has ascribed its national character; each state may apply
its authority to the ships to which it has ascribed its national character and
to events occurring upon such ships; each state may protect the ships to
which it has ascribed its national character against interferences and
2See, generally, sources cited above, note 1.
3 The distinction between decision that a state's attribution of national character is
irrelevant and decision denying a state's competence to attribute nationality is some-
times confused by confusing two different references of the word "nationality." The
word may be given both a factual reference and a "legal consequence" reference. See
Silving, "Nationality in Comparative Law," 5 A. J. Comp. Law 410 (1956).
The factual reference is, of course, to the act, the authoritative decision, of a state in
its attribution of national character. The legal consequence reference is to the responses
which authoritative decision-makers later make to this fact upon problems of access to
the oceans, the application of coercion to vessels, labor relations, taxation, and so on.
Thus, by reference to legal consequences the same vessel could be said to have many
different "nationalities" for many different purposes-one nationality for access,
another for the purposes of application of coercion, another for labor problems, another
for taxation, and so on.
The employment of the word "nationality" in the second reference, to legal con-
sequences, leads, we suggest, to unutterable confusion in discussion and encourages the
invocation of wholly irrelevant contexts and decisions in argument and policy applica
tions. It has all the vices which are elsewhere categorized as "normative-ambiguity."
See Lasswell and McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Train
ing in the Public Interest," 52 Yale Law J. 203 (1943).
In this article we shall use the word "nationality" to refer to the fact that a state
attributes its national character to a vessel. The legal consequences which other
authoritative decision-makers attach to this fact we propose to explore in a series of
carefully delimited problems, raising in very different degree the policy relevance of thi4
fact.
4 Our reference in this article is only to "recognized" states. The special difficulties
arising with respect to unrecognized states are so complex as to require separate treat-
ment. Some of these difficulties appear in The Maret, 145 F. 2d 431 (1944). See al4i
Briggs, " INon-Recognition in the Courts: The Ships of the Baltic Republics," 37 A.J.I.L.
585 (1943).
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deprivations by others.5 No state may preclude the ships of other states
from access to the high seas or directly apply its authority to the ships of
other states, except as may be authorized by international law. Every
ship is required to have a national character, and scant protection is af-
forded ships which have no nationality. For interactions within their
internal waters and territorial sea, coastal states are of course authorized to
assert authority over ships of other states for the protection of their exclu-
sive interests, but states which have ascribed their national character to
these ships are also conceded a limited concurrent jurisdiction for the pro-
tection of their interests.0
ATTRIBUTIONS OF NATIONAL CHA ACTER TRADITIONALLY CONCLUSIVE
The necessary high certainty and easy precision in identification of the
national character of vessels, required by such jurisdictional principles,
have traditionally been achieved by according states a virtually conclusive
unilateral competence to confer their nationality upon vessels. The mode
by which national character has traditionally been conferred upon vessels
has been by the simple act of a state in making formal attribution through
appropriate registration and documentation.7 Historically states have, of
course, as a matter of domestic policy, conditioned their bestowal of na-
tional character upon vessels by many different criteria. But as a matter
of international law, until very recent date, states have universally been
regarded as possessing a practically unlimited discretion in their choice of
criteria." The only limitation commonly accepted has been that a state
5Thus Professor A. P. Higgins states: "La nationalit6 du navire est l'une des
garanties fournies par le droit international pour la libert6 de la navigation, et tout
bitinent naviguant en haute mer doit avoir un earact~re national et 6tre en mesure d'en
6tablir la preuve. La possession d'une nationalit6 sert de base au controle et 4 la
protection exerc~s par l'ftat du pavilion; e'est aussi une garantie pour les autres 32tats
au point de vue de la repression des torts dont peuvent se rendre coupables les gens qui
sont 6, bord. Les conditions fixes par les 2tats pour l'acquisition de la nationalitd 'out
pour objet d'assurer la possibilit6 ou d'accroitre la facilit6 et l'efficacit6 du contr~le, en
permettant de recounaitre A distance la qualit6, la nationalitd des navires.' " Higgins,
"Le r~gime juridique des navires de commerce en haute mer en temps de paix," 30
Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 5, at 20 (1929, V).
6 Jessup, op. cit. note 1 above; 3 Gidel, op. cit. note 1 above; Colombos, op. cit. note 1,
above; Rienow, The Test of the Nationality of a Merchant Vessel (1937); Potter, The
Freedom of the Seas (1924); United Nations Secretariat, Memorandum on the Regime
of the High Seas, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/32 (1950).
7 Rienow appropriately emphasizes the rle of the state: "To impress effectively its
nationality on vessels and to be assured that such nationality will be respected, a State
must take certain established steps intended to make other States cognizant of certain
particulars: that the vessel has met to the satisfaction of the State all the statutory
conditions; that the State considers the vessel one of its own. These are the points
which the practice of the United States, and that of foreign States, has consistently
exemplified." ' Rienow, cited above, at 116.
8 This conclusion is confirmed by almost any source to which one turns. Thus, half
a century ago, Westlake wrote: "The conditions on which different states admit ships
to their register, or otherwise grant them the right to carry their mercantile flag, are
very various ... [b]ut with such conditions international law has no concern: it suffices
1960]
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may not confer its national character upon a vessel already having the
national character of another stateY The rationality of this simple system
is attested by the high degree in which the states of the world have in
modern times achieved their community objectives in the shared uses of
the oceans.
THE PROPOSED SuBvERSION IN GENUINE LINK
Unfortunately, in recent years efforts have begun to be made to limit the
exclusive competence of states to ascribe their national character to vessels
by new and ill-defined criteria which would confer upon states a unilateral
competence to question, and even deny, each other's ascription of nation-
ality. These efforts have culminated in the recently formulated Conven-
tion on the High Seas 10 which, if adopted and interpreted as some suggest,
might introduce vast and costly uncertainties into the simple, rational, in-
herited system. Article 5 of this convention, after correctly emphasizing
the traditional exclusive competence of each state to determine the condi-
tions for the ascription of its national character to ships, projects a newly
devised restriction upon this competence in the form of an undefined re-
quirement of a "genuine link." The relevant words of Article 5 read:
There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in
particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and con-
trol in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying
its flag.
Beyond the extraneous criteria introduced by the words "in particular,"
the convention nowhere specifies what content is to be written into "genuine
link." Still more confusingly, the convention leaves entirely unspecified
such vital matters as who is to apply the requirement and what sanctioning
consequences are to be attached to failure to conform. The drastic poten-
tialities of possible interpretations are, however, made all too clear in the
formative discussions in the International Law Commission and in the
appraisal of subsequent commentators. Thus, Professor Max Sorensen,
Chairman of the Danish Delegation at the Geneva Conference, in a
pamphlet published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment, takes
that, for whatever reasons, a state accepts the authority and responsibility which result
from the ship's nationality." 1 International Law 169 (2d ed., 1910).
The Italian scholar Fedozzi expressed this unilateral competence in even stronger
language: "Tout les 2tats maritimes d6terminent dans la plenitude de leur autonomie,
les conditions de la reconnaissance on de la concession de leur nationalit6 aux navires
marchands et los documents ndcessaires pour la preuve de la nationalit6 elle-mgme."
"La condition juridique des navires de commerce," 10 Hague Academy Recueil des
Cours 5, at 49-50 (1925, V).
Professor Sorensen puts it this way: "International law has traditionally left each
state free to determine under what conditions it will register and thereby confer its
nationality upon a ship." Sorensen, The Law of the Sea 202 (International Concili-
ation, Pamphlet No. 520, 1958).
9 See Rienow, op. cit. note 6 above, at 16.
10 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. II, Plenary Meetings,
p. 135; 52 A.J.I.L. 842 (1958). (Hereinafter references to this convention are made
merely by citing the relevant article where that is appropriate; otherwise no citation
will be given.)
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for granted that states may determine unilaterally whether a genuine link
exists, and surmises that, if such a link between a vessel and the state does
not exist,
a foreign state should be free not to recognize the purported nationality
of the ship and to treat it as a stateless ship, having no right of access
to its ports."
Professor Philip Jessup, building upon Professor Sorensen's conclusions,
notes that the genuine link theory applied by the International Court of
Justice with respect to individuals in the Nottebohm Case,' 2 "could easily
be utilized internationally to determine the national character of corpora-
tions and ships," and boldly predicts that the
law is in the process of development; the most that can be said is that,
in the light of the court's opinion in the Nottebohm Case, it is probable
that if the issue were presented to it, that tribunal would sustain the
link theory in its application to the nationality of ships.13
Writing shortly before the Geneva Conference and obviously stimulated by
the final Draft Articles adopted by the International Law Commission, a
British author, Mr. A. D. Watts, in a major article on the protection of
merchant ships, concluded that national ownership and not registration,
i.e., nationality of owners, should be "the proper basis for the exercise of
protection over private shipping." 14 In the opinion of Mr. Watts, a flag
state should not be allowed to "protect" its ships until it has been estab-
lished that there exists between them a "strong link," or a "real and
effective link," or, at least, an "effective link." '5
The uncertainties and potential dangers introduced by the convention
in Article 5 are still further compounded by observing that the text of this
article may be interpreted to embrace not one test but two tests. The
words: "in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction
and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying
its flag" could be construed to mean that, even though a ship has passed
a genuine link test, it may still fail to satisfy the additional criteria imposed
by the quoted words. Even though a state's attribution of national char-
acter to a vessel may not be subject to challenge under any of the com-
monly proposed references of genuine link, one state might still, under the
11 Sorensen, note 8 above, at 203. Professor J. H. W. Verzijl's speculation about
genuine link indicates even more clearly the possibilities of chaos. After alleging that
the "genuine link" is "now defined as to its main purport" and noting that the con-
vention provides no sanction, Professor Verzijl declares that:
"However, under these conditions international tribunals, municipal legislatures and
municipal courts would seem to have been given a free hand to attach to the general
requirement of 'genuine link' the legal consequences they deem fit and proper."
Verzijl, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva 1958," 6
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Internationaal Recht 115, 118 (1959).
12Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6, 1955, (1955] 1.C.J. Rep.
4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955).
28 Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," 59 Columbia
Law Rev. 234, at 256 (1959).
14 Watts, "The Protection of Merchant Ships," 33 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 52, at 84
(1957). 15 Ibid. at 68, 73, 67.
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assumed authority of these words, challenge such attribution and impose
unspecified sanctions because the flag state does not assert sufficiently
"effective" control over the ship's, say, "social matters."16 No more
than for "genuine link," does the convention anywhere specify meaning
for "effective," "jurisdiction" and "control," or for "administrative,
technical and social matters." Since inherited traditions do not provide a
reliable guidance, it is again left to every state unilaterally to determine
the applicable standards and appropriate sanctions.
IRRELEVANT DEMANDS BY LABOR AND BUSINESS
It is easily observed that the proposed innovations in the convention for
identifying the national character of ships have been primarily stimulated
by certain pressure groups, including both seamen's unions and ship-
owning interests, acting on both national and international levels.
The perspectives of the pressure groups representing labor, as well as the
wide range of interests which they seek to secure by application of the
"genuine link" concept, are fully documented in the proposals submitted by
the Seafarers' members of the International Labor Organization to its
Committee on Flag Transfer. This unique document is so concise and
comprehensive as to merit quotation at length:
The Seafarers' group has considered points in relation to flag trans-
fers and submits that the following points should be considered in
relation to any form of instrument which is finally adopted:
1. Notice to be taken of the declaration made by the International
Law Commission of the United Nations on the subject of merchant
ships having a broader link with the country of registration than
merely the formality of registration.
2. The country of registration to have greater and more intimate
jurisdiction over ships flying its flag, possibly by requiring that-
(a) ships should be owned by companies having their principal
place of business in the country of registration;
(b) each company shall have nationals of the registering country on
its board of directors;
(c) meetings of the boards of directors shall be held within the ter-
ritory of the registering country.
3. To make and adopt regulations designed to ensure that all ships
flying its flag observe internationally accepted safety standards.
4. To establish and operate a government-controlled ship inspection
service within its territory adequate to the requirements of the ton-
nage on its register and to ensure that all ships flying its flag are
regularly inspected within its territory to ensure conformity with
regulations issued under 3 above.
5. To lay down regulations governing the recruitment, engagement
and discharge of seafarers serving in its ships according to interna-
tionally accepted standards and establish the requisite government-
controlled agencies to give effect to such regulations.
6. To lay down regulations or legislation providing that not less
than 25 percent of seafarers in any one ship are nationals of the
country of registration.
16 Compare below, p. 108, for potential requirements relating to labor conditions,
a statement by Mr. Jenks, the I.L.O. representative at the Geneva Conference.
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7. To make and adopt regulations or legislation, if such do not
already exist in the country, providing for the freedom of association
of its seafarers.
8. To ensure by regulation that proper repatriation for its seafarers
be provided.
9. To provide that seafarers will be covered by social security ar-
rangements which in any case shall not be less than those provided
for workers in other countries.
10. To ensure that proper and satisfactory arrangements are made
within the country concerned for the examination of candidates for
certificates of competency and for the issuing of such certificates. 17
The seriousness with which these proposals are made is confirmed by the
report that the International Transport Workers' Federation, in calling for
a worldwide boycott of the ships flying flags of convenience, sought to at-
tain the following objectives: (1) "All ship owners should make monthly
payments of $5.60 for each crew member into federation funds"; (2)
"Costs should be standardized for all shipping companies"; (3) "Pay for
all merchant seamen should be equalized.' The Federation expressed
the hope that the boycott will eventually result in forcing all shipping
companies "into line with federation rules." 19 Reviewing the causes of
this boycott, a New York Timnes report asserted that it "involves so many
facets that some of the central protagonists are confused as to the reasons
for the boycott, and even its objectives." The article continues:
The major unions around the world that have been pressing for
action against "flags of convenience" now speak of the boycott as an
economic wedge. They would use it to force the so-called runaway
shipping lines to establish better union wage scales and working condi-
tions.
Despite the emphasis on unionization much of the fleets under the
Liberian and Panamanian flags are now fully unionized.
Another point that has been stressed in the past by the union critics
has been safety. They charge that the runaway ships are not subject
to the same standards as those imposed by the traditional maritime
countries.
This is another point that is reportedly no longer really valid. -0
Writing on the same theme in an article entitled "Union Contract is Ship
Boycott Goal," a staff correspondent of Tie Christian Science Monitor
described the agitation about the flags of convenience as "the case of elusive
employers being chased by unions." With apparent knowledge of the
real causes behind labor's demands, he states:
Neither side [i.e., shipowners and seamen] appears much concerned
over what flag flutters from the ship's stern. But the conflict is being
waged with no less vigor because it revolves around dollars and cents.
17 International Labour Conference, 41st Session, 1958, Flag Transfer in Relation to
Social Conditions and Safety 5 (1957).
Is New York Times, Nov. 15, 1958, p. 40. More recently it was reported that the aim
of the American unions is to obtain for seamen serving on "runaway" ships the
American wage scales " . . . in most cases double and frequently treble those of Eu-
rcipean Maritime nations .... ." Ibid., Aug. 19, 1959, p. 58.
) Ibid., Nov. 15, 1958, p. 40. 20 Ibid., Nov. 30, 1958, p. 48.
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While American unions demand the return of vessels to the Ameri-
can flag, indications are they were more interested in obtaining con-
tracts than in a return to the native colors.
"It is immaterial to us whether these ships come back under the
United States flag" said a spokesman for the Seafarers International
Union, one of two large maritime unions involved in the boycott.
21
The perspectives which inspire the shipping interests are equally matters
of common knowledge. Thus Professor Sorensen, a proponent of the
"genuine link" test, after alluding to certain unspecified abuses by states
of their freedom to prescribe the conditions of the attribution of their na-
tionality to ships, summarizes as follows:
The problem of registration under flags of convenience was first
raised by the International Transport Workers' Federation shortly
after the Second World War as a problem affecting the economic and
social security of seafarers. Because of improved conditions in the
many modern ships registered under flags of convenience, the emphasis
has shifted since then. The problem is now also viewed as one of
economic competition between the merchant fleets of traditionally
maritime countries and the new and efficient vessels operating with
lower costs under the flags of countries to which they are attached
only by the administrative formality of registration.
2;'
No less specific is a report on shipping by the Organization for European
Economic Co-operation which states:
. .. [the] virtual freedom from taxation of ships sailing under the
flags of convenience enables many of the shipowners concerned so to
arrange their business enterprises that their profits are not liable to
taxation in any country. They are thus able to devote to the expan-
sion and development of their fleets that proportion of their profits
which their competitors in other countries have to set aside to meet
tax requirements.
21 F. W. Roevekamp, The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2, 1958, p. 2.
22Loc. cit. note 8 above, at 203. (Emphasis added. Throughout this article
emphases are ours unless indicated otherwise.)
In 1949, the International Dockers' and Seafarers' Conference adopted a resolution
in which it was stated:
"Having heard reports from Britain, Holland, Norway and Sweden about the sale
to Panamanian registry of ships which are obsolete or uneconomic or which could not
continue operation under their original flags because they no longer satisfy the survey,
safety and other requirements of those countries...
"Condemns the practice as menacing the established standards of the shipping in-
dustry and calculated to place the traditional maritime countries at a serious dis-
advantage." I.L.O., Conditions in Ships Flying the Panama Flag 46 (1950).
Invited to elaborate on these charges by the I.L.O. Committee of Enquiry, especially
established to investigate the matter, Mr. Oldenbroek, General Secretary of the Interna-
tional Transport Workers' Federation, described the conditions of, and in, these ships
as "chaotic," "very old," "lacking discipline" and with low standards of safety.
Requested by the I.L.O. Committee of Enquiry to supply "more specific and detailed in-
formation on the charges brought by the I.T.F.,"' Mr. Oldenbroek promised to comply
within a fortnight. However, "despite repeated requests," the Committee was com-
pelled to report with "regret" that "except for one or two vague and meagre documents,
none of the information in question was received from the I.T.F." Tbid. at 4, 5 and 7.
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The real effect of such registrations is to bring the high operating
costs incurred by ships registered in the U. S. down to a level nearer
that of the general run in the countries of their foreign competitors.
In a sense, therefore, it is the removal of a handicap rather than the
gaining of an advantage which flows from these particular transfers.
23
A further illustration of the same perspectives is provided by the following
comment:
British and Norwegian shipowners have been pressing for some solu-
tion to the convenience fleet problem by urging that all ships be able to
prove that a "genuine link" exists between vessels and the flags they
carry. However they have encountered great difficulty in defining
the term "genuine link."
They have therefore welcomed actions taken by trade unions against
convenience ships.2
4
Thus, although on the question of boycott in an unusual solidarity with
their employees, the shipowners in traditional maritime countries, never-
theless, "admitted these measures did not constitute effective answers to
the threat they faced from flag-of-convenience shipping." 25 The variety
of ills affecting the shipping industry is more fully summarized by the
president of the United Kingdom Chamber of Shipping, who sees British
shipping interests endangered not only by the flags of convenience but by
two more "deadly enemies," flag discrimination and subsidized merchant
marines.'-  Some indication of the realism of the concern exhibited by
maritime nations for their competitive position is indicated by an editorial
comment in a British business magazine:
23 Quoted in New York Times, April 6, 1958, p. 78, col. 1. Apparently the reference,
unavailable to us, is to "Study on the Expansion of the Flags of Convenience Fleets
and Various Aspects Thereof," O.E.E.C. Doe. C (57), Jan. 28, 1958, cited in Sorensen,
lot. tit. note 8 above, at 203, note 9.
4 New York Times, Aug. 31, 1958, § 5, p. 11.
25 Ibid.
.6 Mr. Robert D. Ropner in New York Times, Nov. 20, 1958, p. 70. Lord Winster 's
list of complaints is even longer. Here are some samples:
(1) "For instance, there is the question of subsidies."1
(2) "The trouble is that the depreciation allowed for taxation purposes is not
proportionate to current replacement rates; and that fact, coupled with inflation, makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for shipowners to replace ships out of earnings."
(3) "Freight rates have fallen catastrophically .... "
(4) " ... there is today far too much tonnage in existence for too little cargo."
(5) "In shipbuilding, costs continue to rise."
(6) "An allied handicap to our shipping is flag discrimination.... The evil is on
the increase." 208 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords 323-330 (March 20, 1958).
It should not be supposed that the pot and the kettle are any more distinguishable
here than in other contexts. Thus Viscount Runciman conceded:
"Indeed, I think it would be quite difficult for us in this country to complain unduly
of people using other flags than their own for the purpose of reducing their costs of
operation. I have only to remind your Lordships of the considerable volume of
Canadian-owned tonnage which is registered in this country at present for precisely
that reason-a fact of which I do not think any of us is likely to complain. After all,
to a certain point we must recognise that 'fair's fair.' " 208 Parliamentary Debates,
Hou.se of Lords 341 (March 20, 1958).
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The argument from safety often levelled against "Panholib" regis-
tered shipping ... ignores certain facts. While it may be true that
"Panholib" shipping is not regulated by legislation so stringent in
matters concerning safety, health and welfare as that of traditional
maritime nations, Panholib vessels in practice tend to be newer, with
obvious advantages. And the vessels are classed and insured in the
same way as those in traditional fleets; one need hardly say that
insurers, perhaps less optimistic but equally as interested as Govern-
ments in respect of the subject matter of their policies, set their own
standards, which are naturally high.
2
1
DEMANDED REMEDIES DANGEROUS AND UNECONOMIC
It is believed that the innovations found in Article 5 of the Geneva Con-
vention derive from certain fundamental misconceptions of problems and
relevant policies. These innovations fail to distinguish the many very
different types of problems in which the national character of ships is a
factor, to delineate the policies uniquely relevant to the different types of
problems, and to recommend remedies appropriate to the different problems.
These innovations further completely misconceive the function served in
maintaining a shared competence over the oceans by states' attributions
of their national character to vessels and the varying degrees of importance
that should be ascribed to these attributions on many different problems.
In justifiable endeavor to correct certain acknowledged evils, they recom-
mend remedies which are both uneconomic in relation to the specific evils
to which they are addressed and positively dangerous in that they imperil
many still cherished policies of the international law of the sea.
Even the most casual inspection of the recommendations submitted to the
International Labor Organization, quoted above, indicates that the problems
about which labor is genuinely and appropriately concerned are very dif-
27 5 Business Law Rev. 62-63 (1958). This statement, as far as it concerns the alleged
abuses of safety by the vessels flying the flags of convenience, finds its most eloquent
corroboration in the following words of the chairman of the American Bureau of Ship-
ping, where the majority of these vessels are classified:
"The inference has frequently been drawn that the ships of these fleets are sub-
standard with respect to design, maintenance, safety equipment, et cetera ....
"It can be truthfully said with respect to those ships classed by the bureau that any
such implications are unwarranted. From the standpoint of original design, mainte-
nance and safety, the ships of these fleets compare most favorably with the fleets of any
other of the maritime nations in which the bureau has active participation.
"There is in some quarters a belief that the fleets of Liberian and Panamanian
registry are comprised largely of older ships sold out from under the flags of original
registry as they are replaced by newer and more modern ships. Such beliefs are com-
pletely unfounded." New York Times, Jan. 28, 1959, p. 61.
Similarly, in a major address in the House of Lords, Lord Winster stated: "Some-
times people speak to me as if this tonnage under flags of convenience were comparable
with the kind of second-hand motor car that one sees for sale outside garages on the
Great West Road. It is not second-hand tonnage at all. The greater part of it is new
and efficient tonnage. Some 35 per cent. of the tonnage under these flags is under five
years old. Our comparative figure is 22 per cent., so we must not imagine that this is
second-hand tonnage." 208 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords 329 (March 20,
1958).
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ferent problems from those involved in the maintenance of the public order
of the high seas with respect to which high certainty and easy precision in
identification of the national character of vessels is so important. It will
be observed that these problems which concern labor are essentially related
to usual labor unions' demands such as better working conditions, higher
wages, better and more abundant job opportunities, greater sharing in
profits derived from maritime commerce and trade, more comprehensive
social security, and the like. However much one may, and does, sympathize
with these objectives of seafarers, it should not be overlooked that the
perspectives behind the proposals submitted to the International Labor
Organization by the representatives of labor embrace so many irrelevant
and abuse-prone standards that, should they be adopted as conditions upon
which to base the recognition of states' ascription of their national character
to ships, the unimpeded flow of ocean trade would be placed in serious
jeopardy. It does not seem that the most economic sanction for these
standards should be a denial of the validity of a state's attribution of na-
tional character to vessels. On the contrary, the authorization of such
denial by unilateral decision of other states, as proposed, must necessarily
endanger the freedom of the seas and in particular the most vital element
of this freedom-freedom of access.28  Certainly there are available alterna-
tives for the establishment and maintenance of appropriate labor standards
which do not involve such disproportionate risk.
It is equally obvious that the principal problem with which the shipping
interests are concerned, that is, the maintenance of their competitive posi-
tion in world maritime commerce and trade, is also a very different prob-
lem from those with which the traditional law of the sea is concerned. The
problem with which the shipping interests are concerned is basically that
of competition within the industry. Thus, Professor Sorensen again pro-
vides the best testimony to this by correctly stating that what is really at
stake "is a problem of the regulation of international competition in an
important industry rather than a problem of the law of the sea." 2 The
drastic innovation proposed in the "genuine link" requirement for deter-
mining the nationality of ships not only is no solution to this problem of
competition, but, by permitting unilateral decision to interfere with
traditional inclusive uses, may positively endanger appropriate solution.
The whole of the international law of the sea, including both basic policies
and jurisdictional principles, has long been based upon the historically
verified postulate that the greatest production of values for the entire
community is to be achieved by the highest degree of internationalization,
with the freest access by all, and with only those restraints necessary to safe-
guard productivity and the fewest possible restraints in favor of particular
28 It was reported that some Geneva Conference "observers" interpreted the mean-
ing of the genuine link standard as follows: "A nation unfriendly to the United States
could, by applying the genuine link criterion, refuse to recognize the nationality of a
Liberian ship owned by United States interests" and "delay the ship, refuse to admit
her to port, or at worst, seize the ship and her cargo." New York Times, April 9,
1958, p. 66.
) Loc. cit. note 8 above, at 205.
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exclusive national interests. Any unnecessary interference with the
traditional freedoms of access and shared competence can be expected only
to reduce the total amount of values created for sharing among all par-
ticipants in the exploitation of the oceans. Instead of attempting to dill
the goose that lays the golden egg, states finding themselves in a difficult
competitive position might well consider appropriate changes in their own
fiscal and tax legislation or, perhaps, a more economic allocation of their
resources.30 A commentator in a British business magazine has provided
a sober suggestion. He states:
The balance can be reversed by measures designed to relieve the
"traditional" shipowner of the burden of taxation to a considerable
extent, but the rights and wrongs of such a course are matters of
economics and politics, not law.3 '
So far, at least one state has taken this course and the results have already
abundantly proved that action on a national level can bring about desired
outcomes most rapidly and at least cost.
32
THE DERIVATION FROM NOTTEBOnM
It is perhaps worth noting that certain of the contemporary misconcep-
tions about the r6le of the nationality of ships appear to derive from
over-extrapolations of the Nottebohm decision. The International Law
30 Addressing the meeting of the representatives of the United States and nine West
European nations held in June, 1959, in Washington, D. C., Under Secretary of State
Dillon said:
"To the extent that there is actual tax avoidance through the use of tax havens, it
seems to me that this is, first and foremost, a problem for the tax authorities in the
particular country whose taxes are being avoided. This is obviously a complex problem
with ramifications far beyond the shipping field. As a practical matter, if differences
in national tax policies cause difficulties for shipowners, it would appear that the solu-
tion, at least in the short run, may have to be found by the individual country which
considers that its own shipowners are operating at a competitive disadvantage." 41
Dept. of State Bulletin 14 (1959).
Viscount Simon, a former President of the British Chamber of Shipping, in a debate
on merchant marine in the House of Lords, described the causes of the ills which burden
the British shipping industry very realistically:
"I think it is perfectly clear that there are only two things which are really re-
sponsible for this languishing position. One is unavoidable. It is the fact that
shipping is an international business in which the British shipping industry is in
competition with the whole world, and therefore the rate of reward must be less than
the rates in more sheltered industries. And because the reward is less, it is more
difficult to attract capital. . . . The other difficulty under which we languish is the
burden of tax. It is not merely the level of taxation but the system as applied to
industry....
"The position would clearly be serious enough, even if there were not the matter of
flags of convenience, to which reference has been made." 208 Parliamentary Debates,
House of Lords 356-357 (March 20, 1958).
315 Business Law Rev. 63 (1958). In citing this stricture for our purpose we are
not to be taken as approving the distinction between law and politics.
32 Thus, during a single year, the Greek merchant fleet gained 955,083 gross register
tons, much of which "Ihas been attracted to the Greek flag by the revision of the nation's
maritime legislation." New York Times, Sept. 8, 1959, p. 56.
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Commission seems to have been the first to attempt to transplant the prin-
ciple of "real and effective" link there enunciated into the wholly different
environment of the law of the sea. In seeking to provide an "account
of the background" to the Commission's articles on the law of the sea for
the use of the General Assembly, the United Nations Secretariat observed:
In connexion with the question of the nationality of ships, it may be
noted that, in the Nottebohm case, the International Court of Justice
enunciated certain principles concerning the duty of one State to
recognize the nationality legislation of another State. Although this
case concerned the nationality of individuals ... the Court considered
the matter of nationality in general terms. It is possible, therefore,
that some of the principles laid down by the Court may be relevant to
the question of the nationality of ships; in particular, to the question of
the circumstances under which one State may or may not be obliged
to recognize the national character of ships of other States.33
This suggestion was readily accepted by Mr. Watts, who begins his article
on the protection of merchant ships with the statement that "the right to
protect a ship does not necessarily belong to the State whose nationality
that ship has, nor is the legitimacy of ascribing to a ship a nationality of
its own acceptable without question," basing these views on both the de-
cision of the International Court in the Nottebohm Case and the acceptance
and extension of the principle there enunciated by the International Law
Commission in its draft Article 29 (now Article 5 of the convention) .4
Professor Sorensen is even more explicit in dependence on the Nottebohni
decision:
It is well established that each state has the right to determine the
conditions under which it will grant its nationality to an individual,
but a state is not in all circumstances bound to respect a naturalization
effected by another state. Only if the grant of nationality is based
upon a genuine connection between the state and the individuals, and
is thus the legal expression of a real and effective nationality, can it be
invoked against foreign states as a valid legal act.
3 5
The reliance placed by Professor Jessup upon the Nottebohrm Case has
already been mentioned. Spokesmen from New Zealand and Norway at
the Geneva Conference also referred to the Nottebohm decision as pro-
viding a useful analogy. Thus the representative of New Zealand stated:
If any State purported to confer its nationality upon an individual,
that action would not, in ordinary circumstances, be questioned by
other States. But, in the exceptional case, other States had the right
to look behind the form and to examine the substance. The principle
of the "genuine link" embodied a parallel rule in regard to the na-
tionality of ships, and the granting of a flag must not be a mere ad-
ministrative formality.3
33 U.N. General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Agenda Item 53, Annexes, p.
29 (1956-1957).
a' Lo. cit. note 14, at 52. 35 Loc. cit. note 8, at 204.
36 31r. Waite, speaking in the Second Committee. United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. IV, Second Committee (High Seas: General
Regime), p. 65, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 13/40 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Official Records
with appropriate volume number).
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THE NOTTEBOHM DECISION SLIGHTLY OVER-EXTRAPOLATED
It is not difficult to demonstrate that the policy which the International
Court of Justice regarded itself as applying in the Nottebohm Case has
little, if any, relevance to problems in which the conclusiveness of a state's
attributions of nationality to a ship is at stake. Thus, the Court itself very
strictly delimited the scope of its decision. To counsel's argument that
"the essential question is whether Mr. Nottebohm, having acquired the
nationality of Liechtenstein, that acquisition of nationality is one which
must be recognized by other States," 3 7 the Court responded:
This formulation is accurate, subject to the twofold reservation that,
in the first place, what is involved is not recognition for all purposes
but merely for the purposes of the admissibility of the Application,
and, secondly, that what is involved is not recognition by all States
but only by Guatemala.38
Guatemala, the Court emphasized, had been the "main seat" of Nottebohm's
activities for 34 years and remained "the center of his interests and of his
business activities"; Nottebohm had been a German national from birth
and had shown no desire to "dissociate himself from the government of
his country"; Nottebohm's "actual connections with Liechtenstein were
extremely tenuous" and "it was impossible to disregard the circumstances,"
including the fact that Germany was at war, under which Liechtenstein
had conferred its nationality.3 9 Even with respect to individuals, not to
mention ships, the scope of the Court's actual decision is, accordingly, 3nost
severely confined. The Court makes clear, further, that the prior decisions
upon which it depends most heavily in creating its new concept of "genuine
link" are cases of "dual nationality." In such cases, arbitrators, the
Court states, "have given their preference to the real and effective na-
tionality, that which accorded with the facts, that based on stronger factual
ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality
is involved." 4 0  By accepted principles regarding the competence of
states to confer nationality upon individuals, several states may confer
their nationality upon the same individual, even though that individual
never budges from the hamlet of his birth; hence, the attribution of no
one state can be regarded as automatically conclusive, and international
decision-makers must have criteria for choice.4 1 With respect to ships, in
37 [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 17. 38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. at 24-26. 40 Ibid. at 22.
41 On many problems, international practice has of course attributed a very high
degree of conclusiveness to a state's attribution of nationality to an individual. Briggs,
The Law of Nations 471 (2d ed., 1952); Parry, "The Duty to Recognise Foreign Na-
tionality Laws," 19 Zeitschrift fr Ausliindisches Recht und V6lkerrecht 337 (1958);
Weiss, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law 200 et seq. (1956); Silving,
"Nationality in Comparative Law," 5 A. 5. Comp. Law 410 (1956). This policy
reinforces the policy we recommend for vessels.
The special difficulty with respect to individuals is, as indicated in the text, that an
individual may lawfully acquire more than one nationality. In such instances, when
different states make competing claims to the same individual, a tribunal must choose
between claims and, if the decision is to be a "reasoned" decision in terms of com-
munity policy, must necessarily establish some criteria of choice. In establishing such
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contrast, by principle which has never been directly questioned, attribution
of nationality by one state precludes all subsequent attributions so long
as the first endures, and international decision-makers are confronted by
no necessity to choose between competing claimants. The criteria which
the Court specifies for giving content to its concept of "genuine link" are,
again, quite clearly relevant only to human beings and wholly inapplicable
to inanimate objects, like ships. The Court states:
the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important
factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of his interests,
his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by
him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.
42
Later the Court refers to "demographic factors" and describes nationality
as
a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties.
43
To derive from applications of criteria of this type to the competence of
states to confer nationality upon individuals, principles assumed to be
relevant to limiting the competence of states to attribute nationality to
ships is, if not an exercise in irrelevancy, certainly a disguised mode of
stating that because certain limits have been imposed on states with respect
to individuals for some problems, other limits ought to be imposed with
respect to ships for other problems.
44
It is by no means clear, furthermore, precisely what generalizations may
be derived from the Nottebo7on Case for projections into the future as
dependable or desirable policy even with respect to individuals. The de-
cision in the case has been severely criticized by commentators for the
limitations which it imposes upon the international protection of human
criteria, the policies so vaguely adumbrated in the concept "genuine link" could per-
haps be elaborated by appropriate operational indices to serve community purposes.
With respect to vessels, however, this necessity for establishing criteria for choice
between competing claimant states does not arise. The insistent requirements of public
order upon the high seas have forced states to establish a simple rule of priority in
time: the first attribution of national character to a vessel precludes all later attribu-
tions. To superimpose upon this clear and easily applicable policy any further require-
ments, which states may use at their unilateral discretion, to the genuineness of the first
attribution would be entirely to defeat this policy.
42 [1955] I.0.J. Rep. 4, at 22. 43Ibid. at 23.
44 The Court placed great emphasis upon "special circumstances" under which the
change of Nottebohm's nationality had been obtained and in no doubtful terms ex-
pressed its conviction that the real purpose of the change was "to enable him to
'subtitute for his status as a national of a belligerent state that of a national of a
neutral state." Ibid. at 26. "Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a na-
tionality granted in such circumstances," concluded the Court. Ibid.
Throughout its decision the Court stresses the importance of allegiance, motivation,
spiritual association and similar mental processes-all of which are quite obviously inap-
plicable to inanimate vessels. To read the Nottebohm decision as supporting the
"(genuine link" doctrine with respect to vessels indeed requires both great imagination
and disregard for some all-inportant physical and legal factors.
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rights,45 and there is much cogency in some of the reasoning in the dis-
senting opinions. The remarks of Judge Read about the importance of
not permitting unilateral challenges upon undefined grounds of a state's
act in attributing nationality to individuals might be more persuasive, in
affecting the course of future decision, than the majority opinion. Judge
Read summarized:
Nationality, and the relation between a citizen and the State to
which he owes allegiance, are of such a character that they demand
certainty. When one considers the occasions for invoking the rela-
tionship-emigration and immigration; travel; treason; exercise of
political rights and functions; military service and the like-it be-
comes evident that certainty is essential. There must be objective
tests, readily established, for the existence and recognition of the
status. That is why the practice of States has steadfastly rejected
vague and subjective tests for the right to confer nationality-sin-
cerity, fidelity, durability, lack of substantial connection-and has
clung to the rule of the almost unfettered discretionary power of the
State, as embodied in Article I of The Hague Draft Convention of
1931.
Nationality and diplomatic protection are closely inter-related. The
general rule of international law is that nationality gives rise to a
right of diplomatic protection.
4 6
Whatever the importance of certainty, and whatever the course of future
decision, with respect to individuals, however, differences in the context of
interaction and the fundamental community problems presented make
certainty of national character an indispensable policy with respect to
ships. The fact of decisive significance, in distinguishing the policy re-
quirements relating to ships from those relating to individuals, is the fact
that the conclusiveness of a state's attributions of national character to
vessels is, in the present decentralized world arena, indispensably necessary
to protect that state's share in the inclusive competence of all states over the
oceans.47  The nationality of individuals, however important to state
power and human rights, serves no comparable community function.
45 'One cannot, however, view with much confidence the development of an interna-
tional jurisprudence on the basis of the link theory without any reference to the criteria
in the light of which it is to be applied. Whatever these criteria may be they must
certainly result in the creation of fresh, and potentially large, classes of unprotected
persons. The effects of judicial 'legislation' in the sphere of municipal law can be
limited or corrected by true legislation; in the international field this is not possible."
Jones, "The Nottebohm Case," 5 Int. and Comp. Law Q. 230, at 244 (1956). See also
Parry, "Some Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in International Law,"
90 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 657, at 705 et seq. (II, 1956); Simpson and Fox,
International Arbitration 107 (1959).
46 [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read, p. 46. Article 1 of the
Convention Concerning Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws,
signed at The Hague on April 12, 1930, provides: "It is for each State to determine
under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States
in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and
the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality." 5 Hudson, In-
ternational Legislation 364 (1936).
47 Upon many problems, such as those said to relate to the "internal affairs" of a
business enterprise, international practice has accorded a very high degree of ir-
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MANIFOLD DANGERS TO SHARED USE AN COMPETENCE
The dangers for the free and ordered use of a great common resource
on the basis of equality and certainty of expectations, which such an ill-
conceived innovation as the "genuine link" requirement creates, can hardly
be exaggerated. As the Mlexican delegate at the Geneva Conference
emphasized,
by conceding to other states the right to decide for themselves whether
there was a genuine link between the ship and the flag state, the Com-
mission had opened the door to the creation of insoluble prob-
lems.... 48
The dangers inherent in according the states an uncontrollable unilateral
discretion to question and deny other states' ascription of nationality to
their ships are manifold. It might lead to the treating on the high seas of
ships of other states as stateless with all the consequences which attach to
ships without nationality; it might permit some states arbitrarily to de-
prive other states of their hitherto universally recognized equal right to
sail ships on the high seas; it might lead to the denial of the right of in-
nocent passage through the territorial sea to such ships and the exclusion
from access to internal waters and ports, and it would certainly encourage
discrimination in international sea commerce. Observers who find analogies
in the law about individuals for the law of ships must regard the creation
of a new category of statelessness as highly ironical in an era marked by
efforts to reduce, if not eliminate, statelessness of individuals. 9 It seems
pertinent here to quote statements made by responsible officials of two
traditional maritime nations which have given their support to the "gen-
uine link" concept and yet who could not fail to detect the hazards of this
innovation. In an answer to the pressures exercised upon the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom to take some positive action against flags of
portance to the fact of a state's attributing its national character to the enterprise.
2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 74-80 (1947); American Law Institute, Restatement, Con-
flict of Laws § 197 (1934); Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law 62 (1954).
The policies underlying these decisions we may appropriately invoke in support of our
recommendation with respect to vessels.
The representatives of a business enterprise may, however, operate within the exclu-
sive public order domains of many different states and more than one state may law-
fully attribute its national character to the enterprise. The impacts of the peripatetic
activities of the representatives of business may be felt in many different states and the
factors which may affect a rational allocation of competence among states for prescribing
and applying policy to such activities may include many more items than the facts of
attribution of national character. The policy relevance of different attributions of na-
tional character thus varies from problem to problem. Most importantly, few of the
problems have much in common, policywise, with the problems of maintaining full
access to, and shared enjoyment of, a common resource such as the oceans.
Note, further, the high degree of immunity that a state may confer upon a business
enterprise by clothing it in a governmental corporation. Brandon, "Sovereign Im-
munity of Government Owned Corporations and Ships," 39 Cornell Law Q. 425 (1954).
484 Official Records 29.
19 In fairness, we mean only those observers with a certain sense of consistency.
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convenience, Lord Mancroft, explaining his government's standpoint on
the subject, declared in the House of Lords:
I believe that the House is also well aware by now that there is no
easy or quick solution to this threat. Because of the nature of the
British merchant fleet, we have to be very careful lest any action taken
by Her Majesty's Government may harm British shipping more than
"Panlibhonco" owners. The British merchant fleet exists and pros-
pers on the free exchange of shipping services. It is therefore most
important that we should not take any action against flags of con-
venience which is any way discriminatory or restrictive, because in
the long run that might, by a chain effect, lead to the placing of re-
strictions elsewhere on the operation of British ships.50
Mr. Pfeiffer, a delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany, warned the
Geneva Conference:
If article 29 [now Article 5] were adopted as drafted, it was con-
ceivable that in many cases ships could no longer be registered by
states offering convenient conditions, owing to the lack of a genuine
link between the state and the ship, but would also not qualify for
registration in the state with which they had a genuine link, because
of the strict conditions imposed. The regrettable result would be that
the ship concerned would be condemned to statelessness by interna-
tional law."
Thus, instead of achieving its proclaimed goal, i.e., greater uniformity and
stability, the concept of a genuine link as formulated in the convention
would seem to be destined to bring about totally undesirable results: con-
fusion, uncertainty, arbitrary unilateral action, and lack of harmony in
the common enjoyment of the oceans.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RATIONAL INQUIRY AND RECOMMENDATION
The full exposition of these multiple, dangerous misconceptions and the
establishment of more rational perspectives must require comprehensive
and realistic orientation in the interrelated processes of interaction, claim,
and decision which constitute states' shared enjoyment of the oceans, and,
through this orientation, the careful distinction of varying problems,
relevant policies, and appropriate remedies. The controversies in which
claims are made that the national character of a vessel is a factor relevant
to decision will be seen to range from those in which the common interests
of states in the shared use of the oceans are at stake in very high degree,
such as with respect to events occurring upon the high seas or in contiguous
zones, territorial seas, or internal waters, to those in which such common
interests are at stake in only modest degree, such as with respect to claims
arising from the mere presence of a valuable asset, the ship, within the
domain of effective control of a territorial community. The projection
of a rational general community policy with respect to these very differ-
ent problems, including determination of the degree of conclusiveness which
should be accorded states' attribution of national character to vessels, must,
50 208 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords 369 (March 20, 1958).
51 4 Official Records 11-12.
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accordingly, entail certain further more specific tasks: first, the clarification
of the detailed policies relevant to each particular type of problem, in a
manner designed to secure both the inclusive interests of states in the
enjoyment of the oceans and their exclusive interests in their internal
processes, and allocating that significance to states' attributions of national
character to vessels which is most appropriate to this end; next, the study
of past trends in decision, and of the factors affecting decision, with respect
to the different types of problems, for the purpose of appraising the policy
relevance of this experience for probable future conditions; and, finally,
the recommendation of appropriate alternatives in principle and procedure
for the future.
We begin by noting in broad outline the processes of interaction, claim
and decision, and move then to the clarification of policies, the observation
of past practices, and the making of certain recommendations.
THE PROCESS OF INTERACTION
1. Participants
Every inhabitant of the globe is obviously a participant in interactions
affected by the common enjoyment of the oceans and a beneficiary of their
shared use. The interacting participants who have engaged in actual use
of the oceans have included all states, coastal and land-locked, large and
small, and countless individuals and private organizations who have
achieved access by operating vessels upon which the states have conferred
their national character. In every interaction upon the oceans the most
significant fact is that the vessels by which the participants interact, if
their interactions are lawful, are identified by their national character.
Among future participants we may anticipate international govern-
mental organizations, making a direct use of the oceans by vessels to which
they attribute an international character.
52
2. Objectives
The most general objective of each participant has been, of course, to
maximize its own values, and values sought by different participants have
embraced the whole spectrum of human demand. The great diversity of
the specific goals sought extends to every phase of all the various value
processes, characteristic of contemporary communities, which we have else-
where described in terms of power, wealth, skill, respect, well-being, en-
lightenment, rectitude and solidarity.5"
2 The Geneva Convention on the High Seas explicitly provides for such a possibility
in Article 7, which reads:
"The provisions of the preceding articles do not prejudice the question of ships em-
ployed on the official service of an intergovernmental organization flying the flag of
the organization."
53 See, for illustration, McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Com-
munity Perspectives Versus National Egoism," 67 Yale Law J. 539, at 569-570 (1958).
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3. Situations
The outstanding characteristic of situations in which interactions occur
in shared exploitation of the oceans is that these situations embrace both
areas upon the high seas, free from the exclusive public order of any par-
ticular state, and areas under varying degrees of exclusive control by
coastal states.
The time element of interaction may also be important because of the
prevalence of varying degrees of expectation of violence between two
polar extremes of peace and war. Interactions on the oceans are, of
course, inextricably interlinked with interactions on the land masses and
have been the great channels of communication by which the territorial
communities of the world have been knit into a single global social com-
munity process. "On the oceans" quite obviously must be construed to
include "over" and "under."
4. Base Values
The base values which the different participants engaging in the use of
the oceans may bring to bear in support of their activities range over all
the values at the disposal of such participants for all their purposes. The
resources of the land masses of the world are at the disposal of partici-
pants for increasing the values they seek upon the oceans, just as the
resources of the oceans are at their disposal for increasing the values they
seek upon the land masses.
The unique base value employed upon the oceans is of course the ship.
Because ships may be employed by or on behalf of all states, great and
small, the oceans have been referred to as the "great equalizer." The suc-
cess of some small states which, throughout history, have been able to
capitalize upon their special geographical position, skills and enlightenment,
bears eloquent witness to the importance of this r6le of the oceans.
5. Strategies
The strategies employed by participants to affect outcomes equally in-
elude all relevant instruments of policy: economic, diplomatic, ideological
and military. As is necessary in a domain of shared competence, emphasis
in strategy has been on peaceful, consensual modalities rather than upon
coercive ones, and, through an elaborate structure of mutual tolerances and
reciprocal deference, a highly co-ordinated process of co-operative enjoy-
ment has been attained with the minimum of concentrated political power.
The most distinguishing characteristic of this regime of mutual restraint
has been unquestioned deference by states to their respective attributions
of national character to vessels.
6. Outcomes
The immense production of values for all participants in the shared use
of the oceans, as the argosies of many different states have plied the sea
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lanes of the globe, needs no elaborate documentation. States have been
able to secure in high degree all the characteristic values of such territorial
communities and especially the vast enhancement of their bases of power
in such values as wealth, skill, respect and enlightenment. Individuals
and private groups, identifying themselves with many different states,
through attributions of national character to vessels, have been able to
achieve their commercial and other value goals in similarly high degree.
7. Effects
The expanding consequences of these outcomes for the continuous benefit
of all mankind are no less obvious. All peoples, even those who do not
themselves directly engage in activities upon the oceans, gain from the
maintenance of the oceans as the primary highways for the interchange of
goods and services, from one end of the globe to the other, and as a vast
reservoir of food and other resources.
8. Conditions
The most important of the conditions affecting this rich production of
values has been the willingness of states to make the accommodations neces-
sary to shared use and shared competence, such as are expressed, for
example, in the "rules of the road" and in the deference to each other's
attributions of national character to vessels. These accommodations have
permitted, among other things, an economic division of labor and the em-
ployment of capital and skills in ways designed to promote the highest
productivity. Freedom of access by all states, the employment of skilled
personnel of all nationalities, the opportunity to experiment in national tax
and fiscal structures, and many other factors, have operated to maintain
initiative and the most intense co-operative activity on a global scale. 54
Tvw PROCESS OF CLAM
In the course of the process of interaction by which peoples enjoy the
shared use of the oceans, controversies continuously arise relating to agree-
ments and deprivations occurring both in the activities upon the oceans and
in the activities upon the land masses. The parties to these controversies
commonly make claims in varying arenas of authority, both international
and national, with respect to the lawfulness of the value changes effected
by such agreements and deprivations. These claims embrace not only the
parties' perspectives of the events precipitating controversy, but also their
demands for specific redress and all the justifications, technical and policy,
which they invoke in support of their demands. This process of claim may
be briefly characterized in terms of the claimants, their objectives, the
specific types of demands asserted, and the conditions which peculiarly
affeet their assertion.
n4 For a more Ystematic statement of these conditioning factors see ibid. at 556.
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1. Claimants
The claimants who invoke processes of authority include the whole gamut
of participants in the world social process-most importantly, nation-states,
private associations and individuals.
2. Objectives
The objective sought by the state-participants are, of course, to secure
their inclusive interests in the shared use of the oceans and their exclusive
interests in the value processes of their land masses and immediately
adjacent waters. The objectives of the private participants are to protect
their varying property, commercial and other interests.
The specific types of claims which states make against each other, both
on their own account and on the account of the private participants, com-
prise a hierarchy of interrelated demands. These specific types of claims,
like the controversies from which they originate, relate to the whole of the
events comprised in the world social process, ranging from those immedi-
ately affecting the shared use of the oceans to those only indirectly af-
fecting such shared use and primarily affecting the internal processes of
states.
The claims with respect to events more directly affecting the shared use
of the oceans include such various types of demand as follows: demands
to attribute national character to vessels; the basic demands for free and
unimpeded use of the oceans; demands primarily concerned with jurisdic-
tion, that is, the prescription and application of authority to vessels and
to events on board vessels; demands to protect vessels from unlawful as-
sertions of authority by other states and demands relating to the criteria
for identifying the national character of vessels.
The specific types of claims about events not directly affecting the shared
use of the oceans embrace all of the activities with which private interna-
tional law has historically concerned itself and may relate to any phase
of any value process. In controversies presenting claims of this type the
national character of a vessel may be but one factor among many in the
context which are relevant to disposition of the claims. For inquiry into
the different types of claims to ascertain the policy relevance of the na-
tional character of vessels, and the importance of the conclusiveness of a
state's attribution of national character, we propose a breakdown under
the following headings:
I. CLAIMS RELATING TO CONTROL OVER SHIPS
A. CLAIMS TO ATTRIBUTE NATIONAL CHARACTER TO SHIPS
B. CLAIMS TO PROTECT SHIPS TO WHICH NATIONAL CHARACTER HAS BEEN
ATTRIBUTED AGAINST UNLAWFUL ASSERTIONS OF AUTHORITY BY OTHER
STATES
C. CLAIMS TO CONTROL TTE MOVEMENT AND ACTIVITIES OF SHIPS TO
WHICH NATIONAL CHARACTER HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED
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D. CLAIMS TO PRESCRIBE FOR DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP AMONG CON-
TENDING CLAIMANTS
E. CLAIMS TO REQUISITION NATIONAL SHIPS OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL DOMAIN
II. CLAIMS TO ACCESS AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
A. CLAIMS TO ACCESS
1. Claims to Access to the High Seas
2. Claims to Access to Territorial Bases of Other States
3. Claims to Access to International Waterways under Special
Regime
B. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO SECURING SHARED ENJOYMENT OF FISHING
ON THE HIGH SEAS
1. Claims Relating to Fishing in Areas of Shared Use and Compe-
tence
2. Claims Relating to Fishing in Areas of Exclusive Competence
C. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO SECURING SHARED USE FOR SUBMARLNE
CABLES AND PIPELINES
D. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO SHARED USE OF AIRSPACE ABOVE THE HIGH
SEAS
III. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO EVENTS DIRECTLY AFFECTING COMMON
ENJOYMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS
A. CLAIMS TO PROTECT MINIMAL ORDER
1. Claims against Other States for the Lawful Conduct of Ships
and Aircraft to Which They Have Ascribed Their National
Character
(a) Major violations of public order
(b) Lesser deprivations
2. Claims to Repress Piracy
3. Claims with Respect to Stateless Ships
4. Claims to Take Punitive Measures Against Ships Fraudulently
Changing Flags on the High Seas
5. Claims to Prevent Use of Ships in Slave Trade
B. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO SECURING SAFE AND ORDERED NAVIGATION
1. Claims to Conform with Internationally Adopted Rules of the
Road and Regulations for the Prevention of Collision at Sea
2. Claims to Conform with International Standards Concerning the
Use of Signals and Maintenance of Communications
3. Claims with Respect to Construction, Equipment and Seaworthi-
ness of Ships
4. Claims Relating to Adequate Manning and Competent Crew
5. Claims Relating to Assistance to Persons and Ships in Distress
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C. CLAIMS RELATING TO CONTROL OF POLLUTION
1. Claims with Respect to Pollution of the High Seas and/or Air-
space Above
(a) By discharge of oil from ships or pipelines
(b) From exploitation of the seabed and subsoil
(c) From the disposal of radio-active waste
(d) Resulting from any activities with radio-active materials or
other harmful agents
D. CLAIMS TO TEMPORARY EXCLUSIVE USE IN NON-CONTIGUOUS AREAS OF
THE HIGH SEAS AND AIRSPACE ABOVE
1. Claims to Exclude Temporarily Non-National Ships or Aircraft
from Certain Delimited Portions of the Oceans for purposes of:
(a) Naval maneuvers
(b) Nuclear experiments of great importance to national security
(e) Experimentations relating to exploration of outer space
2. Claims to Compensation for Ships, Aircraft and Individuals Who
Have Suffered Harm by Such Activities
IV. CLAIMS RELATING TO EVENTS OCCURRING ON BOARD Sinn ON THE
HIGH SEAS
A. CLAIMS RELATING TO PUBLIC ORDER OF SHIP
1. Claims Relating to the Discipline of the Crew
2. Claims Relating to Control of Passengers
B. CLAIMS RELATING TO EVENTS NOT AFFECTING PUBLIC ORDER OF SHIP
1. Claims with Respect to Deprivations
2. Claims with Respect to Agreements
3. Claims with Respect to Dispositive Acts: (a) Wills; (b) Gifts
4. Claims with Respect to Events Affecting Personal Status of
Passengers and Crew: (a) Births; (b) Marriages; (c) Deaths
V. CLAIMS TO PROTECT COASTAL INTERESTS
A. CLAIMS RELATING TO INTERNAL WATERS
1. Claims to Control of Access
2. Claims to Control Passage through Internal Waters
3. Claims to Regulate Navigation of Ships
4. Claims Relating to Control over Ships
5. Claims to Apply Authority with Respect to Events Occurring on
Board Ship
(a) Events affecting value processes beyond the ship
(b) Events only incidentally affecting value processes beyond the
ship
6. Claims to Exclusive Exploitation of Natural Resources
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B. CLAIMS RELATING TO TERRITORIAL SEA
1. Claims to Deny Access
(a) Claims to deny access absolutely
(b) Claims to deny passage as non-innocent
2. Claims to Regulate Navigation of Ships
3. Claims Relating to Control of the Ship
4. Claims to Exercise Authority over Events Aboard Ship
(a) Events affecting value processes beyond the ship
(b) Events only incidentally affecting value processes beyond
the ship
5. Claims to Deny Access to Non-National Aircraft
6. Claims to Exclusive Exploitation of Natural Resources
C. CLAIMS RELATING TO CONTIGUOUS ZONES
1. Traditional Claims: (a) Security; (b) Customs; (e) Revenue;
(d) Health
2. Claims to Exclusive Access to Fisheries Beyond the Territorial
Sea
3. Claims to Exclusive Exploitation of the Natural Resources of
Continental Shelf and Other Submarine Areas: (a) Marine re-
sources; (b) Mineral resources
D. CLAIMS RELATING TO THE DELIMITATION OF BOUNDARIES
VI. CLAIMS RELATLNG TO SEIZURE OF SHIPS FOR PURPOSES OF CIVIL
JURISDICTION
VII. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO EVENTS PRIMARILY AFFECTING VALUE
PROCESSES WITHIN TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES AND NOT DIRECTLY
RELATED TO THE ENJOYMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS
VIII. CLAIMS RELATING TO MODALITIES OF PROOF OF THE NATIONAL
CHARACTER OF VESSELS
A. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO REGISTRATION
1. State Vessels
2. Private Vessels
B. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO DOCUMENTATION
C. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO FLAG
D. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO NAME OF THE VESSEL
E. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO "GENUINE LINK"
3. Cozditions
The conditions which affect the making of these claims and the response
to such claims include all of the important variables of the contemporary
world arena. The lack of centralized authority capable of monopolizing
force in support of community authority is, of course, the most distinguish-
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ing characteristic of this arena. Nevertheless, the potentialities in un-
organized sanctioning by reciprocity and retaliation are so formidable that
claimants may enjoy moderate expectation that the processes of authorita-
tive decision will afford them a reasonable protection.
THE PROCESS OF DECISION
The process of authoritative decision, established by the general com-
munity of states for the resolution of controversies arising from the shared
use of the maritime domain, exhibits in a very high degree the primitive,
yet complex, development of organizational, jurisdictional and procedural
structures and techniques generally characteristic of international law.
Though there is frequent explicit multilateral prescription of community
policies, most decisions in application are taken by states acting unilaterally.
There is unfortunately no procedure or sanction for compelling states to
submit to third-party review of their unilateral decisions. Incentives for
the clarification of policies in the common interest and an important check
upon abuses of authority may, however, be found in the practical necessities
of everyday commerce and the inherent requirements of a decentralized
system of shared competence. The main outlines of this system may be
observed summarily under the headings of officials, objectives, strategies,
outcomes and conditions.5
1. Officials
The most important authoritative decision-makers are, of course, state
officials. The dual r6le of these officials, -who on some occasions are mere
claimants to authority, and on other occasions the authorized representatives
of the general community applying authority to the claims of others, does
not necessarily mean that they are inherently unable to identify a common
interest and incapable of taking the decisions designed to serve that in-
terest. It is indeed this dual r6le which requires the clarification of com-
mon interest and the basing of all claims upon the promise of reciprocity.
Although not participating directly in formal decision, many private
pressure groups, such as, e.g., seamen's unions and shipowners' organiza-
tions, exercise a most significant influence upon the actual course of de-
cision. The fact that some of these groups have achieved more effective
international organization than has been achieved upon the level of govern-
ment is not without policy consequences. The historic r6le of private as-
sociations performing functions indispensable to maritime commerce, such
as classification societies and insurance companies, needs no new exposition.
An ever-increasing r6le in relevant decision is being taken by interna-
tional officials, such as those in the United Nations, International Labor
Organization, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Food
and Agriculture Organization, International Telecommunications Union,
55 Gidel's three-volume work, Le Droit International Public de la Mer (1932-1934), is
still the most authoritative treatment of this process of decision; see also, Colombos,
International Law of the Sea (3d ed., 1954); Potter, Freedom of the Sea (1924).
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International Civil Aviation Organization, World Health Organization,
World Meteorological Organization, international courts, and arbitral
tribunals. The intelligence and recommending functions of these inter-
governmental organizations are of particular importance, and new pro-
posals are being made to extend the r~le of compulsory adjudication and
arbitration in the resolution of controversies.
2. Objectives
The more general objectives sought by the community of states in its
establishment of authoritative decision-makers for these controversies may
be conveniently categorized, beginning with those directly related to the
shared enjoyment of the oceans, and moving to others not so directly re-
lated, as follows:
(a) to secure and preserve equality of access to the common resource of
the oceans;
(b) to maintain the minimal public order at sea by:
(1) preventing unauthorized violence,
(2) preventing controversies from arising;
(c) to protect the inclusive and exclusive interests of states and to
promote the most economic accommodation of these interests in the
shared use of the oceans;
(d) to promote efficiency in common enjoyment;
(e) to conserve exhaustible resources of the oceans (such as fish, min-
erals) ;
(f) to authorize states to protect and fulfill basic goal values in the in-
ternal processes of their territorial communities.
An overriding objective, particularly characteristic of public and private
international law, is, of course, to attain that stability in the expectations
of peoples necessary to encourage transactions across state lines and be-
tween states, and yet at the same time to promote beneficial change.
3. Strategies
In decision with respect to these controversies, as elsewhere in interna-
tional law, authoritative decision-makers engage in a variety of policy
functions, including prescribing, intelligence-serving, recommending, in-
voking, applying, appraising and terminating.
The prescribing function has been performed in greatest measure in
what is commonly called development by custom in generalizing inferences
from past uniformities in practice. In modern times explicit agreements
have become more important, though these on occasion largely embody
historic practice.
The identification of parties authorized to invoke the processes of au-
thority for the protection of ships against abuses of authority has been
effected in universal practice by making conclusive the competence of
states to attribute national character to vessels. This competence of the
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state of national character has not, of course, precluded the concurrent
competence of other parties, as authorized by various principles of public
and private international law.
The function of applying basic jurisdictional and procedural policies has
been largely performed in day-to-day practice of foreign offices and other
national agencies. For many problems crucial to the shared enjoyment of
the oceans, competence and responsibility for the direct application of
coercion to ships has been accorded to and imposed upon the state at-
tributing its national character to a vessel. For other problems, not so
crucial-and involving more the exclusive interests of states---states other
than a state of national character have been authorized directly to apply
coercion to ships.
In addition to government officials, pressure groups from both labor
and the shipping interests have begun to play important r~les in the less
formalized but no less significant functions of intelligence-serving, recoin-
mending and appraising.
Explicit agreement, not always well advised, 56 is on occasion employed
for the purpose of terminating traditional practice.
4. Outcomes
The historic outcomes of the process of decision, honoring the conclusive-
ness of states' attributions of national character to ships when necessary,
and according such conclusive attributions appropriate significance on
other problems, have in very considerable measure achieved protection of
equal access to the oceans, the establishment of a satisfactory minimal
order and a reasonable accommodation of the inclusive and exclusive in-
terests of states. Documentation of this accomplishment will be offered
below in describing the trend of decisions.
5. Conditions
The conditions affecting the process of decision embrace all the inter-
acting variables of the world arena. In recent times these variables have
been undergoing profound change.
The world has divided into hostile camps projecting contending systems
of public order. Many new states have emerged and some of these, as well
as older states, which should be more sensitive to their responsibilities, are
demanding to be "more equal than others" in access to sharable and
strategic resources.57  Increasing socialization in many states has exacer-
bated the difficulties of international co-operation. Expanding scientific
knowledge and improving technology have vastly enhanced potentialities for
both production and destruction. The resources of outer space may in the
future be in competition with those of the oceans. Burgeoning populations
combined with these technological developments have intensified the inter-
56 Such as the introduction of the "genuine link" requirement in the Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas.
57 It will be recalled that comparable demands were made by some of the protagonists
in "Animal Farm."
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dependences of peoples. Capital investments, both state and private,
across national boundaries and the movement of goods and services have
multiplied in many ways. The effective internationalization of pressure
groups, outdistancing that of government, has magnified the difficulties of
establishing and maintaining a general community policy.
THr CLARIFICATION OF GENERAL POLIcrEs: TiE CoMMON INTEREST IN THE
CONCLUSIVENESS OF ATTRIBUTIONS OF NATIONAL CHARACTER
In seeking more systematic and detailed clarification of a rational general
community policy concerning the nationality of ships-a policy to which a
proponent of a world public order of freedom, security and abundance may
unreservedly commit himself-we begin with the axiom, until recent times
almost universally honored with respect to this problem, that jurisdictional
and procedural principles and techniques should be shaped entirely to serve
the more basic, substantive policies which are their excuse for being.58
The application of this axiom in necessary detail requires that we be quite
exact about the basic, substantive policies at stake in events which include
the national character of ships among policy-relevant factors.
In our description above of processes of interaction, claim, and decision
we identified certain inclusive interests and certain exclusive interests of all
states. We observed that all states have asserted claims to equal access to,
and enjoyment of, the oceans and to a shared competence in the processes of
authoritative decision, by which such equality in access and enjoyment is
protected and regulated. The expectation is common, and undoubtedly
realistic, that the shared competence in decision-making is indispensable to
the shared enjoyment in use. Hence, it may be said that all states share
an inclusive interest in both common enjoyment and shared competence
with respect to the oceans. In polar extreme to this inclusivity of interest,
we observed also that all states assert claims to protect their internal com-
munity processes from harms from the sea by exclusive prescription and
application of authority. It need not be doubted that states' expectations
of potential harms from the sea are realistic, and, hence, that all states
have an exclusive interest in appropriate protection. Similarly, all states
make claim to prescribe and apply authority to various events, occurring in
the world social process, which substantially affect their internal com-
munity processes, even though these events do not occur or have their
effects entirely within their own territorial boundaries, and all states have
a common interest in the maintenance of a process of authoritative decision
with respect to such events which protects both their exclusive and inclusive
interests. From the most comprehensive perspective, it may be added
further that all states share an inclusive interest in the establishment of
standards of safety, labor and competition, for activities occurring upon
the oceans as well as upon the land masses, which will promote the highest
well-being and the greatest production of goods and services for all man-
kind. It is easily demonstrated, however, that procedural principles re-
U.N. Secretariat, Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas 10, U.N. Doe.
A/ON. 4/32 (1950); McDougal and Burke, Zoe. cit. note 53, at 559.
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lating to the nationality of ships bear upon, and admit of manipulation for
securing, these different policies in very different ways.
For securing the common interest of all states in shared enjoyment of,
and competence over, the oceans, the procedural principle that one state's
attribution of national character to a vessel is conclusive upon other states
appears indispensable. It is by a vessel that a state asserts both its claim
to enjoyment and its claim to participate in shared competence. It is by
control of the vessel that enjoyment is secured, and by competence to
prescribe and apply authority that control is secured. Such control and
assertion of authority can be made secure in the present disorganized world
arena only if a state which has attributed its national character to a vessel
is accorded unquestioned competence to protect the vessel against abuses of
authority by other states. The state which is denied such competence is
denied its share in authority, and in the absence of centralized, interna-
tional institutions, with effective control over abuses of authority, it has no
other lawful recourse. An arena in which such denials became common
practice could not be expected long to remain an arena of shared authority.
In examining below the trends in past practice with respect to problems
in which the basic community policies of shared enjoyment and shared
competence are most directly at stake, we will indicate in more detail the
importance to these problems of the high conclusiveness of states' attribu-
tions of national character.
For honoring an appropriate authority in states for the protection of
their exclusive interests in their internal community processes, whether
these interests relate to preclusion of harm from the sea or more generally
to the regulation of the impact of events occurring in part elsewhere, it
is not necessary that the conclusiveness of a state's attribution of national
character to vessels should be put in question. For problems in which the
lawfulness of such assertions of authority by states is the relevant issue, the
fact that another state has attributed its national character to a vessel is but
one factor among many which may be significant for policy, and it may
not be the most decisive factor. For violations of its lawful regulations
with respect to its internal waters, territorial sea, and contiguous zone, a
state may, of course, apply its authority to vessels having the national char-
acter of other states, else its regulations would be pointless. Whether the
regulations are lawful, as, for example, with regard to contiguous zones,
may require nice calculations of "reasonableness" in a balance of the
interests sought to be protected, the interests of others subjected to inter-
ference, the modalities of interference, and so on, but the nationality of
the ships to which authority is applied certainly can be no more than a
relevant factor in determining appropriate balance. In its prescriptions
and applications of authority for events having substantial effects upon its
internal processes, though not occurring entirely within or having effects
entirely within its boundaries, a state may, again, quite lawfully apply its
authority to ships to which other states have attributed national character,
just as it may to individuals and corporations bearing the nationality of
other states. The most fundamental policies at stake are a reasonable
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security in transactions and "comparative justice" by the standards of
mature systems of law.5 For determining these policies in particular in-
stances, the nationality of a vessel may be a relevant, but not necessarily
conclusive, factor. The important point is that decisions, in cases of this
type, that the national character of a vessel is not the most significant factor
in determining decision need not be over-generalized as holdings that the
"conclusiveness" of national character is denied. The justifiable applica-
tion of authority to vessels, irrespective of their nationality, is obviously
quite different from denial of the competence of a state to attribute its
national character to a vessel. Policies making attributions of national
character conclusive for purposes of protecting shared competence over
the oceans need not be extrapolated into policies demanding immunity
from authority for all purposes; conversely, decisions denying the policy
significance of national character on problems in which shared competence
over the oceans is not at stake need not be exaggerated into precedents for
confusing such problems. The confusion of saying that "national char-
acter is irrelevant" with saying that the "competence of a state to attribute
national character is denied" arises from simple failure to distinguish
different types of problems and uniquely relevant policies.
It may require emphasis, so much confusion abounds in the books, that the
factor which may be significant or conclusive in all these cases-the factor
whose policy significance we seek to appraise-is the act, the authoritative
decision, of a state in conferring its national character upon a vessel.
Theoretically, this act could be evidenced in many different ways. The
most common way is, of course, by registration-with incidental aid from
documentation, flags, and names-and this is the way which would appear
most compatible with general community policies of security, dispatch, and
notice to other states and parties. The policy significance of registration,
documentation, flags, and so on, despite elaborate and painful efforts to
establish for them an independent significance, is, however, merely ancillary.
Their importance and only importance is as modalities of dependable or
undependable proof of the primary act of state attribution. Note may be
taken further, in passing, that "genuine link," whatever content may be
poured into the words, can add nothing to the security, dispatch, and
public notice which registration affords. Justification for any requirement
of "genuine link" must be found, if it can be found, not in the needs of
proof of state decision to attribute national character to vessels, but in
policies which override and limit that decision. The task of securing the
inclusive interests of all states in the establishment and maintenance of
standards of labor and competition, on a world-wide basis, which will pro-
mote the highest well-being and greatest production of goods and services
for all mankind, is clearly a problem quite different in nature and magni-
tude from those hitherto considered. It may be that for the better secur-
59Yntema, "The Objectives of Private International Law," 35 Canadian Bar Rev.
721, 735 (1957); Katzenbach, "Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law," 65 Yale Law J. 1087, 1107-1109
(19no,).
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ing of these interests it has, or will, become necessary to make states' access
to the oceans conditional upon fulfillment of specified standards. A very
heavy burden of proof is, however, incumbent upon those who urge that
the conferring upon states of unilateral competence to question each other's
attribution of national character to ships is the most economic mode of
giving sanction to these standards. Such a mode of administration might
not only fail to achieve the new objectives but cause immeasurable damage
to already established common values. States willing to accept the new
standards of substantive policy might also be willing to accept more rational
measures in implementation.
The search for a content for "genuine link," expressing a generalizable
policy for the whole community of states, may, we note finally, find little
substance or comfort in the national policies which states have applied
internally to condition their attribution of national character to vessels.
The most common of these policies relate to ownership by nationals and
the nationality of the crew or the commanding officers, and, in lesser degree,
to construction within the country. No one of these criteria would appear
to express a policy designed to secure a general community interest. On the
contrary, it is clear that they express unsharable exclusive interests. Any
international requirement which conditioned the attribution of national
character upon ownership by national individuals would sorely limit
countries with little accumulated capital in favor of countries with large
accumulations. The international restriction of competence to attribute
national character to vessels manned only by the individual nationals of
the same state might promote, from global perspective, a most uneconomic
division of labor and would further impose severe limits upon the free
movement of human beings, wholly incompatible with contemporary con-
ceptions of human rights. Any international limitation of national char-
acter to vessels constructed within a country would have similar unfortunate
effects and impose equally onerous burdens upon the newly emerging
states. All the traditional criteria which states have employed in their
exclusive national interests, whether required singly or in combination,
would thus, if transposed into international policy, impose grave depriva-
tions upon the free choices of individuals in movement, as well as in-
tolerable limits upon states' power to employ ships and enjoy the oceans
as bases of power.
More detailed policies relating to each specific category of claim will, for
convenience, be stated at the beginning of the discussion pertaining to
such category and will be followed with a brief summary of past decisions
confirming these policies.
TREND OF PAST DECISIONS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS
I. CLAIMS RELATING TO CONTROL OVER SHIPS
A. Claims to Attribute National Character to Ships
The basic community policy here is that of securing the most productive
shared use of the oceans. The historic practice by which all states have
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been able to make effective claims to share in the use of the oceans has been
by sending forth both state and private ships to which they have attributed
their national character.6 0 It has long been accepted under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity that one state cannot question the national character
of state ships, and the procedural policy with respect to other ships which
seems most compatible with securing the basic community policy would
appear to be that of making states' attributions of national character con-
clusive, whatever the criteria of their choice."" The one necessary limit
upon the discretion of states, and a limit which appears universally ac-
cepted, is that, once a state has conferred its national character upon a
vessel, other states may not confer their national character as long as the
original national character remains unchanged.
Uniform practice on both international and national levels has long
fully substantiated the policy conclusions outlined above.6 2 In the famous
case of Mutscat Dhows, involving the contention advanced by Great Britain
that France was restricted by treaty in granting its national character to
vessels belonging to the subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague declared that "it belongs to every
sovereign to decide to whom he will accord the right to fly his flag and to
prescribe the rules governing such grants," 63 and concluded that "France
was entitled to authorize vessels belonging to subjects of His Highness the
Sultan of Muscat to fly the French flag, only bound by her own legislation
and administrative rules .... ', 64 Similar deference for the conclusiveness
of a state's attribution of national character has been exhibited in a num-
ber of other cases. Two of the more famous cases in which this deference
was accorded under the most extreme circumstances are the cases of The
Virginitis 6 5 and The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.66
The Virginius, a vessel registered in the United States and flying the
American flag, while sailing toward Cuba, was seized by a Spanish warship
I0 The degree of consensus on this is evident in the emphasis on national character in
Gidel:
"L'attribution aux navires de mer d'une identit6 et d'une nationalit6 est le corollaire
du principe du libre usage de la haute mer. GrAce & cette r~glementation . . . les
navires peuvent Atre surveill~s, contr614s: les abus que pourrait entrainer le principe de
]a libert6 des mers se trouvent limit~s si 'on n'admet & 1'usage de ces mers que les
navires pouvant justifier d 'tine nationalit6." 1 Gidel, Le Droit International de la Mer
73 (1932).
61 "This is the undisputed right of each State: to set up such prerequisites for the
assumption of its nationality as its concept of national welfare dictates. There are ap-
parently no limits on the positive exactions of States in this regard. Theoretically, a
State may, by the harshness of its rules, prevent any vessel from sailing under its
flag." Rienow, The Test of the Nationality of a Merchant Vessel 214 (1937).
62 This historical tradition has been described by a noted French commentator in
these words: ", ... en ce qui concerne la nationalit6 des navires, le droit pour l'tat de
Ia conf6rer eat affrm6 depuis longtemps avec une particuli~re nettet6." Cavar6, Le
Droit International Public Positif 231 (1951).
63 The Muscat Dhows Case (France and Great Britain), Award of the Tribunal, The
Hague, Aug. 8, 1905. Scott, Hague Court Reports 95, 96 (1916).
64 Tbid. at 99.
65 2 Moore, Digest of International Law 895 (1906).
,611 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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on the high seas and taken into a Cuban port. In explaining this seizure
and the subsequent execution of a number of crewmen and passengers, Spain
claimed that the vessel was engaged in aiding insurrection in Cuba and
that its American national character was fraudulently obtained, the latter
charge being based on ownership of the Virginius by Spanish nationals.
In the course of the dispute President Grant asserted that, even if the
Virginius had fraudulently obtained its registry, "proceedings should be
instituted in [American] courts for the punishment of the offense com-
mitted against the United States." 67 Secretary of State Fish, in a note to
Spanish authorities, further elaborated:
The shipping laws of the United States are municipal regulations
which it prescribes for itself . . . and the administration of which it
intrusts to its own officers. It judges of the requirements and of the
formalities to be observed to give its national character to private
trading-vessels, and reserves to itself the punishment of evasions or
omissions of those requirements or formalities.8s
The Virginins was eventually restored to the United States, even though
the latter admitted that the vessel obtained its American national character
by fraud.
Though the decision in The Schooner Exchange case was made to turn
on the immunity of a foreign "public armed vessel," the fundamental
policy of not questioning the national character of a vessel was honored
under the most extraordinary circumstances. 9 The vessel in dispute came
into Philadelphia harbor under the flag of the French sovereign and was
there libeled by two American citizens, claiming ownership of the vessel of
which they were "forcibly and violently" deprived earlier when it was
seized at sea by the French.70  The significance of the decision in this case
67 Special Message to Congress of Jan. 5, 1874. 2 Moore, Digest of International
Law 901 (1906).
68 Rienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 17, quoting from 2 Foreign Relations 1207-1208
(1875-1876).
69 The Court could not, of course, have reached the question of immunity if it had
not accepted the French nationality of the vessel. Counsel for libelants "admitted that
the commission, the flag, and the possession were sufficient evidence of the public
character of the vessel." 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 116, 121 (1812).
The necessities of minimal order certainly require that states honor each other's
authoritative attribution of nationality to state vessels. As we see in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, mutual deference, in the interests of harmonious intercourse,
may be carried to the extreme of conferring upon state vessels complete immunity from
local jurisdiction.
Complete immunity from the jurisdiction of other states, questioned even with respect
to state vessels today, obviously is neither necessary nor desirable for non-state ships.
The same policies which require unquestioned mutual deference to attributions of na-
tional character to state ships would appear, however, to be equally relevant with respect
to non-state ships, especially in days when state and non-state ships increasingly compete
for the same world trade.
,0 Chief Justice Marshall apparently had little doubt about the truth of the claims of
the libelants:
"In the present state of the evidence and proceedings, the Exchange must be con-
sidered as a vessel, which was the property of the libellants, whose claim is repelled by
the fact, that she is now a national armed vessel, commissioned by, and in the service
of the Emperor of France." Ibid. at 146.
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lies in the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States, in dismissing
the complaint and refusing to investigate the rights and wrongs of the
parties, did not question the French nationality of the ship, despite the
fact that France had forcibly taken the vessel from its American owners.
A more recent instance in which the Supreme Court of the United
States has reaffirmed the finality of a state's attribution of national char-
acter to a vessel is Lauritzen v. Larsen. There, Mr. Justice Jackson ex-
pressed relevant policy with utmost clarity:
.. .Each state under international law may determine for itself
the conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant ship,
thereby accepting responsibility for it and acquiring authority over it.
Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ship's papers and its
flag. The United States has firmly and successfully maintained that
the regularity and validity of a registration can be questioned only by
the registering state.
7'1
Further cogent indication of the universal acceptance of these policies is
to be found in the singular uniformity of relevant treaty provisions for the
past hundred years. Thus Article II of a treaty concluded in 1851 between
Great Britain and the Kingdom of Sardinia reads:
All vessels which, according to the laws of Great Britain are to be
deemed British vessels; and all vessels which, according to the law of
the Kingdom of Sardinia, are to be deemed Sardinian vessels, shall
for the purposes of this Convention ... be deemed British vessels and
Sardinian vessels respectively.
72
More than a century later, in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and The Netherlands, concluded on
March 27, 1956, the corresponding provision is as follows:
Vessels under the flag of either Party, and carrying the papers re-
quired by its law in proof of nationality, shall be deemed to be vessels
of that Party both on the high seas and within ports, places and
waters of the other Party.
7 3
The unanimity among commentators may be illustrated by a single
quotation from Rienow in his comprehensive monograph:
Each State determines for itself what ships it will regard as its
own, but it cannot, of course, impinge upon the prior rights of other
States. If a vessel already has a nationality, another State is not free
to impose its nationality upon it. If the State to which a vessel be-
longs refuses to release it, no other State may admit it to its merchant
marine. Beyond this, a State is free to encourage application for its
nationality by maintaining liberal rules. No matter how lenient or
harsh its conditions may be, once a State has denoted that these con-
71 345 U. S. 571, at 584 (1953); digested in 47 A.J.I.L. 711 (1953). The principal
issue in this case concerned the application of the Jones Act to claims by a Danish sea-
man who was injured in the course of his employment upon a Danish ship in Havana
harbor. 72 Rienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 19.
73 Art. XIX, 8 iT. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 2043; T.I.A.S., No.
3942. For a more detailed exposition of the relevant U. S. practice, see Walker,
"Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation," 42 Minn. Law Rev. 805
(1958).
19601
HeinOnline -- 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 59 1960
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ditions have been met to its satisfaction through the medium of an
official document, the nationality is impressed upon the vessel.7 4
B. Claims to Protect Ships to Which National Character Has Been At-
tributed against Unlawfutl Assertions of Authority by Other States
The most important policy here, in implementing basic community policies
about shared use and competence, is that of maintaining the effectiveness
of the whole process of decision by which shared use and competence are
secured. The claim to protect vessels, like claims to protect other forms
of wealth and human beings, may be asserted through many different
procedures, including: (a) diplomatic representation between foreign
offices; (b) claims to and by consular authorities; (c) claims before the
United Nations and other intergovernmental bodies such as I.M.C.O., I.L.O.,
and the like; (d) suits in international courts and arbitral tribunals; (e)
claims in national courts and administrative agencies; and (f) the applica-
tion of coercion by self-help in self-defense. It is not without reason that
the community has made available so many different procedures to secure
the purposes of protection. The competence to protect rights is, of course,
indispensable to the enjoyment of the substance of rights, and since the
competence of states to attribute national character to ships can in fact
be questioned in relation to any particular problem, the competence to pro-
tect is indispensable with respect to every problem.
In the absence of prompt and effective compulsory international review
of unilateral challenges to competence, it would be intolerable to submit the
substance of states' rights to the enjoyment of the oceans to quibbles over
ill-defined procedural criteria. In view of the compelling nature of these
policies it is not a little surprising to find that the one major, and only
recent, publication dealing with this problem takes a position in flat contra-
vention of these policies. Thus, Mr. Watts, in an article distinguished,
inter alia, by an ambiguous use of the word "protection," and recommend-
ing ownership as "the criterion for protection," writes:
But internationally protection should not have a unilateral basis,
for it is of necessity of inter-state concern: the protection-link should
be objective, and such that it is compatible with the doctrine that a
State in presenting an international claim is doing so in respect of
damage to itself.
75
74 Rienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 218-219. The opening lines in Article 5 of the
1958 Convention on the High Seas read: "Each State shall fix the conditions for the
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for
the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are
entitled to fly." The first sentence could conceivably be interpreted to incorporate
historic policy with respect to the conclusiveness of the attribution of nationality and to
preserve registration as the best evidence of that attribution. The second sentence,
however, appears to reject registration as conclusive evidence of nationality, and the
sentence which immediately follows introduces the requirement of genuine link. Further
consideration is given to genuine link below, p. 104 et seq.
75Watts, "The Protection of Merchant Ships," 33 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 52, 66
(1957), citing as a prime example the Nottebohm decision. The interests which states
are protecting are their inclusive interests in the common enjoyment of the oceans. It is
fantastic to suggest, as Mr. Watts does, that, while states have jurisdiction over their
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The act of a state in attributing its national character to a vessel is, of
course, a unilateral act, as are most of the acts with which international
law is concerned. But the policies behind the long-established practice
that states so attributing their nationality to a vessel have competence
under international law to protect the vessel are international policies ex-
pressing a common interest. Certainly, when a state seeks protection
against deprivations imposed upon vessels to which it has attributed its
national character, it is seeking redress for injury to its interests-in-
terests which it shares with all other states who demand equal access to, and
enjoyment of, the oceans.
The practice of states provides abundant and convincing evidence of
the traditionally honored competence of every state to extend its protection
to ships which bear its national character, irrespective of the nationality
of the owners or any other possible relation between the ship and some
state other than that of national character. The same practice shows that
the conclusive factor for determining the exercise of protection against
allegedly unlawful assertions of authority by other states is the fact of the
national character of the ship. 0 It will have been noted that two of the
cases cited in the previous section involved controversies where protection
was invoked. It should, however, be emphasized that in the case of The
Virginius Spain recognized the right of the United States to intervene on
behalf of the Virginius, even though the vessel was owned by Spanish
nationals and had procured American registration by fraud. President
Grant asserted the competence of the United States to extend its protection
to the Virginius most forcefully:
When, therefore, she left the port of Kingston .. .under the flag
of the United States, she would appear to have had, as against all
powers except the United States, the right to fly that flag, and to claim
its protection, as enjoyed by all regularly documented vessels registered
as part of our commercial marine.
7
7
ships, they have no right to protect them. Protection is, of course, of the most inclusive
concern, inclusive concern for the protection of both the inclusive and exclusive interests
of states. One principal purpose of a state's making attribution of national character
to a vessel is to preclude other states from unauthorized assertions of authority for
exclusive reasons.
7 81ipert, for example, states: 'La nationalit6 du navire determine les autorit6s
eomptentes pour exercer sur ce navire la surveillance et la protection." 1 Ripert, Droit
Maritime 322 (4th ed., 1950).
With respect to aircraft, see Kamminga, The Aircraft Commander in Commercial Air
Transportation 30-31 (1953). Kamminga writes: "An aircraft used for international
transportation must be under the control of a State, which will see to it that the aircraft
in question fulfills its obligations while in other States; this task devolves upon the
State of origin of the aircraft. At the same time, however, this State naturally acts
as protector of the rights of the aircraft concerned." ibid. at 30. "Nationality is
therefore of importance for the aircraft commander because it means that all over the
world he is subject to the control of the State where his aircraft is registered, and also
because he can count on protection by this State if the rights granted to his aircraft
are infringed." Ibid. at 31.
77 2 Moore, Digest of International Law 900 (1906).
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Hence the mere fact of registration, although fraudulent, was considered
sufficient to provide protection for the Virginius, even against the state
whose nationals owned it.
The decision in The 11'in Alone 7 controversy between Canada and the
United States is another unequivocal example of protection based almost
exclusively upon the fact of the attribution of national character to that
vessel. The I'm Alone was a vessel registered in Canada which engaged
in smuggling liquor, in violation of the United States law, from British
Honduras to certain points off the coast of Louisiana. On March 22, 1929,
the Im Alone was sunk on the high seas in the Gulf of Mexico by the
American revenue cutter Dexter. The Commissioners appointed to decide
upon the Canadian claim for compensation found the vessel "de facto
owned, controlled, and, at the critical times, managed and her movements
directed and her cargo dealt with and disposed of" by United States
citizens.7 9  Notwithstanding these overwhelming links between the I'm
Alone and the United States, the Commissioners held the act of sinking
the vessel "unlawful" and ordered the United States to apologize and pay
the Canadian Government $25,000 "in respect of the wrong." 8'
The confusion encountered in works of commentators with respect to
protection is on occasion due to a confusion between the appropriate bases
of protection and the indices of such bases. The commentators who see
as the bases of protection in a given case the ownership, the flag or the
registration of a vessel, clearly ignore the more important base: the act of
the state in attributing its national character to a ship.
Emphasis upon the unquestioned competence of the state of national
character to protect its vessels need not, however, be construed to mean
that other states may not be competent to protect their varying interests
in such vessels. Concurrent competence to protect by reason of ownership
of a national is a well-established practice in international law, and there
are no overriding reasons to dispense with it with respect to ships, provided,
of course, that the interests of the state whose national character the vessel
possesses be accorded adequate safeguards. In this connection, Mr. Rienow
correctly observes:
Yet the right to protect ship property is an imperfect one, due to
the special nature and qualities of ships. It can be made effective so
long as it does not conflict with the control which the State to which the
vessel legally belongs is, under international law, permitted to effect
and does, in fact effect. 8'
-8 (1933), 29 A.J.I.L. 326 (1935); 3 Rep. Int. Arb. Awards 1611 (1949).
79 Ibid. at 1618.
so In his effort to replace nationality as a basis for protection of ships, Mr. Watts,
understandably enough, finds the decision in the I'm Alone case embarrassing. He
therefore offers the following explanation of the "paradox": ,. . . the Claims Com-
mission, invested with jurisdiction over any claims in respect of a 'British vessel' for
compensation, took jurisdiction, thus considering the Iim Alone a British vessel for
jurisdictional purposes, but held the I' n Alone not to be a British vessel for purposes
of protection." Watts, Zoe. cit. note 75 above, at 67.
siRienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 104-105.
[Vol. 54
HeinOnline -- 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 62 1960
lMAINTENAINCE OF PUBLIC ORDER AT SEA
C. Claims to Control the Movement and Activities of Ships to Which Aa-
"tional Character Has Been Attributed
It would appear indispensable for the maintenance of public order upon
the oceans, most noticeably in times of armed conflict, that some state have
control of the movements and activities of a ship; and it would appear no
less indispensable, to secure the equal rights of states, that, within limits
imposed by international law, each state be given control of the ships to
which it has attributed its national character, and that this right be honored
and made effective by officials of other states. It is of course unquestioned
practice that the state which is responsible for a ship's conformity with
international law has a competence equal to its responsibility and may
control the movement and activities of its ships as its interpretation of
community obligations and its national policies require. This competence
is so unquestioned that one will search in vain equally for conventions
giving it superfluous reiteration as for those denying it. This unchallenged
prerogative of the state of national character comes most often to attention
in time of national emergency or war, as the examples below demonstrate.
Thus, in the case of Furness, Withy & Co. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Banco, 2
the Zamora, a ship of Swedish nationality, was chartered in 1916 to an
English company for voyages between ports in various parts of the world.
While the vessel was at Cardiff her owners refused to continue with their
obligations on the ground that, under Swedish emergency legislation, vessels
of Swedish registry were not allowed to trade outside Sweden. In a
suit against the owners of the Zamora, the British court dismissed the
complaint, giving full effect to the decree of the state whose national
character the vessel possessed. In both world wars a number of neutral
states issued decrees determining the areas where ships of their national
character were allowed to navigate. Thus, for example, Section 3 of the
Joint Resolution of Congress, approved November 4, 1939, authorized the
President of the United States to define combat areas and to make it un-
lawful "for any citizen of the United States or any American vessel to
proceed into or through any such combat area." 3 For violations of
these restrictions heavy penalties were provided. Similarly, Lord McNair,
explaining the British practice, observed that the "Crown by prerogative
may at any time order its subjects, and British merchant ships, to return
to this country." 1' Furthermore, as noted by another commentator, a
state "may suspend entirely the commercial intercourse of its vessels with
another State, or all of them." 85
D. Claims to Prescribe for Determination of Ownership among Contend-
ing Claimants
Stability of expectations about the ownership of ships, whether state or
private, is, of course, indispensable to stability in arrangement with respect
82 [1917] 2 K.B. 873.
as See 34 A.J.I.L. Supp. 162 et seq. (1940).
84 McNair, "Problems Connected with the Position of the Merchant Vessel in Private
International Law, with Particular Reference to the Power of Requisition," 31 Grotius
Society Transactions 30, 36 (1946). 85 Rienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 4.
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to the use of the ships. If the ownership of vessels, which ply the ports
of the world, changed like a sailor's love with each port, capital would have
little attachment for ships. It has come to be expected that in the course
of their operations ships may become subject to certain special liens, and
indeed this is the principal meaning of the metaphoric personification of
ships, but the subjection to these liens is in accordance with certain highly
crystallized and internationalized principles of admiralty and international
law.
The assumption upon which all states act is that the state of national
character determines ownership. Thus, the Brussels Convention of 1926
relating to Maritime Liens and Mortgages provided that
Mortgages, hypothecations, and other similar charges upon vessels,
duly effected in accordance with the law of the contracting State to
which the vessel belongs, and registered in a public register either at
the port of the vessel's registry or at a central office, shall be regarded
as valid and respected in all the other contracting countries.86
It has been the practice of major maritime states to enact national legisla-
tion regulating in detail ownership claims in respect to ships, anil u one
appears to question the competence of states in international law to adopt
such legislation. Thus, the United States has provided by statute as fol-
lows:
. . . it shall be unlawful, without the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce, to sell, mortgage, lease, charter, deliver, or in any manner
transfer, or agree to sell, mortgage, lease, charter, deliver or in any
manner transfer, to any person not a citizen of the United States, or
transfer or place under foreign registry or flag, any vessel or any
interest therein owned in whole or in part by a citizen of the United
States and documented under the laws of the United States. .... 87
The mutual respect which states exhibit for each other's legislative pro-
visions of this nature is well expressed in the following communication of
Secretary of State Lansing to the Department of Commerce:
. . . if the sale and the transfer to American citizens of a ship owned
by the citizens and flying the flag of a foreign government, whose
laws forbid such a transfer without the consent of its appropriate
authorities, should be held by the competent tribunals of this country
to be valid, it is plain that such transfer in contravention of the laws
of the country of the ship's previous register would give rise to
vexatious complications. . . . The desirability, therefore, of the ob-
servance of the spirit of comity in the matter of the transfer of ships'
registry is obvious."8
86 Art. 1, 3 Hudson, International Legislation 1848 (1931). A more recent example of
the importance accorded to records kept in the state of national character is provided
by the Convention on International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, the purpose of
which is, among other things, the protection of secured creditors and "facilitation of
the transfer of aircraft from one nationality to another." For an analysis see Wilber-
force, "The International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft," 2 Int. Law Q. 421. 424
(1948). 87 46 U.S.C. § 808 (1952).
88 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 763-764 (1941).
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Unless the competence for determination of ownership is in the state
of registry, the registry will become a record of fraud and falsification
rather than a reliable guide to the determination of rights in the ship. 9
On the other hand, the fact that customary maritime law permits the
creation of various unrecorded ("secret") liens which a vessel may "pick
up" anywhere in the world for a variety of reasons, 90 should not, of course,
be interpreted as denial of either the flag state's competence to legislate
with respect to determination of ownership or the national character of the
vessel in question. The concession appears to be one of the hard necessities
of international commerce.
E. Claims to Requisition National Ships outside Territorial Domain
One of the great incentives to states in attributing their national char-
acter to vessels is the expectation that these ships may be bases of national
power in unforeseeable future exigencies. It does not appear unreasonable,
absent overriding considerations of public policy, that states should indulge
each other in this expectation. It would entirely defeat this expectation
if the high degree of conclusiveness were not accorded to a state's attribu-
tion of its national character to a vessel.
States have unquestioned competence under appropriate conditions to
requisition ships of their national character and even the ships of other
states when these ships are under their effective control within their terri-
torial domain. In addition, states are accorded competence to requisition
ships having their national character which are not at the time of the
requisitioning decree within their territorial domain. 1 The fundamental
principle is concisely stated, after a full review of relevant cases, by the
late Professor Preuss:
For purposes of requisitioning, a national vessel is considered as
"quasi-territorial." Therefore, the requisitioning of a ship while it is
on the high seas (or, semble, while it is within the territorial waters of
another state) is not an extraterritorial exercise of state authority.92
The application of this principle may be illustrated by numerous judicial
decisions. Thus in 1916 Swinfen Eady, L.J., declared that it "is not dis-
puted-indeed it is beyond dispute-that it is part of the prerogative of
the Crown in times of emergency to requisition British ships." 93 Simi-
89 For comparable policy with respect to land recording, see MeDougal and Brabner-
Smith, "Land Title Transfer: A Regression," 48 Yale Law J. 1125 (1939); McDougal,
"Title Registration and Land Law Reform: A Reply," 8 U. Chicago Law Rev. 63
(1940).
9oFor a comprehensive and critical survey, see Gilmore and Black, The Law of
Admiralty, Ch. IX (1957).
91 "There are apparently no limits to this power, and the State in applying it is
answerable to no other." Rienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 7.
92"State Immunity and the Requisition of Ships during the Spanish Civil War,"
Part II, 36 A.J.I.L. 37, 55 (1942); for a review of British cases involving Spanish
vessels, see, by the same author, Part I of the above article in 35 ibid. 263-281 (1941).
99 he Broadmayne, [1916] P. 64, at 67, cited with approval by Finlay, L. J., in The
Arantiazu Mendi, [1939] P. 37, at 53.
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larly, during the second World War, in Lorentzen v. Lydden9, a British
court upheld the competence of the Norwegian Government to decree the
requisitioning of "All ships registered in Norway or belonging to a port
there and situate outside the area" under the enemy occupation. The
court declared that the decree was "in accordance with the comity of
nations." 9 The decision in the famous and complicated case of the
Spanish vessel Navemar96 was also in accord with these policies. Thus
Judge Augustus N. Hand in the final stage of the litigation said:
It is not necessary to say that the decree effected an expropriation
of the vessel while she was in foreign territorial waters at Buenos
Aires, though it was promulgated and notification thereof was given
to the master when the ship was at that port. Even if the decree
might not be effective while the Navemar was at Buenos Aires, never-
theless it was an instrumentality of expropriation that would become
operative upon the vessel as soon as she reached the high seas.97
Lord McNair's analysis of the relevant judicial decisions led him to
reach the following conclusion, inter alia:
• . . the Crown has the right to requisition British merchant ships
whether they are in British waters, on the high seas, or in foreign
waters, and to enforce that requisition upon them anywhere except
in foreign waters.
Conversely, the British Government and Courts should recognize
a corresponding right in other States.98
II. CLAIMS TO ACCESS AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
A. Claims to Access
1. Claims to Access to the High Seas
The claim to equal and unrestricted access to, and enjoyment of, the
oceans is of course the most important of all the claims of states, and the
most fundamental community policy is that of protecting this claim. The
major jurisdictional principles for securing this policy-that each state
may apply authority to vessels having its national character and that,
except as authorized by international law, no other state may apply
authority to such a vessel-are, as has been emphasized, built about a
necessary identification of the national character of ships. It would ap-
pear reasonable that the degree of conclusiveness conferred by imple-
menting procedural principles upon a state's attribution of national char-
acter to a vessel should be in direct proportion to the importance of the
right. Certainly the right to equal access and enjoyment, through em-
94 [1942] 2 K. B. 202. 95 Ibid. at 216.
96 Compaiia Espafiola de Navegaci6n Maritima v. The Navemar, 17 F. Supp. 495;
ibid. 647 (1936); 18 F. Supp. 153; 90 F.2d 673 (1937); cert. granted, 302 U. S. 669
(1937); The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68 (1938), 32 A.J.I.L. 381 (1938); 24 F. Supp. 495
(1938); 102 F.2d 444; and supplemental opinion in 103 F.2d 783 (1939).
97 102 F.2d 444, at 449.
98 McNair, loc. cit. note 84 above, at 46; for an even more forcefully expressed view,
see Rienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 185 and 103-104.
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ployment of ships of national character, must be beyond unilateral
challenge.
It is common knowledge that the historical claims to deny access to the
high seas which rested on broad assertions of sovereignty over the oceans
had largely been defeated by the 19th century. 9 While the more limited
modern assertions of authority also raise issues involving freedom of the
seas, it is now taken for granted that ships of all states may traverse
the oceans free of prohibition by any state or group of states.10 0  Gidel
has most aptly summarized both desirable general community policy and
the pattern of state practice:
Ships of all nationalities have an equal right to make use of the
high seas in every possible way, but the idea of equal use only comes
second. The essential idea underlying the principle of freedom of
the high seas is the concept of the prohibition of interference in peace-
time by ships flying one national flag with ships flying the flags of
other nationalities. The prohibition of interference is based on the
idea of the flag, that is to say, the symbol of the attachment of the
ship to a given State and not on the idea of the nationality of the
individuals concerned in the maritime relations in question.101
The importance of this practice is emphasized in the presumption made
explicit by the International Law Commission as the basis for its considera-
tion of the regime of the high seas:
The principle generally accepted in international law that the high seas
are open to all nations governs the whole regulation of the subject. 0 2
If the great weight of this presumption needs emphasis it may be seen in
the endorsement by the Permanent Court of International Justice of a
general principle which remains authoritative to this day:
It is certainly true that-apart from certain special cases which are
defined by international law-vessels on the high seas are subject to
no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly.
03
The pronouncements in which states and authoritative writers have en-
dorsed the general principle of freedom of access, and the r6le of the
national character of ships in protecting that freedom, could be multiplied
almost endlessly. It is sufficient to note the most recent example in the
1958 Convention on the High Seas, Article 4: "Every State, whether
coastal or not, has the right to sail ships under its flag on the high seas."
99 Hall, International Law 178-190 (8th ed., Higgins, 1924); Lauterpacht, "Sover-
eignty over Submarine Areas," 27 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 376, 403-405 (1950); Gidel
dates the defeat of the notion of sovereignty over the high seas from the 17th century,
in U. N. Secretariat, Regime of the High Seas, U. N. Doe. A/CN. 4/32, p. 3 (1950);
Potter, The Freedom of the Seas 85-89 (1924); 1 Oppenheim, International Law 582-
587 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
10oLauterpacht, loc. cit. above, at 403-407; U. N. Secretariat, cited above, at 3; 1
Oppenheim, op. cit., at 587-592.
101 U.N. Secretariat, op. cit. note 99, at 3-4.
102 International Law Commission Report, Art. 27, Commentary, U.N. General As-
sembly, 11th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9, p. 24 (A/3159) (1956); 51 A.J.I.L. 205
(1957).
103 The Lotus, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, p. 25 (1927).
1960)
HeinOnline -- 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 67 1960
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. Claims to Access to Territorial Bases of Other States
The relevant community policies here are the protection of vessels against
the arbitrary assertions of effective power by coastal states and the se-
curing to states of the full benefits promised by agreements providing
access for their vessels. It is no longer questioned that each state may
determine for itself whether or not to admit the vessels of other states
to the areas of its exclusive competence. Access to such areas of exclusive
competence is, of course, dependent upon explicit agreement.104 But
numerous agreements, commonly called treaties of friendship, commerce
and navigation, do stipulate for such access. It would completely defeat
the purpose of these agreements if one party could unilaterally question
attributions of national character by the other parties. Indeed, many of
these agreements expressly make the parties' attributions of national char-
acter to ships conclusive, and this would seem to be the best and most
economical general policy.
In countless treaties the national character of a vessel is made the
determining condition of the exercise of the right of access. A typical pro-
vision in such treaties reads:
Vessels of either Party shall have liberty, on equal terms with
vessels of the other Party . . . to come with their cargoes to all ports,
places and waters of such other Party open to foreign commerce and
navigation.
10 5
The explicit provisions characteristic of these treaties, making the authori-
tative decision of a state in ascribing the national character to vessels con-
clusive, have already been illustrated with reference to British and Ameri-
can practice. For further example we may refer to a typical corresponding
provision from a treaty concluded by France:
Les navires qui, selon les lois et r glements frangais, justifient de la
nationalitg frangaise et les navires qui, selon les lois et r~glements
hellniques, justifient de la nationalitg hellinique, seront, en ce qui
regarde L'application de la pr6sente Convention, consid&s comme
itant respectivement de la nationalitg frangaise et hell6niqzle.
10 6
It has been reported that between 1920 and 1940 forty-four states had
concluded 151 agreements where an identical or similar standard was em-
104 Thus, e.g., Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 33 (3d ed., 1959); Sorensen,
The Law of the Sea 200 (International Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 520, 1958). Contra,
Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 129 (3d ed, 1954).
105 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, Art. XX (1), 7 U. S.
Treaties and Other International Agreements 1839; T.I.A.S., No. 3593. Almost
identical words can be found in corresponding treaties concluded by the United States
with The Netherlands (March 27, 1956); Japan (Aug. 29, 1953); Greece (Aug. 3,
1951); and Italy (Feb. 2, 1948).
106 Convention of Commerce and Navigation with Greece, of March 11, 1929, Art. 26.
Similar provisions may be found in treaties concluded by France with the Belgium-
Luxembourg Economic Union (Feb. 23, 1928), Art. 17; Estonia (March 15, 1929), Art.
30; Yugoslavia (Jan. 30, 1929), Art. 25, and with other states. Niboyet-Goul6, Recueil
de Textes Usuels de Droit International, Suppl6ment, 1929 (1930).
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ployed.107 Even when there is no agreement between the two states,
access is not denied on the ground that the flag state was without competence
to confer its national character upon a vessel under conditions of its own
choice. The one instance in recorded American experience in which the
question of flag arose concerned a vessel carrying documentation issued by
Manchukuo, and the State Department took the view that since the United
States did not recognize Mlanchukuo as a state, the documents had no
validity for the United States. The United States did not, however, allege
that the foreign state had no authority to confer national character on the
vessel concerned, but that there was no foreign state involved at all and,
therefore, the documentation could not be accepted as valid. 08
The more important discussions of this problem fail to provide examples
where the authoritative ascription of national character was denied for
purposes of access.
3. Claims to Access to International Waterways under Special Regime
The policy recommended with respect to international waterways 109
under special regime, indispensable to the economic use of the oceans, must
necessarily be identical to the policy recommended with respect to access
to the oceans. A state's attribution of its nationality to a vessel seeking
passage through the waterway should be regarded as conclusive. A care-
ful study of the more important sources fails to disclose any instance in
which a ship has been denied the right of passage through such interna-
tional waterways because a territorial Power controlling the waterway has
found it lacking sufficient connection with the state of attribution."0
107 In a book based on an extensive analysis of treaty provisions "of a type that
recur in the more basic and relatively long-term treaties of commerce, navigation, and
establishment,"I Professor Hawkins states: I ... the usual treaty practice is to identify
as national vessels those registered under the respective laws of the parties. From
1920 to 1940, forty-four states concluded 151 agreements in which this standard of
national laws and registry was used, and only four countries defined vessels of the
contracting parties in a vague or different manner." Hawkins, Commercial Treaties &
Agreements 6 (1951).
108 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 207-208 (1941).
109 The waterways to which we are referring are those administered under special
agreements, such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. It will be recalled that
Art. 1 of the Convention of Constantinople, 1888, explicitly provides that the Suez Canal
"shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of
commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." 3 A.J.I.L. Supp. 123 (1909); Hall-
berg, The Suez Canal 407 (1931). The obligation of the United States with respect to
the Panama Canal is somewhat less explicit. See Padelford, The Panama Canal in
Peace and War 92 (1942), and 3 A.J.IL. Supp. 128, 137 (1909).
If inquiry is extended to straits, then the decision in the Corfu Channel Case becomes
relevant. It will be remembered that the decision of the International Court of
Justice suggests that a condition of unfriendly relations short of war would not be suf-
ficient to authorize the coastal state to deny access to foreign warships. Judgment of
April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4; 43 A.J.IL. 558 (1949).
11o Hallberg and Padelford, op. cit. above, give the most detailed discussions of the
two most important canals. See also Schonfleld, The Suez Canal in World Affairs 128-
129 (1953).
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To cite the most prominent recent controversy, Egyptian practice in de-
nying passage through the Suez Canal to Israeli ships does not appear to
rest on the claim that Israel does not exist as a state or that Israel is
otherwise incompetent to confer national character on vessels, but has
instead assumed that the attribution by the state of Israel is conclusive.
The Bat Galim, the only vessel Israel has attempted to send through the
Canal, was seized by Egypt for the reason that it undoubtedly was an
Israeli vessel."'
Apart from identifying vessels which the coastal state may seek to
exclude from passage, national character has also been important for pur-
poses of protecting alleged rights of access to international waterways. A
number of states whose ships have been affected by Egyptian authority
over the Suez Canal in connection with Israel have offered protests against
the permissibility of the action taken.112
B. Claims with Respect to Securing Shared Enjoyment of Fishing on
the High Seas
1. Claims Relating to Fishing in Areas of Shared Use and Competence
For the most productive and harmonious exploitations of the riches of
the oceans, equality of access for fishing is no less important than equality
of access for navigation, and should therefore be protected by the same
jurisdictional and procedural policies. Fortunately, practice is thoroughly
in conformity with this policy. Assertions by a state of competence to
secure free access to a fishery for vessels with its national character appear
never to have been denied on the ground that the vessel did not possess
that character or that the state was not competent to confer its nationality
on the vessel in question.113 The classic case remains that of the Norwegian
trawlers in the Moray Firth. It will be recalled that after the Firth had
been closed to trawling, British owners began to use trawlers registered in
Norway. The foreign masters of some of these Norwegian-registered ships
were arrested, found guilty and fined for violation of the prohibition, but
upon protest by Norway against three of these convictions, the men were
released. According to Fulton,
It was subsequently explained that in taking this action Norway was
merely making a formal stand for the rights of her flag, since the
trawlers had been registered in Norway in a legal way, Norwegian
subjects were concerned, and no claim had been put forward on be-
half of the British Government to the Moray Firth as being territorial
in character." 4
ill Gross, "Passage through the Suez Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo and Israel Ships,"
51 A.J.I.L. 530 (1957). '12 Ibid.
"is Account of disputes involving the major fisheries of the world may be found in
Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (1911); Innis, The Cod Fisheries (rev. ed., 1954);
Leonard, International Regulation of Fisheries (1944); Oda, "New Trends in the
Regime of the Seas," 18 Zeitsehrift fuir Ausliindisches Offentliches Recht und Vbilker-
recht 61, 68-86 (1957); Tomasevich, International Agreements on Conservation of
Marine Resources (1943); Gregory and Barnes, North Pacific Fisheries 281-302 (1939).
.4 Fulton, op. cit. above, at 728; see also Leonard, op. cit. above, at 48-55; Briggs,
The Law of Nations 52-57 (2d ed., 1952).
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In more recent years the most famous case of interference with fishing
on the high seas involved the seizure of Panamanian ships by Peru for
alleged violations of the Peruvian territorial sea and of its regulations
for fishing beyond that area, and protest was promptly offered by Panama,
the United States and the United Kingdom.1 1 5  So far as is known, Peru
did not reject the Panamanian protest on the ground that the vessels did
not partake of the national character of Panama, although it was a well-
known fact, repeated in numerous contemporary accounts of the affair,
that the vessels in question had varying connections with several states."8
These illustrations could, of course, be supplemented by almost innumer-
able other accounts, historical and contemporary. The 1958 Conference
on the Law of the Sea furnishes the best evidence of the consensus on the
importance and conclusiveness of the nationality of vessels in this context.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas deals with fishing problems solely in areas of inclusive use,
as Article 1 affirms, by declaring that "All States have the right for their
nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas. . . ." "7 For implementa-
tion of this right, as well as of other prescriptions affecting it, the conven-
tion provides that the reference to "nationals" means "fishing boats or
craft of any size having the nationality of the State concerned, according to
the law of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the members of
their crews." 11s It would be difficult to imagine more explicit emphasis
upon the conclusiveness of unilateral attributions of nationality than this
unequivocal declaration in the most important multilateral convention of
modern times on the subject.
2. Claims Relating to Fishing in Areas of Exclusive Competence
The importance of the conclusiveness of the national character of vessels
here is again effectively to secure such vessels against unlawful assertions
of exclusive competence. Reference may again be made to the 1958 Con-
servation Convention, which provides for certain measures of exclusive
competence in coastal states for regulating adjacent fisheries." 9  In ac-
115 Phleger, "ISome Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the High Seas,' 
32 Dept. of State Bulletin 934 (1952); U.S. Naval War College, International Law
Situation and Documents 1956, 289-294 (1957).
116 Although The Economist mistakenly, but perhaps understandably, concluded that
the "resulting situation is an international lawyer's nightmare," the multiple connec-
tions in the case were pithily described: "An Argentine citizen, of Greek origin, resident
in France, and whose ships fly a Panamanian flag and carry German crews and British
insurance, has been attacked at sea by Peru, which is supported by Ecuador and Chile."
The Economist, Nov. 27, 1954, p. 715.
117 2 Official :Records 139; 52 A.J.I.L. 852 (1958). Art. 1, par. 1, provides in full:
"All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas,
subject (a) to their treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States
as provided for in this Convention, and (c) to the provisions contained in the following
articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas."
11 sArt. 14. 2 Official Records 141; 52 A.J.I.L. 856 (1958).
119 Art. 7 of the convention permits unilateral adoption of conservation measures by
a coastal state if negotiations with other states concerned have not produced agreement
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cording rights to, and imposing obligations upon, non-coastal states, the
convention speaks repeatedly of "States whose nationals" engage in fish-
ing, and identification of the state thus referred to is achieved by reference
to fishing boats which have "the nationality of the State concerned, ac-
cording to the law of that State . 1.2
C. Claims with Respect to Securing Shared Use for Submarine Cables
and Pipelines
The importance of national character extends beyond the protection of
vessels for abuses of authority to identification of the states responsible
for the conduct of vessels and competent to apply authority to vessels for
harmful conduct. Both by customary law and by treaty, determination of
the state responsible for imposing sanctions for harm to submarine cables
has been by identification of the national character of the vessel charged
with causing the harm. The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Sub-
marine Cables, to which a large number of states have subscribed, authorizes
warships of one state to stop vessels of another to investigate for complicity
in interference or damage to cables, but imposes responsibility for enforce-
ment upon the courts of the state to which the vessel belongs. 12' The
obligations imposed by this convention on the state of national character
were recently emphasized in the note of March 23, 1959, from the United
States to the Soviet Union declaring the former's belief that a trawler
flying the Soviet flag had violated Article II of the Convention of 1884,
and noting that
Article VIII et seq. of the convention place the responsibility for the
repression of these violations of the convention and trial and punish-
ment of the violators on the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Government
of the United States calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics to discharge its international obligations as sum-
marily as its laws and regulations will permit, by promptly .. . taking
such measures as are necessary to punish those who may be found
to be guilty.'2 2
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas also imposes several obligations
upon the state which has attributed its national character to an offending
vessel. 2'
D. Claims With Respect to Shared Use of Airspace above the High Seas
The conclusiveness of the national character of aircraft for purposes of
securing equality of access to the airspace above the high seas, and for
within six months. Provision is made for challenging the validity of these measures
according to specified criteria, but the conservation program remains in force pending
conclusion of the procedure provided for settling the dispute. 2 Official Records 140;
52 A.J.I.L. 853 (1958). 1202 Official Records 141.
121 U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas
251 (U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER. B/1) (1951); Wilson, Submarine Telegraphic Cables in
Their International Relations 12-13 (1901) (Lectures delivered at the U. S. Naval War
College).
122 Text of the note is in 40 Dept. of State Bulletin 555 (1959).
123 Arts. 27 and 28. 2 Official Records 138; 52 A.J.I.L. 849 (1958).
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protecting aircraft against abuses of authority, would appear to be no less
indispensable than the comparable conclusiveness with respect to vessels. 2 4
It is an interesting parallel, not only with respect to the shared use of
airspace above the high seas but with respect to the use of aircraft gener-
ally anywhere, that the important jurisdictional discriminations are made
in terms of the national character of the craft and that states' authori-
tative decisions about the national character are regarded as conclusive.
Indeed, both multilateral and bilateral air agreements accord privileges
to, and impose burdens upon, aircraft having the national character of the
contracting parties, and, as the Chicago Convention of 1944 puts the matter
bluntly in Article 17, "aircraft have the nationality of the State in which
they are registered." 1 No provision is made for questioning a state's
authoritative decision about registration upon any ground.
III. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO EVENTS DIRECTLY AFFECTING COMMON
ENJOYMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS
A. Claims to Protect Mininial Order
1. Claims against Other States for the Lawful Conduct of Ships and
Aircraft to Which They Have Ascribed Their National Character
The importance of the national character of ships and aircraft for the
maintenance of minimal order lies in the certain and easy identification of
the parties responsible for particular breaches of public order of the high
seas. Ships may, of course, be instruments of coercion and violation of
fundamental community prescriptions, and states may find it necessary to
apply the laws of war and neutrality to vessels in the course of conflict.1'2
124 Art. 2 (4) of the Convention on the High Seas states, in summary of accepted
cnLtomary law, that freedom of the high seas embraces inter alia "freedom to fly over
the high seas." On the other hand, ICAO's "Rules of the Air' -- pursuant to Article
12 of the Chicago Convention, the only standards of flight and maneuver in force over
the high seas-prescribe: "The Rules of the Air shall apply to aircraft bearing the
nationality and registration marks of a Contracting State." Rules of the Air, Annex 2,
2d ed., April, 1952, 2.1.
1,- Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago, Dec. 7, 1944.
I.C.A.O. Doe. 7300; U. S. Dept. of State Pub. 2282 (Conf. Ser. 64). The U. S. Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731 (Public Law 85-726, 85th Cong., S.3880), provides
in See. 501 (a) for compulsory registration of aircraft. Par. (f) of the same section
reads: "Such certificate of registration shall be conclusive evidence of nationality for
international purposes .... '
126 There is, of course, a great body of prescriptions uniquely applicable when out-
breaks of comprehensive violence occur, and the slogan "freedom of the seas" for many
decades was most frequently used in such a context. See Potter, The Freedom of the
Seas 81-96 (1924). See also Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea (1957);
Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954); 2 Oppenheim, International Law
(7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1952).
It may be remembered, however, that the policies and factors relevant for determining
the "enemy character" of ships and goods in time of war are very different from those
relevant for determining the nationality of ships. The two types of problems have very
little in common. Rienow, op. cit. note 61 above, at 130, and sources there cited; Me-
Nair, "The National Character and Status of Corporations," 4 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law
44-56 (1923-1924); see also The U-nitas, [1950] A.C. 536.
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In these latter circumstances the national character of vessels is again
important for protection against abuses of authority. This certain and
easy identification of vessels is so important that special punitive measures
are allowed against stateless ships and ships which fraudulently change
their flag.
As a general principle, derived as we have seen from the overriding
community policy assuring free access to the vessels of all states, ships
of one state are prohibited from interfering with vessels of another state
on the high seas.12 7  In application of the fundamental policies of the
United Nations Charter about impermissible coercion,12 8 as in the more
limited traditional prescriptions limiting resort to coercion, states are held
accountable for ships of their national character and it is commonly assumed
as basic that attributions must be regarded as final.125
Where states authorize ships having their national character to interfere
with ships of other states, the flag state is responsible for any deprivations
imposed. Flag states are universally held to be strictly accountable for the
actions of state ships even in stopping foreign vessels upon the high seas,
if for an impermissible purpose,' as well as for prohibited activities
within the areas of the exclusive authority of other states. 81' Recently,
for example, the Soviet Union protested as "completely unjustified" the
action of an American destroyer, which had stopped and boarded a Soviet
fishing vessel in the Atlantic for investigation of the possibility that it had
caused numerous cable breaks in the area.13 2  The boarding action was
undertaken in this instance in pursuance of a treaty to which both the
United States and the Soviet Union had adhered, and which imposed
liability upon the flag state of the boarding vessel if the actions were un-
warranted; but by customary law, too, responsibility would have been im-
posed on the United States if there had been no treaty authorizing this
action. The importance of national character here is, thus, as elsewhere,233
127 See note 100 above.
1 2sFor exposition and analysis, see McDougal and Feliciano, "Legal Regulation of
Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective,"
68 Yale Law J. 1057 (1959).
129 The problem here is not that some other state's national character ought to be
impressed upon a vessel, but that the flag state cannot be permitted to shift responsi-
bility for the acts of its vessels. Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea 38-41
(1957).
13o In The Jessie, The Thomas F. Bayard and the Pescawha, a case involving claims
by Britain on behalf of British sealing vessels, the actions of the American vessel in
stopping and searching the vessels on the high seas were not done with the authorization
of the U. S. Government, but the United States was held responsible. 6 Rep. Int. Arb.
Awards 57 (1955); also reported in Briggs, Law of Nations 327-328 (2d ed., 1952);
and see authorities cited ibid. at 328-330.
131 Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.S. Rep. 4; 43 A.J.I.L.
558 (1949). 132 40 Dept. of State Bulletin 558 (1959).
133Thus, in another context requiring identification, Colombos states: "The na-
tionality of a ship is one of the guarantees offered by international law for the freedom
of navigation, and every ship which sails the high seas must possess a national character
and be in a position to provide evidence of it. The possession of a nationality is the
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in its indispensability to the quick and easy identification of responsible
parties.
When deprivations of a substantial character imposed by private vessels
are unauthorized, the acts may be regarded as piratical and, as we will see,
the ship and its crew may be made responsible, irrespective of their na-
tional character.
2. Claims to Repress Piracy
In a domain subject to no exclusive competence of any particular state
and with no centralized international administration of sanctions, it is of
course necessary to make special provision for the repression of private
violence. Historically this has been achieved through development of
rules relating to piracy. The community considers the maintenance of
public order on the high seas of such vital importance that all states are
authorized to take measures against private violence, appropriately char-
acterized as "piracy," irrespective of the national character of the offending
ship. 134
Whatever difficulties there may have been in the past in achieving an
agreed definition of the substantive elements of piracy,135 the basic juris-
dictional principle in repression of piracy has long been both certain and
agreed. Thus the matter was put sharply by Lord Stowell in the case of
Le Louis, where he declared that pirates are "the enemies of every country,
and at all times; and therefore are universally subject to the extreme rights
of war." 36 To similar effect Mr. Justice Story, in United States v. Smith,
described piracy as follows:
basis for the intervention and protection by a State; it is also a protection for other
States for the redress of wrongs committed by those on board against their nationals."
International Law of the Sea 216 (3rd ed., 1954). Compare also 1 Gidel, Le Droit
International Public de la Mer 74 (1932).
Professor Van Bogaert of the University of Ghent, noting that international law re-
quires that every ship which navigates the high seas have a national character, states:
"Cette obligation est base sur la consid6ration qu 'n navire doit tre soumis A un
r~gime juridique d6termin6, qui rbgle les relations A bord du navire, qui assure la protec-
tion 6ventuelle de la part de 1'Etat du pavillon et qui rend cet Etat responsable envers
les autres Etats pour les infractions commises contre les r gles du droit international
public maritime." "Le droit que possode PEtat pour d~terminer les conditions
d'aplrbs lesquelles les navires ont le droit d'arborer son pavilion," 35 Revue de Droit
International et de Droit Compar6 485 (1958).
134 See Harvard Research in International Law, Piracy, 26 A.J.I.L. Supp. 739, at 757
(1932).
135 "It is of considerable importance that there be no confusion about the significance
of the proposition that pirates jure gentium are hostes humani generis. Is the juris-
diction universal because they are hostes humani generis, or are they said to be hostes
humani generis because the jurisdiction is universall Does the proposition state a
prerequisite or a consequence? Does it describe a constituent element of the offense of
piracy or only a reprehensible quality or characteristic which the law attributes to
pirates? It is evident that the applicability of the law of piracy to modern marauders
on the sea, including the 4hi-jackers,' for example, may depend much upon the correct
answers to these questions." Diekinson, "Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?", 38
Harvard Law Rev. 334, 351 (1924-1925). '3GLe Louis, [1817] 2 Dodson 210, 244.
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The common law, too, recognises and punishes piracy as an offence,
not against its own municipal code, but as an offence against the law
of nations (which is part of the common law), as an offence against
the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the
human race.13 7
A century later, the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee
of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, reporting
on piracy in 1926, formulated the problem in these words:
Piracy has as its field of operation that vast domain which is termed
"the high seas." It constitutes a crime against the security of com-
merce ....
'When pirates choose as the scene of their acts of sea-robbery a place
common to all men and when they attack all nations indiscriminately,
their practices become harmful to the international community of all
States. They become the enemies of the human race and place them-
selves outside the law of peaceful people.138
The most recent formulation is Article 19 of the Geneva Convention on
the High Seas, which reads:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the per-
sons and seize the property on board.
The point we emphasize here, as elsewhere, is that uniform and universal
application of the same policies to the ships of all states, irrespective of
national character, is no denial of the conclusiveness of attributions of
national character. The convention itself in Article 18 makes this explicit,
noting that a "ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has
become a pirate ship or aircraft," 131 and adding that the "retention or
loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such
nationality was originally derived."
3. Claims with Bespect to Stateless Ships
So great a premium is placed upon the certain identification of vessels
for purposes of maintaining minimal order upon the high seas, as indi-
cated above, that extraordinary deprivational measures are permitted with
137 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820). Similarly Mr. Justice Johnston in United
States v. Bowers, ibid. 190 (1820), especially at 193, 194-195.
135 Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International Law 117 (League of Nations Pub. No. 0. 196. M. 70.
1927. V; 20 A.J.I.L. Spec. Supp. 224 (1926)). See also Harvard Research in Inter-
national Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Art. 9, 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 435 (1935);
Johnson, "Piracy in Modern International Law," 43 Grotius Society Transactions 03
(1959).
139 But Professor A. Pearce Higgins, stressing the "jurisdictional competence' of the
state of national character over its ships on the high seas, seems to imply that oven
piracy does not constitute a derogation of this "general rule" because it is, in fact,
"denationalization" of the pirate ship which has become a hostis humani gneris.
Higgins, "Le R4gime juridique des navires de commerce," 30 Hague Academy Recueil
des Cours 5, at 18 (1929, V).
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respect to stateless ships. Thus, it is commonly considered that ships
either having no nationality or falsely assuming a nationality are almost
completely without protection. It is obviously an extreme view to regard
such ships as hostes hurnani generis, but there appear no clear policies
which might protect such ships from very summary treatment.
Excellent illustration of this severity in community attitude is found
in a relatively recent decision of the British Privy Council in Nait-
Molvan v. Attorney General for Palestine.140  In this case the vessel Asya,
sailing in 1946 from a French port towards Palestine with several hundreds
of illegal immigrants aboard, was apprehended some 100 miles off the coast
by a British destroyer. When first sighted, the Asya was flying no flag;
however, it hoisted the Turkish flag, which was soon hauled down and
replaced by a Zionist flag. Having no documents with which to prove
its national character, the ship was subsequently taken by the destroyer to
Haifa, and eventually by a court ordered forfeited to the Government of
Palestine. Affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Palestine,
the Privy Council through Lord Simonds declared that the freedom of the
high seas is "a freedom of ships which fly, and are entitled to fly, the flag
of a State which is within the comity of nations." L41 "The Asya did not
satisfy these elementary conditions," in the opinion of the Court, and,
therefore, "could not claim the protection of any State nor could any
State claim that any principle of international law was broken by her
soizure. " 142-
One very effective restraint upon the frequency of stateless ships in fact
is that access to the ports of states is, as we have seen, largely secured
through agreements which bestow the right of access only upon the ships
having the national character of the parties. Rienow has rightly observed
that "It is by this control of their ports that States, in practice, clear
the high seas of nondescript vessels." 143
4. Claims to Take Punitive Measures agaist Ships Fraudulently
Changing Flags on the High Seas
The same policy prevails in the drastic penalties provided for vessels
fraudulently changing flags on the high seas. This policy, thoroughly
clarified in a long process of customary development, is clearly expressed
in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 6 of which provides:
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or
in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while
in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or
change in registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using
them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities
i4o [1948] A.C. 351; 42 A.J.I.L. 953 (1948).
141 [1948] A.C. 351, at 369. 142 Ibid. at 369-370.
143 Rienow, The Test of the Nationality of a Merchant Vessel 15 (1937).
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in question with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to
a ship without nationality.
4 4
It must, however, be noted that the exception stated in Article 6(1) in the
following words-- 'save in the case of a real transfer of ownership," is
most unfortunate. This exception would appear to authorize a change of
flag upon the high seas without change in registry, thus destroying the
security of the registry and encouraging artistry in quick and fraudulent
change of flags.'
145
5. Claims to Prevent Use of Ships in Slave Trade
The common interest in repressing the slave trade, similarly, is so great
that especially severe measures have been allowed against vessels employed
for that purpose. It is, nevertheless, somewhat paradoxical, since slave-
trading involves attacks upon human dignity rather than upon goods,
that customary international law did not establish the same universal
jurisdiction with respect to slave-trading as with respect to piracy. This
defect has, however, been remedied by various international agreements
subscribed to by varying numbers of states, and authorizing states to apply
varying degrees of authority to each other's ships for the repression of
slave-trading. 14 6  Considerably more modest in scope are some of the more
recent conventions, such as the Geneva Slavery Convention of 1926,147
the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956,14s and
the Convention on the High Seas of 1958, in which it has been left to every
state to adopt effective measures "to prevent and punish the transport of
slaves" in ships having its national character.149 Although regrettably
limited, these prescriptions do emphasize the importance which states place
upon respect for the conclusiveness and significance of national character.
144 52 A.J.LL. 844 (1958). See also note 140 above, and accompanying text.
145 Our criticism here is parcel of our more comprehensive criticism of the convention 
emphasis upon documentation and flag rather than registration as indications of the
attribution of national character. See below, pp. 101-103.
It may be added that in this context the word "or" in "save in the case of a real
transfer of ownership or change in registry" probably is not to be interpreted as mean-
ing "that is to say." For the ambiguities of this term, see Allen, "Toward a
Procedure for Detecting and Controlling Syntactic Ambiguity in Legal Discourse,"
An International Conference for Standards on a Common Language for Machine Search-
ing and Translation, Cleveland, Ohio, Western Reserve University, Sept. 6-12, 1959;
"And/or," 18 A.B.A.J. 456 (1932); Note, "In Defense of 'And/or,' " 45 Yale Law
J. 918 (1936).
146 For a brief summary of the United States attitude towards the establishment of
an international penal jurisdiction with respect to suppression of slave-trading, see
McDougal and Arens, "The Genocide Convention and the Constitution," 3 Vanderbilt
Law Rev. 683, at 698-700 (1950); and Wilson, "Some Principal Aspects of British
Efforts to Crush the African Slave Trade, 1807-1929," 44 A.J.I.L. 505 (1950).
147 3 Hudson, International Legislation 2010 (1931).
14s Relevant articles are in U.N. Legislative Series, Supplement to Laws and Regula-
tions on the Regime of the High Seas and Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships 70
(U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER. B/8) (1959).
149 Art. 13. See also Colombos, op. cit. note 133 above, at 341-345.
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B. Claimzs with Respect to Securing Safe and Ordered Navigation","
It is a common practice in conventions designed to secure safe and
ordered navigation to impose upon each state responsibility for securing
conformity by vessels of its national character with the standards pre-
scribed by such conventions.' 1 No other state is commonly authorized to
apply its authority to vessels for securing such conformity. Under the
existing circumstances, in the absence of a centralized enforcement agency,
and with the exigencies of ocean commerce requiring swift identification, it
is only natural that the state which has attributed its national character to
a vessel should be vested with exclusive authority to enforce compliance
with international rules relevant to safety of navigation. This policy seems
to be applicable to all the types of conventions dealing with matters of
safety at sea.
The new Geneva Convention on the High Seas embraces provisions sub-
stantially comparable to those found in many previous separate conventions,
such as those of the types itemized above in the process of claim. This most
recent convention similarly employs the same jurisdictional and pro-
cedural principles as are employed in the separate conventions. Thus, for
example, the Geneva Convention provides that every state shall take meas-
ures with respect to "ships under its flag" to conform with international
standards designed to ensure and promote safe and ordered sea naviga-
tion.15 2  It will be noted that no provision is made for going behind the
authorized flag.
150 Even before the advent of explicit agreements, there were widely accepted uniform
rules for regulating navigation upon the high seas. See The Scotia, 81 U. S. (14 Wall.)
170 (1871).
151 The most important multilateral agreements with respect to safety of navigation
are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, in force since
Nov. 19, 1952, the International Load Line Convention, 1930, and some of the I.L.O.
conventions relating to the adequacy and competence of the crew and labor conditions
on ships. As of Jan. 1, 1954, ocean navigation is regulated by the new International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, agreed upon at the 1948 International Con-
ference on Safety of Life at Sea and attached to the Final Act of the conference as
Annex B, commonly called the International Rules of the Road. These Rules have been
adopted by more than fifty states, among them all the principal maritime Powers, in-
cluding the U.S.S.R. "Most maritime countries follow the basic International Rules in
their local waters as well as on the high seas, adding special rules to supplement the
International Rules when local conditions so demand." Farwell and Prunski, The Rules
of the Nautical Road 11 (rev. ed., 1959). See also Reiff, The United States and the
Treaty Law of the Sea 227 et seq. (1958). For a general survey of the maritime ses-
sions of the International Labor Organization during the past four decades, see "Seven
Maritime Sessions of the International Labour Conference," 78 Int. Labour Rev. 429-
460 (1958). For texts of I.L.O. maritime conventions, see 1 International Labour
Code 1951, Bk. IX (1952).
In addition to the above, the following agreements bear more importantly upon the
safety of ocean navigation: International Code of Signals, Agreement concerning Mari-
time Signals, 1930; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with respect
to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, 1910 (Art. 11 in particular); and Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with respect to Collisions between Vessels, 1910
(Art. 8 in particular). 152 Arts. 10 and 12.
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C. Claims Relating to Control of Pollution
The importance of national character of ships in administering com-
munity policies for control of pollution is again in the easy identification
of a responsible party which it offers. The state of national character may
be required by agreement to prescribe the necessary regulations for its
ships, and it has authority to apply coercion to its ships in sanction of
these regulations. The state of national character may further be made
responsible for appropriate observance by its vessels and, in additional
precaution, other states may under certain conditions be given concurrent
jurisdiction.
These policies find illustration in the London Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, in force since July 26, 1958.115
The convention refers in a number of articles to "sea-going ships registered
in any of the territories of a Contracting Government," and the contracting
government assumes responsibility for securing the compliance by vessels
of its national character with the provisions of the agreement. 4  The con-
vention further authorizes every contracting state to report contraven-
tions by vessels of any other contracting state, wherever they may occur,
to the government of the country whose national character the offending
vessel possesses. 1 5 The unimpaired competence of each state to prescribe
and apply measures for preventing pollution of waters within its territorial
domain to all ships, irrespective of their national character, involves of
course no detraction from the conclusiveness of attributions of national
character. 156 The provisions of Articles 24 and 25 of the Geneva Conven-
tion on the High Seas are comparable to those of the London Convention
of 1954.
D. Claims to Temporary Exclusive Use in Non-Contiguoits Areas of the
High Seas and Airspace Above
The basic assertion of authority here is for purposes of naval maneuvers,
nuclear experiments of great importance to the national security of the
claimant state, and for experimentation usually related to military uses
of outer space (testing range for missiles). Naval maneuvers constitute
a common example of this type of claim of unquestioned legality. Quite
153 U.N. Legislative Series, op. cit. note 148 above, at 33. The Geneva Convention on
the High Seas contains some very general prescriptions on problems of pollution by
nuclear materials. See the JAG Journal, April, 1959, for a useful survey of the legal
problems involved in the use of nuclear-powered ships, including submarines.
154 Thus, for example with slight modifications, Arts. III III, V, VII and X.
555 Art. X (1). Art. X (2) further provides: "Upon receiving such particulars the
latter Government [i.e., of ship's nationality] shall investigate the matter, and may
request the former Government to furnish further or better particulars of the alleged
contravention. If the Government in the territory of which the ship is registered is
satisfied that sufficient evidence is available in the form required by law to enable pro.
ceedings against the owner or master of the ship to be taken in respect of the alleged
contravention, it shall cause such proceedings to be taken as soon as possible .... "
55s See, e.g., British Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1955, Art. 14 (1). U.N. Legisla-
tive Series, op. cit. note 148 above, 37 at 39-40.
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controversial recent examples of the assertions of claims of this type are
those of the United States and the United Kingdom to conduct nuclear
experiments on the high seas vital to their security. The significance
of national character here is the same as in all interactions in which the
necessity arises for the protection of vessels against alleged abuses of
authority. The policies which we have recommended for protection gen-
erally are equally applicable to these problems.
This type of exclusionary claim is usually made known by giving notice,
through channels of information familiar and accessible to mariners all
over the world, that certain defined areas will be unsafe for navigation for
certain specified periods of time. The areas so designated are customarily
so circumscribed and selected as to create the least possible interference
with other uses of the ocean. Literally hundreds of these areas have been
established by the United States, and other states, including Great Britain,
the Soviet Union and France, have engaged in the same practice. In previ-
ous summary, it is observed: "Although such claims may be traced indirectly
to antiquity, their legality has seldom been questioned or even discussed." 15
In addition to affecting the competence to protest the legality of claims to
exclusive use, the nationality of ships is here important for identifying the
state which may attempt to recover damages for harm caused by the ac-
tivities which necessitate creation of the exclusive area. Thus, in the case
of the hydrogen bomb tests in 1954, Japan presented a claim for two million
dollars on behalf both of the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel injured by
effects of the test and of the Japanese fishing industry. Japan explicitly
refused to request discontinuance of the tests and the United States satisfied
the monetary claim "without reference" to questions of legal liability.'-1
I V. CLAIMS RELATING TO EVENTS OCCURRING ON BOARD SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS
It is important that a clear distinction be made between events which
affect the public order of the vessel and those which do not.' 59 The in-
'571McDougal and Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security," 64 Yale Law J. 648 (1955), establishes the case for the law-
fulness of the hydrogen bomb tests in terms of the law of the sea. For other views see
Margolis, "The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law," ibid. 629;
Gidel, "Explosions Nuel~aires Exp6rimentales et Libert6 de la Haute Mer," in Grund-
probleme des Internationalen Rechts: Festschrift fir Jean Spiropoulos 173 (1957),
commented upon in McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community
Perspectives versus National Egoism," 67 Yale Law J. 539, 547, note 28 (1958).
'rs McDougal and Schlei, loc. cit. above, at 694-695.
159 By distinguishing between events which affect the public order of the ship and
those which do not, we intend only to emphasize the special interest of the flag state in
certain events. The events on board a ship on the high seas are components of larger
community processes, and states other than the flag state may be concerned with their
impact, as, for example, upon their nationals. Thus, such states may in appropriate
cases reasonably assert a concurrent competence even with respect to events primarily
affecting the public order of the ship. Our distinction merely seeks to secure that the
unique character and impacts of events on board ship be given appropriate policy con-
sideration.
The famous case which is associated with recognition of this concurrent competence is,
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terest of the state of national character is most substantial and direct with
respect to the events which affect the public order of the vessel, though on
occasion a concurrent jurisdiction may appropriately be honored with
respect to these events as well as to those not affecting the public order of
the vessel.
A. Claims Relating to Public Order of Ship
In matters relating both to the discipline of the crew and to control
of the passengers, it is imperative that the state of national character
should have competence immediately to apply its authority. It is the
current fashion to refer to the metaphor of the ship as a "floating bit of
territory" as outmoded fiction, but, as in famous aphorism, a "fiction
feigned is very near the simple truth." 160 The very real community on
board a ship is as much in need of the unified prescription and application
of authority for the maintenance of public order as is a community on
land. Every state demands this competence with respect to its ships and
in turn recognizes similar competence in other states.1 1
This competence is commonly stated in the books in very broad terms. 
1 2
of course, that of The Lotus, decided by the Permanent Court, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10
(1927). Art. 11 of the Convention on the High Seas reverses the specific holding of the
Lotus Case, but does not disturb its more general significance.
160 While rejecting the usefulness of the "fiction of territoriality" of merchant ves-
sels, Professor Higgins nevertheless states: "]l y a done des liens 6troits entre le naviro
et l']Atat dont il acquiert la nationalit6 et ces liens entrainent comme cons6quence l'ap-
plication aux navires de la l6gislation du pays du pavillon. C'est en vertu de cette
idgislation que le capitaine exerce son autorit6 et qu'Il la fait respecter. Le navire
pent 6tre un objet mobilier, un bien meuble, mais il est rdgi par des lois sp6ciales, et il
est universellement admis qu'en haute mer, il dolt 6chapper 6 tout contr6le autre que
celui des autorit~s du pays du pavilion." Loc. cit. note 139 above, at 18. See also
St. Clair v. United States, 154 U. S. 134, at 152 (1894).
161 U.N. Legislative Series, Laws Relating to Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed
Abroad or on the High Seas (U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER. B/2) (1952), and Supplement
(U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER. B/8) (1959).
162 See, e.g., Colombos, op, cit. note 133 above, at 222; Smith, The Law and Custom
of the Sea 61 (3d ed., 1959); Fenwick, International Law 311 (3d ed., 1948).
A most recent confirmation of the competence of a state to apply its authority to
events occurring on board vessels having its national character is provided by the decision
in R. v. Governor of H. M. Prison Brixton, ex parte Minervini, [1958] 3 All E.R. 318;
digested in 53 A.J.I.L. 447 (1959). An Italian national serving on board a Norwegian
vessel murdered a fellow crewman during a voyage of the vessel and was subsequently
arrested in England. In the ensuing proceedings, following a request by Norway for
extradition on the basis of the Treaty of Extradition between the two countries, Lord
Parker, C.J., ruled that the word "territory" as applied in the treaty should be in-
terpreted as meaning "jurisdiction," and consequently Minervini's crime should be
dealt with as if it had been committed in Norway. In conclusion, Lord Parker said:
"Accordingly, it seems to me that it matters not in this case whether the ship was in
the middle of the North Sea, in the territorial waters of Norway, in the territorial
waters of this country or in the territorial waters of any other Power; the Norwegian
government had jurisdiction, and that is sufficient to enable these proceedings to be
brought." [1958] 3 All E.R. at 321.
With respect to aircraft Kamminga observes: "With regard to breaches of discipline
on board the aircraft, it is fairly generally agreed that these must be judged solely by
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Thus a comment, in the most recent draft of the American Law Institute,
to a section devoted to the scope of jurisdiction, reads:
The principle is well established that a state may prescribe rules
governing conduct aboard its vessels while they are on the high seas.
The principle applies to all persons aboard, whether nationals or
aliens. The United States and other maritime nations hold that
conduct aboard is regulated by the law of the flag of the vessel even
when it is in the waters of another state.
163
Similarly, Professor Hyde observed:
A State has the right to make reasonable application of its criminal
code to its own vessels (private or public) when they are on the high
seas, and, therefore, to punish the occupants who violate it. The
relation of the State to the vessel when so circumstanced justifies the
assertion of jurisdiction.'6
This perspective of a state's competence is so deeply respected that even
when disorders aboard ship have occurred within the territorial domain of
another country, the local authorities have been reluctant to interfere,
except when asked to or when disorder threatened the value processes on
shore. Thus in the celebrated Wildenhiis' Case, where one Belgian mem-
ber of the crew killed another Belgian member of the crew aboard a
Belgian ship in an American port, C. J. Waite stated:
And so by comity it came to be generally understood among civilized
nations that all matters of discipline and all things done on board
which affected only the vessel or those belonging to her, and did not
involve the peace and dignity of the country, or the tranquillity of the
port, should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the
authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged as the laws of
that nation or the interests of its commerce should require. 165
the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses." The Aircraft Commander in
Commercial Air Transportation 34 (1953). For more detail see pp. 136, 146 et seq.
163 Restatement, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Tentative Draft
No. 2), § 17 at 43 (1958). The relevant provisions of the Restatement read:
"17. A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing:
(a) The conduct of all persons aboard national vessels while under the control
of their commanding officer; .. ." (Ibid. at 42.)
"18. A state has jurisdiction to enforce rules governing the conduct of persons:
(a) Aboard its national vessels while under the control of their commanding of-
ficer; . . 11 (Ibid. at 44.)
164 1 Hyde, International Law 800-801 (2d rev. ed., 1945).
165 120 U. S. 1, 18 (1887). When the public order of a vessel upon the high seas is
threatened by a member of the crew or a passenger, the captain may immediately apply
authority in order to protect life and property entrusted to him. In Tlhe Condor, Judge
Hand stated with respect to the r~le of the captain: "Discipline on the sea is not like
that on the land in ordinary industrial employments. The relations between master and
men require an authority which is not necessary when both parties have immediate re-
course to constituted authority. No doubt countless misery and brutality has arisen
from the exercise of master's authority; but the substance of that authority still re-
mains in civilized countries, and must remain, if men are put to sea for weeks, out of
reach of the usual methods of keeping order." 196 Fed. 71, 74 (1912). For a more
comprehensive coverage of this question see 1 Norris, Law of Seamen 82 et seq., Chs. 23
and 25 (1951).
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B. Claims Relating to Events Not Affecting Public Order of Ship
It is obvious that with respect to the great variety of events, including
both deprivations and agreements as well as dispositive acts and matters
affecting personal status, many different states will make many different
claims based upon many different justifications and that many of these
claims will be well founded in community policy. The fact that events of
this type occur on board ship is just one factor among many others relevant
to allocation of competence, and the multiple principles of jurisdiction in
public and private international law ascribe a varying importance to differ-
ent factors in different contexts."' The state of national character may
be accorded competence with respect to such events, but other states may
be protected in a concurrent competence. This policy is relevant to each
of the sub-categorizations of events which we have specified.
The competence of the state whose national character the vessel possesses
is asserted in categoric terms by many authorities. Thus Colombos states
that "it is a generally recognised rule that the flag-State of the vessel is
competent to deal with all matters civil and criminal, which originate in
the ship" while on the high seas.
1. 7
The competence of states other than the flag state has been asserted in
countless instances on many different types of problems and this competence
is commonly regarded as lawful when asserted under appropriate justifica-
tion. Appropriate justification may be found in many different principles
of jurisdiction, nationality, impact territoriality, passive personality, pro-
tective, "act of state," and so on.
V. CLAIMS TO PROTECT COASTAL INTERESTS
In lawful assertions of exclusive competence under international law a
coastal state may apply its authority to the ships of any country. The
importance of the national character of ships here is again to identify the
states which may protect vessels against unlawful assertion of coastal
competence. If a state's authority to question the lawfulness of such
assertions of coastal competence with respect to its ships may be denied by
unilateral challenge, the inclusive rights of states would be left with little
or no protection. If states attributing national character are denied
competence to protect, the effective powers of the coastal state over not
only its internal waters but its territorial sea and contiguous zones could
become even more comprehensive and absolute.
166 For an excellent survey of such relevant factors, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U. S. 571 (1953), and Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354
(1959). For a thoughtful discussion of the problem, consult Bickel, "The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty," 35
Cornell Law Q. 12 (1949); Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty 46-47 (1957).
See also 2 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 346-351 (1947).
167 Colombos, op. cit. note 133 above, at 234. See also 1 Beale, A Treatise on the
Conflict of Laws 287-288 (1935).
[Vol. 54
HeinOnline -- 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 84 1960
!1MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER AT SEA
On every specific problem arising in each major subdivision below, the
question is: Who can protect the vessel against abuses of coastal authority?
The advantage of easy identification of such a vessel is in the economy and
dispatch with which the protecting state may be ascertained. Any pro-
longed investigation of, or dispute about, the identity of the protecting
state would seriously interfere with the smooth flow of ocean commerce.
The importance of our detailed sub-categorization of problems is to indicate
how frequent the occasion for protection may be and how vital are the
interests at stake.
Fortunately these preferred policies find universal acceptance in practice.
The conclusiveness of a state's attribution of national character has been
carried to the extent of allowing a state to protect a vessel to which it has
attributed nationality even against a state whose individual nationals
solely own and operate the ship. 8
A. Claiis Relating to Internal Waters
The books are full of accounts of controversies between states regarding
the exercise of state authority over foreign vessels in internal waters, most
of them in connection with claimed exemptions from jurisdiction and prob-
lems relating to the exercise of port authority over events aboard the
vessel' 61 In disputes such as these, the exercise of the protective function
by protest against an alleged impermissible assertion of authority by the
port officials becomes of very considerable importance. The identification
of the state authorized to make this protest is determined, both by customary
law and many explicit agreements, by the national character of the ship
concerned.17 0  The records fail to substantiate the notion that states are
accustomed to deny objections by flag states to assertions of local authority
on the ground that the flag-state connection with the vessel was not adequate
to warrant the grant of nationality.1 1 To the contrary, in practice issues
between territorial and flag states are commonly dealt with on the basis of
the merits of the issue involved, and states do not seek to deny the basis for
the attribution of national character.
las Reference is made to the I'm Alove Case and the events connected with exclusion
of trawling from Moray Firth, discussed above, pp. 62, 70.
l6 It is generally agreed that coastal states have full authority to prescribe and
apply policy to events on board vessels in ports, except as agreements may limit coastal
discretion. See Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 144-
194 (1927), and the numerous works there cited; Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S. 1 (1887);
for more recent practice see 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 208-224 (1941) ;
The Lonze Star, 1947 Annual Digest 84-90 (1951); Master Amiruzzaman and Others v.
The Crown, 1953 Int. Law Rep. 171-172 (1957); Silberwacht v. Attorney General, ibid.
at 153, 154-155; and American Law Institute, Restatement, op. cit. note 163 above, § 34.
17o Provision for competence over events on board foreign merchant vessels in port is
commonly made in consular agreements. For illustrative provisions see U. S. agree-
inents with the Philippines, Costa Rica, and the United Kingdom in 45 U.N.T.S. 38
(1949), 70 ibid. at 50 (1950) and 165 ibid. at 152-154 (1953).
71g See sources cited in note 169 above.
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B. Claims Relating to the Territorial Sea
1. Claims to Deny Access
Since it has long been recognized that community use of the territorial
sea of coastal states is often either virtually indispensable or convenient in
very high degree, the promotion of inclusive interests of marked significance
may be at stake in controversies concerning such an area.17 2  The protection
afforded by the flag states to vessels passing through the territorial sea
against abuse from coastal authority serves, accordingly, not only to save
a particular vessel from harm, but also to establish and maintain a struc-
ture of prescription for protecting all who use the oceans. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that in this context the conclusiveness of the attribution
of nationality is so taken for granted in the practice of states as to require
no mention, much less emphasis. 7 3  In particular, the issue of innocent
passage is highly crucial in the case of fishing vessels, both because the
potentiality of infringements upon coastal laws is so obvious, and because
navigation close to the shore is peculiarly necessary for this type of craft.
Yet one looks in vain for denials by the coastal state of the competence of
the flag state to protect against coastal exercises of authority over those
vessels. The issue is rather debated in terms of the actual interests at
stake, and the procedural principles are taken for granted.
174
2. Claims to Regulate Navigation of Ships
Because coastal officials are more likely to know of the difficulties and
dangers of transit through adjacent waters and the coastal state is most
intimately affected by chronically unsafe conditions in such waters, it is
clearly desirable that these officials exercise exclusive competence to regu-
late navigation through the territorial sea. The practice of states thor-
oughly accords with such policy and the importance of national character
is again to insure protection against abuses of authority.17 5
172 Denial of access may be absolute, as in denial of innocent passage, or qualified, as
in denial of passage that is allegedly non-innocent, but we do not differentiate these
claims here because policy for present purposes is unaffected by the difference. For
prescriptive formulations see Art. 14 and Art. 16(3) of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, in 2 Official Records 133-134; 52 A.J.I.L. 837, 838 (1958).
173 The most important and authoritative secondary sources customarily used for
reference upon territorial sea problems are: Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea (1911) ;
Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927); Bustamante,
The Territorial Sea (1930); 3 Gidel, Le Droit International Public de la Mer (1934);
laestad, La Mer Territoriale (1913); and the compilation in Crocker, The Extent of
the Marginal Sea (1919).
174 Selak, "Fishing Vessels and the Principle of Innocent Passage," 48 A.J.I.L. 627
(1954).
175 Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 137-141 (1927);
1 Oppenheim, International Law 495 (8th ed., 1955, Lauterpacht); Restatement, cited
note 163 above, § 36 (2) and Comment (c) to § 36 at 111 and 113.
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3. Claims Relating to Control of the Ship
Although recent agreement 176 could alter the situation, disputes over
this type of authority have been quite rare.1 77  It is widely assumed, both
by officials and by writers, that the nationality of a vessel serves the func-
tion of identifying the state entitled to object to coastal attempts to assert
control over a ship for purposes of civil jurisdiction, and in the sole re-
ported case involving this issue, United States v. Panana, no question was
raised about the competence of Panama to confer its nationality on the
ship concerned. 7 8 It is clear, of course, that if states could easily deny
the attribution of nationality in a situation of this kind, there would be
no need for a structure of prescription which seeks to limit the exercise of
coastal authority, for the simple reason that such authority would be com-
plete and for all practical purposes beyond question.
4. Claims to Exercise Authority over Events aboard Ship
Although the general prescriptions for allocation of competence, phrased
in terms of the impact of the events in question, are comparable to those for
ships in port,17 9 the importance of the protective function would appear
greater in this situation, since interference with passage through the ter-
ritorial sea would have more drastic consequences. The evidence suggests
that states do not, even in rare instances, seek to deny the national character
of a vessel when the flag state protests the application of coastal law to a
vessel in the territorial sea. The prohibition laws of the United States
represent the most sweeping claim to apply local law in the territorial sea,
and the states which protested, in the name of "inoffensive passage,"
sought to point out the detrimental effects of such application upon ships
flying their flags. s0 In concrete cases the United States never questioned
176 The International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, opened for
signature on May 10, 1952, has been ratified by a few states, and relates to the arrest of
vessels "flying the flag of a Contracting State in the jurisdiction of any Contracting
State" for certain specified maritime claims. For text see U. S. Naval War College,
International Law Situation and Documents 1956, 566 (1957); 53 A.J.I.L. 539 (1959).
177 The general conception prevailing among international lawyers is that the coastal
state is not authorized to arrest a vessel passing through the territorial sea except "in
respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course
of or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State." Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Art. 20(2), 2 Official Records 134.
The 1952 Convention, if interpreted to extend to ships in passage, would permit arrests
for a much broader category of claims.
178 Compafila de Navegaci6n Nacional (Panama) v. United States, in Report of B. L.
Hunt, American and Panamanian General Claims Arbitration 765 (1934) (Dept. of
State Arbitration Series, No. 6); 6 Rep. Lit. Arb. Awards 382 (1955); 28 A.J.I.L. 596
(1934); Jessup, "Civil Jurisdiction over Ships in Innocent Passage," 27 A.J.I.L. 747
(1933).
17 9 Art. 19 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone is the most
recent authoritative formulation on this point. Art. 19 provides for coastal competence
which is more limited than that which states claim in ports. Compare the provisions
of Art. 19 with the sources cited above, note 169.
18o Jessup, op. cit. note 175 above, 211-238, reviews some of the counterclaims; and
see Jones, The Eighteenth Amendment and Our Foreign Relations (1933).
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the nationality of the ships concerned except where facts indicated the
foreign registry was fraudulently obtained, as where there was knowledge
of failure to comply with the foreign registration law. 81  The deference
accorded to the foreign attribution of nationality in these instances is
representative of state practice in this situation.
5. Claims to Deny Access to Non-National Aircraft
Access to airspace above the territorial sea is largely dependent upon
special agreement. 8 2  Such agreements habitually accord access only to
aircraft having the national character of the contracting parties. It will
be recalled that the Chicago Convention provides in Article 17 that "[a] ir-
craft have the nationality of the State in which they are registered," and,
in Article 18, that an "aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than
one State."
6. Claims to Exclusive Exploitation of Natural Resources
There is, of course, no question that coastal states may exclude non-
nationals from fishing in the territorial sea, and claims to exclude foreign
vessels from this area are quite common. 83 The chief dispute about these
claims concerns the areas sought to be included within the territorial sea.18'
As previously pointed out, Norway was careful to assert the right to protect
its vessels against exclusion in the Moray Firth incident, when it was
thought that the exclusionary authority might extend to the high seas, even
though it was well known that the vessels were being used by British
trawler owners merely to evade a British statute.18 5 The United States,
the United Kingdom and numerous other states have been quick to defend
against suspected excesses of otherwise acknowledged coastal authority, but
there is no practice of denying these assertions on the basis that the ob-
jeeting state had no authority to confer its nationality on the ships con-
cerned. 18
C. Claims Relating to Contiguous Zones
With respect to contiguous zones the policies specified above are even
more important because assertions of authority under this concept may
extend out over vast areas of the high seas and could cause immense disrup-
tions in the processes of co-operative exploitation of the oceans. Vessels
may avoid the internal waters of a state which abuses its authority over
vessels, but on occasion the exigencies of navigation may require vessels to
181 Jessup, op. cit. note 175 above, at 241-276.
182 See Arts. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.
For details, see Wassenbergh, Post-War International Civil Aviation Policy and the Law
of the Air (1957).
183 Jessup, op. cit. note 175 above, passim; Riesenfeld, The Protection of Coastal
Fisheries under International Law (1942); Leonard, International Regulation of
Fisheries 9-11 (1944). 184 Leonard, op. cit. above, at 12-34.
185 Fulton, op. cit. note 173 above, 721-728.
1s6 Notes 203 and 204 below, and accompanying text.
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resort to the territorial sea and, even more often, to the sometimes extensive
area of contiguous zones.
1. Traditional Clabs
There is a very substantial practice of, and consensus about, asserting
authority beyond the territorial sea for special purposes and, since areas
of inclusive use are affected and the doctrine of the freedom of the seas is
so easily available for use, states are quick to act in defense of vessels
affected by such authority.8 7 In this extensive practice of claim and
counterclaim there is not the slightest indication of any consistent pattern
of questioning the attribution of nationality to a particular vessel, although
there are instances in which there would appear to be very slight connec-
tion between the flag state and the vessel. The I'm Alone Case, the facts
(,f which were presented above, is a classic illustration.18 8  The United
States introduced evidence that the beneficial ownership of the vessel was
American, although it was registered in Canada. In an Interim Report,
the Commissioners decided that the Tribunal was authorized to inquire into
the question of ownership "as a basis for considering the recommendations
which they shall make." ""' In the Final Report the Commissioners found
as a fact that, from September, 1928, down to the date when she was
sunk, the I'm Alone, although a British ship of Canadian registry, was
de facto owned, controlled, and at the critical times, managed, and her
movements directed and her cargo dealt with and disposed of, by a
group of persons acting in concert who were entirely, or nearly so,
citizens of the United States, and who employed her ... 11o [for rum-
running].
Although in the Interim Report the Commissioners had noted the possibility
that this might "be a circumstance that should actuate the claimant
Government in refraining from pressing the claim, in whole or in part,"
nothing was said of this in the Final Report, and the Commissioners ob-
viously did not regard this as sufficiently important for such purpose. The
Commissioners, because of the fact of American ownership and control,
declared that no compensation need be paid for the loss of ship or cargo,
but that sinking the ship was an "unlawful act" for which the United
States ought to make acknowledgment and apology and pay the Canadian
Government. Thus American ownership and control meant that there
187 For review of policies and controversies consult 3 Gidel, op. cit. note 173 above, at
361-489; McDougal and Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security," 64 Yale Law J. 648, at 666-681 (1955); Yntema, "Validity of
Hovering Legislation in International Law," in Hearings before the House Committee
on Ways and Means on H. R. 5496, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 82-124 (1935).
-8 See note 78 above.
189 The Commissioners noted three potential effects upon the Canadian claim of "in-
direct ownership and control" by American citizens: "whether it would be an answer
to the Claim under the Convention, or whether it would go to mitigation of damages, or
whether it would merely be a circumstance that should actuate the claimant Government
in refraining from pressing the claim in whole or in part." 3 Rep. Int. Arb. Awards
1611, 1614 (1949). o90ITbid, at 1617-1618.
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could be no recovery for the vessel or cargo, but it did not follow that
Canada was not entitled to extend its protection to the vessel and to collect
for an illegal action causing harm to a vessel registered in Canada but
having most intimate connection with the United States.""'
2. Claims to Exclitsive Access to Fisheries beyond the Territorial Sea
A limited number of unilateral claims of this type have been advanced
by coastal states, 92 but the most important attempts to establish this au-
thority have been in the form of proposals for exclusive fishing rights in a
contiguous zone which are explicitly coupled with proposals for extending
the territorial sea a moderate distance.1 93 At the 1958 Conference the
suggestion which received the greatest affirmative response was that of the
United States, calling for exclusive fishing rights beyond the territorial
sea, "provided that such rights shall be subject to the right of the vessels
of any State whose vessels have fished regularly in that portion . . ." to
fish in the exclusive area. 9 4  The conference records are barren of any
suggestion that states might be authorized, if this proposal were adopted,
to question the competence of the flag state to attribute its national char-
acter to a fishing vessel.
191 This case has been interpreted to stand for the proposition that the state may not
extend "protection" where ownership and control rests in the hands of citizens of
another state. See Watts, zoo. cit. note 75 above. The confusion which led to this
misunderstanding of the I'm Alone Case appears to arise from failure to note that the
Tribunal, in refusing to require payment for the loss of the vessel and cargo, was merely
giving effect to its finding of U. S. ownership and control by mitigating damages, as it
suggested it could do in its Interim Report, but was not suggesting that Canada should
refrain from pressing the claim, an alternative the Commissioners also thought might
follow from this fact. Indeed, the requirement of payment to the Canadian Govern-
ment would seem to underscore the right of that state to assert claims on behalf of
vessels of its national character, irrespective of ownership. In any event, if the fact
of American ownership and control had been thought to warrant denial of Canada's
right to press a claim against the United States, as Mr. Watts suggests the Commissioners
decided, it is reasonable to suppose that the Commissioners could have found a better
way to express this conclusion than in requiring the United States to pay Canada
$25,000 for sinking the I'm Alone.
192 Brazil and Yugoslavia (U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situation and
Documents 1956, 444, 500-501 (1957)); the claims of Chile, Ecuador and Peru are also
illustrations, if one accepts the contention of these states that their 200-mile claims were
not efforts to widen the territorial sea. 1 Verbatim Record of Debate in the 6th Com-
mittee of the General Assembly 32 (U.N. Doe. A/Conf.13/19) (1957). And see 2
Official Records 6-7, 32-33, 61-62, for statements by representatives of these states
seeking to emphasize the "limited" authority claimed in the 200-mile zones.
'9' See Report of the First Committee, 2 Official Records 115.
194 U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/L.29, in 2 Official Records 125-126. In Plenary Session this
proposal received 45 affirmative votes, with 33 against, and 7 abstentions. 2 Official
Records 39. The Canadian proposal, also providing for an exclusive fishing zone beyond
the territorial sea but without mentioning a limit for the latter, was approved in the
First Committee, and in Plenary Session received 35 favorable votes, with 30 against,
and 20 abstentions. Ibid.
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3. Claims to Exclusive Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the
Continental Shelf and Other Submnarine Areas
There is no evidence in past experience of limited exclusive authority to
indicate that states have sought to deny the national character of vessels
in this context."'5
4. Claims Relating to Conservation
Whether claims to conserve fishery resources are made unilaterally, as
in the American Proclamation of 1945,196 or multilaterally, as in the 1958
Conservation Convention,19 7 the national character of fishing vessels serves
functions indispensable to successful and peaceful operation of the regula-
tory schemes projected. In either case the conclusiveness of the attribution
of nationality is so widely assumed that the question is seldom, if ever,
raised. The claims to exclusive competence for conservation purposes be-
yond the territorial sea, either prohibiting foreign fishing or imposing
regulations thereon, are not new, but the practice of states is to be
scrutinized in vain for evidence supporting the expectation that states may
deny the competence of the flag state to attribute nationality to a vessel. 98
Indeed the situation is quite the opposite: the deference to this competence
is so marked that regulatory schemes have on occasion foundered because
of successful evasive efforts of the citizens of the regulating state in seeking
the shelter of the flag of another state.199 The recognized conclusiveness
of attributions of national character to fishing vessels is merely emphasized
further by the many expressions of support for permitting exclusive coastal
competence for conservation purposes, for such sentiments derive from
recognition that, as Gidel puts it, "the system of conventions is at the
mercy of individual egoism." 200
195 Hurst, "Whose is the Bed of the Sea?" 4 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 34 (1923-
1924) ; Mouton, The Continental Shelf 138-161 (1952); Waldock, "The Legal Basis of
Claims to the Continental Shelf," 36 Grotius Society Transactions 115, 118 (1951).
See also Art. 2, Convention on the Continental Shelf, 2 Official Records 142; 52 A.J.I.L.
858 (1958).
196 The Proclamation of Sept. 28, 1945, perhaps made limited assertion of exclusive
competence, since the U. S. offered to establish conservation zones by agreement with
the states where fishing "activities have been or shall hereafter be legitimately de-
veloped by nationals of the United States and nationals of other States .... " The
exclusive claim seems to reside in the instance where the fishing activities had been
maintained solely by Americans, and others later sought to enter the same fishery. For
text, see U. S. Naval War College, International Law Situation and Documents 1956,
434-435 (1957); 40 A.J.I.L. Supp. 46, 47 (1946). See Bingham, "The Continental
Shelf and the Marginal Belt," 46 A.J.I.L. 173 (1946).
197 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, 2 Official Records 139; 52 A.J.I.L. 851 (1958).
'98 Leonard, International Regulation of Fishing (1944) ; Fulton, The Sovereignty of
the Sea 604-649, 694-698 (1911); Tomasevich, International Agreements on Conserva-
tion of Marine Resources (1944).
199 Tomasevich, op. cit. at 87; Leonard, op. cit. at 49, 90, 104-106.
200 U.N. Secretariat, Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas 44 (U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/32) (1950).
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The importance of the conclusiveness of attributions of national character
to fishing vessels is to be seen in the frequent practice, once a convention
on conservation is agreed upon, of placing enforcement powers in the
hands of officials of the flag state of a vessel suspected of violations.
0 1
Finally, attention may again be called to the 1958 Conservation Con-
vention. As previously noted, the structure of the convention with respect
to the invocation of authority for challenging the permissibility of proposed
conservation measures depends largely on the national character of fishing
vessels affected by such measures. Article 14 provides that for purposes
of various articles in the convention dealing with the effects upon fishing
vessels of an actual or proclaimed conservation program, "the term 'na-
tionals' means fishing boats or craft of any size having the nationality of
the State concerned, according to the law of that State, irrespective of the
nationality of the members of their crews." 202
D. Claims Relating to the Delimitation of Boundaries
If states which make questionable claims to the delimitation of water
boundaries are conceded authority unilaterally to challenge the competence
of other states to protect ships to which they have attributed their national
character, such states might of course postpone indefinitely decision as to
the legality of their questioned delimitations. This is the way the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries 20 3 Case came up, and there would indeed be no need
for its clarification of fundamental policies, if it is made too difficult to test
states' exclusive interpretations of these policies.
Numerous claims to exclusive fishing rights have, of course, affected
foreign vessels and have been controverted on the ground that the area
concerned could not lawfully be included within the territorial sea or
internal waters of the claiming state.0 4  While these counterclaims, put
forward in protection of inclusive fishing rights, have created very con-
siderable dispute, none has arisen concerning the nationality of affected
vessels. There is not the faintest sign of a practice of rejecting counter-
201 Leonard, op. cit. note 198 above, at 38-39, 91, 111-112.
202 2 Official Records 141.
203 Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116; 46 A.J.I.L. 348 (1952).
Waldoeck, "The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case," 28 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 114, 117-
124 (1951), outlines the historical background of interference by Norway with foreign
vessels.
204 Indeed, practically all objections to exclusive fishing claims relate to the boundary
problem. See Riesenfeld, op. cit. note 183 above, at 146, 157; Fulton, op. cit. note 173
above, at 650-740. The North Atlantic Fisheries Case and the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case both dealt principally with delimitation of sea boundaries. Difficulties
over disputed extensions of the territorial sea so affected American fishermen that legisla-
tion was adopted in 1954 for reimbursing flnes imposed upon them when the United
States did not recognize the rights asserted by the claiming state. 68 Stat. 883.
Desirable community policy concerning the width of the territorial sea, with detailed
examination of factors relevant to policy with respect to exclusive fishing rights, is dis-
cussed in MeDougal and Burke, "The Community Interest in a Narrow Territorial Sea:
Inclusive versus Exclusive Competence over the Oceans," 45 Cornell Law Quarterly, No.
2 (Winter, 1960).
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claims on behalf of foreign fishing vessels on the ground that the objecting
state had no authority to confer its nationality upon the vessels concerned.
The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case illustrates one important way of
contesting claimed sea boundaries and it is typical in the sense that the
claims and counterclaims centered upon the question of permissible bound-
aries and not upon any issue of competence to fix national character on
vessels affected by the claimed delimitation scheme.
VI. CLAIMS RELATING TO SEIZURE OF SHIPS FOR PURPOSES OF
CIVM JURISDICTION
It is a practice common to both common-law and civil-law countries, and
a practice fully authorized under principles of jurisdiction in public and
private international law, that the mere physical presence of an asset within
the territorial domain of the exclusive public order of a state is sufficient
to confer competence upon that state to apply authority to many different
types of controversies.*0 5  It would appear most compatible with the policy
of harmonious and economic exploitation of the oceans that states should
assert such authority, certainly in the territorial sea, only under the most
demanding conditions.2 0  It may be emphasized that, even when states do
assert competence to arrest ships for purposes of establishing jurisdiction,
such assertion need not be regarded as a denial of the national character
of the vessel. The only premise necessary to decision is that factors other
than nationality are more important.
There is no doubt that states are permitted by customary international
law to arrest or detain vessels, irrespective of flag, for the purpose of the
exercise of judicial authority in application of local or foreign policy to
them. The practice of states varies greatly on the competence accorded
local courts over events occurring elsewhere involving foreign vessels, some
states placing great emphasis upon the nationality of the parties or of the
ship,'207 and others entertaining suit merely on the ground of the physical
presence of an asset.2°8 Despite this variance, the practice of leading
maritime states, extending judicial authority to events occurring anywhere
on the globe, has not been successfully protested by other states and un-
doubtedly falls within the limits of permissible competence.20 9 In the
United States, for example, "The courts of the United States take jurisdic-
tion, subject to some reservations imposed by their own application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, of suits on maritime claims arising out
205 Wolff, Private International Law 64-72 (2d ed., 1950); Dicey 's Conffict of Laws
213-214 (7th ed., gen. ed., Morris, 1958).
206Jessup, "Civil Jurisdiction over Ships in Innocent Passage," 27 A.J.I.L. 747
(1933). Art. 20(2) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
provides for a very limited coastal competence to levy execution upon or to arrest a ship
for a civil proceeding while it is merely passing through the territorial sea between
outside points. 2 Official Records 134; 52 A.J.I.L. 839 (1958).
207Wolff, op. cit. note 205 above, at 54, 60-61; Coffey, "Jurisdiction over Foreigners
in Admiralty Courts," 13 Calif. Law Rev. 93, 99 (1925).
20sWolff, op. cit. note 205 above, at 74; Robinson, Admiralty Law 14-20 (1939);
Coffey, oo. cit. above, at 94. 209 Coffey, loe. cit.
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of transactions and occurrences anywhere in the world.1 210  In England
the mere presence of a vessel in an English port is sufficient to found
jurisdiction of the courts.
2 11
In contrast to customary international law, which imposes no limit.
certain agreements concerning the arrest of vessels for specific maritime
claims may make the matter of the national character of a ship important
in their application. Thus the International Convention Relating to the
Arrest of Seagoing Ships limits the scope of the claims for which vessels
may be arrested, and those benefits of the treaty extend only to vessels
flying the flag of contracting states. Vessels flying the flag of non-con-
tracting states may be arrested for any claim permitted by the law of a
contracting state in accordance with general maritime law.
212
VII. CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO EVENTS PRIMARILY AFFECTING VALUE
PROCESSES WITHIIN TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES AND NOT DIRECTLY
RELATED TO THE ENJOYMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS
In addition to the above-mentioned claims which states make against
each other about interactions directly affecting their common enjoyment and
shared competence over the oceans, states also make a great many claims
about interactions which only indirectly affect such enjoyment and com-
petence. These claims include those relating to agreements and depriva-
tions in many different value processes in their territorial communities,
claims concerning activities of private associations seeking wealth and
other values by operations and transactions across state boundaries, claims
with respect to family relationships, claims relating to management of re-
sources, and so forth.
212
Sometimes states having effective control over persons or property make
direct claims against other states or the general community of states to
prescribe and apply policy to certain particular events,2 1 4 but on other
occasions, when not disposing of immediate effective control, a state may
make claim against other states, who do have such control, to defer to, or
honor, its authority over the events in question.2 15  These two different
210 Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty 46-47 (1957).
231 Wolff, op. cit. note 205 above, at 74; Dicey, op. cit. note 205 above, at 213-214;
Coffey, loc. cit. note 207 above, at 94.
232 Arts. 1 and 8. The text of the treaty is in U. S. Naval War College, International
Law Situation and Documents 1956, 566 (1957), and 53 A.J.I.L. 539 (1959).
213 More specific illustration would mention, for instance, the effects of contracts and
torts occurring within another territorial community, taxation of nationals and non-
nationals, labor-management relations, and entry of persons and goods.
214 This involves a claim not only to apply policy but also a claim to decide that it is
local policy which is applicable. The general subject matter embraces all of private
international law. See, generally, Wolff, op. cit. note 205 above; Katzenbach, "Con-
flicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and Inter-
national Law," 65 Yale Law J. 1087 (1956); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws (1959).
215 Comment, , 'Act of State' Immunity," 57 Yale Law J. 108 (1947-1948);
Wolff, op. cit. note 205 above, at 249-274; Comment, "The Jurisdictional Immunity of
Foreign Sovereigns," 63 Yale Law J. 1148 (1954); Katzenbach, 65 ibid. at 1128-1132
(1956).
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kinds of claims may, of course, be contraposed by different states in one
and the same controversy, and decision may require choice between the
directly opposing assertions of authority for prescription or application
or both.
The primary demands by states having some effective control over
relevant persons or property to prescribe and apply policy to particular
events are asserted with respect to both events occurring within their
territory and events occurring beyond such territory. Concerning events
which occur within their territorial boundaries, states quite naturally seek
to protect their resource base and the integrity and efficiency of their in-
ternal value processes. Concerning events occurring beyond their bound-
aries, states may make claim, as we have already seen in the discussion of
interactions directly affecting shared use of, and authority over, the oceans,
to protect national vessels wherever they may be, and to protect certain
interests regarded as universal to all mankind, such as the suppression of
piracy. States may also make claim, in the context of interactions which
have but incidental impact on common use of, and competence over, ocean
areas, to protect the territorial base or community processes from external
attack or deprivation, to protect substantial state interests (as in the
integrity of their currency) against external injury, to control and to
protect individual and corporate nationals while abroad, and to promote
fundamental community interests shared by all peoples, such as assuring
compliance with prescriptions about resort to, and use of, coercion.
The important interactions giving rise to all these claims obviously may
have effects, varying in scope and intensity of impact, upon several ter-
ritorial communities. The most general community objective is, accord-
ingly, that of allocating competence to prescribe policy among the affected
states in a way to maintain the efficacy and substantial fairness both of the
authoritative power processes by which control over value changes is
exercised and of the interdependent social processes of which the pre-
cipitating events are but one segment. Professor Yntema has phrased the
point succinctly:
In a highly integrated world economy, politically organized in a
diversity of more or less autonomous legal systems, the function of
conflict rules is to select, interpret and apply in each case the par-
ticular local law that will best promote suitable conditions of inter-
state and international commerce, or, in other words, to mediate in
the questions arising from such commerce in the application of local
law.
16
The "essential policy considerations peculiar to conflicts law" he subsumes
under the principles of "security " and "comparative justice." 217 The
latter refers, presumably, to such standards as those embodied in the
familiar general principles of law recognized in mature legal systems. Con-
crete implementation of these policies in the immediate context clearly
..'- Yntema, "The Objectives of Private International Law," 35 Canadian Bar Rev.
721, 741 (1957). 217 1bid. at 735.
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requires use of a multifactor analysis which will permit appropriate weigh-
ing of all considerations relevant to identification of the local policy which
will "best promote" the end in view. The fact that the attribution of
national character by one state to a ship is but one factor to be taken into
account in this process does not mean, it must be emphasized, that national
character is not a most important factor bearing upon policy, nor does a
determination that national character is not conclusive of decision constitute
a denial of the exclusive competence of the flag state to attribute its na-
tionality. In sum, appropriate mutual tolerance requires that states
exercise a very delicate discretion in their application of local policy in
situations in which national character is a relevant factor, even in problems
of this type.
The practice by which states make these indicated policies effective with
respect to events which have simultaneous impact upon different territorial
communities, and also indirectly affect use of the oceans, is, of course,
written large and often both in judicial decision and in the observations
of commentators upon private international law and admiralty. Detailed
recapitulation of familiar knowledge is unnecessary. For succinct but
expressive summary of the considerations which characteristically move
decision-makers when faced with problems of this type, the opinion of
Mr. Justice Jackson in Lauritzen v. Larsen is already considered classic:
International or maritime law in such matters as this does not seek
uniformity and does not purport to restrict any nation from making
and altering its laws to govern its own shipping and territory. How-
ever, it aims at stability and order through usages which considera-
tions of comity, reciprocity and long-range interest have developed to
define the domain which each nation will claim as its own. Maritime
law, like our municipal law, has attempted to avoid or resolve con-
flicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of
contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose
competing laws are involved. The criteria, in general, appear to be
arrived at from weighing of the significance of one or more con-
necting factors between the shipping transaction regulated and the
national interest served by the assertion of authority. It would not
be candid to claim that our courts have arrived at satisfactory stand-
ards or apply those that they profess with perfect consistency. But
in dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of
the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided;
nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to
warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically
be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an
American transaction.
218
Similarly, lMr. Justice Frankfurter, in Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Company, offered comparable formulation in referring to "the
accommodations that become relevant in fair and prudent regard for the
interests of foreign nations in the regulation of their own ships and their
21s 345 U. S. 571, 582 (1953); 47 A.J.I.L. 711 (1953). For discussion generated by
this decision, see Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty 386-394 (1957). See also
2 Norris, The Law of Seamen 348-361 (1952) and 1958 Cumulative Supp. 147-149.
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own nationals, and the effect upon our interests of our treatment of the
legitimate interests of foreign nations." "'
VIII. CLAIMS RELATING TO MODALITIES OF PROOF OF THE NATIONAL
CHARACTER OF SHIPS
It is the act of a state in attributing its national character to a vessel
which is important in all instances in which the national character of a
vessel is either controverted or question is raised about the relevance to
decision of that national character. With respect to the modalities of
proof of this act, relevant policy considerations embrace two different
interests: first, the interests of all parties, both claimants and challengers,
in the maintenance of secure, economic and quick methods for establishing
the act of attribution; secondly, the interests of states other than the
attributing state, and non-state parties, in a record of attributions adequate
to put them on notice. Notice is indispensable both to prevent double
attributions and to protect parties from being taken by surprise in financial
transactions. Of the various modalities suggested for proof of attribution,
such as registration, flag and documentation, registration would appear
to be the most economic alternative. It is least susceptible of fraudulent
manipulation. Flags, in contrast, can be run up and down with great
speed, and documentation can be easily falsified; hence neither flag nor
documentation would seem to guarantee the desired degree of certainty in
establishing the act of attribution and in identification of the national
character of the vessel. None of the many suggested references for
genuine link, it may be noted, have any bearing, reliable or unreliable, upon
this task of proving a state's act of attribution of national character to
ships. Registration should be accompanied, as it customarily is, by
documentation, and every precaution should be taken against false docu-
mentation. When discrepancy appears between registration and docu-
mentation, the former, because of the greater reliability it affords, should
prevail.
A. Claims with Respect to Registration
The best evidence of the surpassing reliability of registration as a mode
of proving national character may be found in both the universality of its
21979 S. Ct. 468, 486; 358 U. S. 354, 384 (1959).
The impact of the genuine link requirement upon application of American labor
legislation to foreign flag vessels is being contested by labor and ship-owning groups.
See Memorandum to the Department of State and to the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board from the American Committee for Flags of Necessity, Oct. 30,
1959. See, for reply to this Memorandum, Reply Brief of Charging Party in West
Indies Fruit and Steamship Company, Inc. and Seafarers' International Union of North
America, Atlantic and Gulf District, AFL-CIO, N.L.R.B. Case No. 15-CA-1454, dated
Dec. 10, 1959.
For an excellent, comprehensive inquiry into the problem of American labor laws and
flags of convenience, with explicit weighing of inclusive and exclusive interests, see
Comment, "The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flag of Convenience
Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies Against Shoreside
Picketing," 69 Yale Law J. 498 (1960).
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use 220 and in the unquestioned success of the maintenance of community
policies which states have thereby achieved.
Registration was practiced, one author asserts, as early as in the days of
ancient Rome.2 21  In its modern sense its appearance is usually associated
with the Navigation Acts of the 17th century which made registration of
British ships compulsory 22 It is significant that one of the first statutes
of the young American Republic was the Registry Act of 1792, providing
for registration, enrollment and licensing of vessels . 2  The Supreme
Court of the United States, in the case of The Mohawk, interpreted the
function of registration in these words:
The purpose of a register is to declare the nationality of a vessel
engaged in trade with foreign nations, and to enable her to assert that
nationality wherever found. The purpose of an enrollment is to
evidence the national character of a vessel engaged in the coasting
trade or home traffic, and to enable such vessel to secure a coasting
license.
224
The practice of registration is so universal 225 that among the relevant
statutes of sixty-five different countries reproduced in the U.N. collection of
laws concerning the nationality of merchant vessels, not a single one can
be found which does not require at least some kind of registration.2 26  The
220 With respect to state vessels, those engaged in commerce are, of course, registered,
whereas warships are recorded in special naval lists.
221Williams, "Function of Evidence in Roman Law," 20 Law Magazine & Review 73
(4th ser.), quoted in Rienow, op. cit. note 143 above, at 155.
222 Abbott, A Treatise on the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen 35, note
(c) (1822); Desjardins, Introduction historique . l'6tude du droit commercial maritime
157 (1890). For details with respect to these Navigation Acts see Reeves, History of the
Law of Shipping and Navigation (1792). A critical appraisal of the human and other
factors behind this British experiment is provided by Harper, The English Navigation
Laws (1939).
22SThe current text provides: "Vessels registered pursuant to law and no others,
except such as shall be duly qualified according to law for carrying on the coastal or
fishing trade, shall be deemed vessels of the United States, and entitled to the benefits
and privileges appertaining to such vessels . . ." 46 U.S.C. § 221 (1952).
In the Merritt Case, the Supreme Court of the United States unequivocally declarel:
"The Merritt is not a vessel of the United States.... [T]hat she was owned by citizens
of the United States did not make her a vessel of the United States. By the statute
of 1792 only ships which have been registered in the manner therein prescribed shall be
denominated or deemed vessels of the United States, entitled to the benefits or privileges
appertaining to such ships. There is no allegation that the Merritt had been so
registered." 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 582, 585 (1873).
22470 U. S. (3 Wall.) 566, at 571 (1865).
225Thus Higgins observes: "La seule condition qui soit g~n6ralement exig6e dans
tous les pays, c'est 1'inscription du navire sur le registre tenu par les autorit6s d6sign~es
A cet effet .... " Higgins, "Le Rlgime Juridique des Navires de Commerce," 30 Hague
Academy Recueil des Cours 21 (1929, V). Similarly, Diena, at one time Vice Chairman
of the League of Nations Committee for the Codification of International Law, "Prin-
cipes du Droit International Priv6 Maritime,' 51 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 409.
at 426 (1935, I).
226 United Nations Legislative Series, Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships (U.N.
Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/5) (1955), and Supplement to Laws and Regulations on the
Regime of the High Seas and Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships 113 et seq.
(U.N. DOC. ST/LEG/SER.B/8) (1959).
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only important difference in this respect between states concerns the
tonnage of the vessels which must be registered, minor craft not intended
for ocean navigation being usually exempted. As already indicated,
numerous multilateral and bilateral international agreements contain
reference to registration as a mode of ascertaining the vessels to which
they apply.2 27 Thus, for example, the Load Line Convention of 1930 pro-
vides in Article 3(a):
A ship is regarded as belonging to a country if it is registered by the
Government of that country.
2 s
It may be of interest to note that at the Twenty-First Session of the
International Labor Conference, the supreme body of the International
Labor Organization, a special committee was appointed to search for the
''most appropriate criterion for the demarcation of the scope as regards
vessels of international Conventions defining standards to be enforced on
board in the public interest." 229 This committee found "registration as
the most appropriate criterion," 230 which resulted in the inclusion of this
standard in five maritime labor conventions adopted at that session. Mir.
C. W. Jenks, a high official of the International Labor Organization, com-
menting upon the work of the Twenty-First Session, after a careful survey
of international practice, concluded that "in view of the desirability of
securing the greatest possible uniformity" with respect to the determina-
tion of vessels for which parties to the I.L.O. conventions assume re-
sponsibility, "registration will perhaps commend itself as the most satis-
factory criterion.' 
2 31
Registration serves, as pointed out above, still another highly important
purpose, comparable to that served by public books about land, as con-
clusive and reliable evidence of various private rights in the ship. As an
illustration we quote from a Swedish statute of 1891:
Similarly aviation statutes of numerous countries require registration. Thus the Air
Transport Act (Luftfahrgesetz) of Austria of Dec. 2, 1957, provides in Art. 15 (1):
"Sont de nationalit6 autrichienne tons les a6ronefs civils enregistr6s an registre des
aronefs (§ 16) ainsi que tous les a~ronefs de l'Arm~e f~d~rale. Ils doivent porter les
signes distinctifs autrichiens." 12 Rev. Fran~aise de Droit Afrien 358, 362 (1958).
227 It will be recalled that countless international treaties of commerce and navigation
accept the ascription of the party's nationality to a vessel as conclusive. However, in
some postwar American commercial agreements there is a clause which allows the con-
tracting parties to deny the benefits of the agreement to companies in which the con-
trolling interest belongs to nationals of a third country, not a party to the agreement.
Commenting upon the meaning of such a clause, Mr. Walker, an official of the Depart-
ment of State, observes: "It cannot be invoked in a manner to deny recognition of na-
tionality and legal existence, or of access to courts, regardless of the dominant real
interests in the company." Walker, "Provisions on Companies in United States
Commercial Treaties," 50 A.J.L.. 373, 388 (1956). Mr. Walker even suggests that
the policy of conclusiveness has proved so advantageous with respect to ships that it
might be appropriately employed in greater degree with respect to companies.
228 5 Hudson, International Legislation 639 (1936).
229 Jenks, "Nationality, the Flag and Registration as Criteria for Demarcating the
Scope of Maritime Conventions," 19 Journal of Comp. Leg. and Int. Law 245 (1937).
2 IoThid. 231 Ibid. at 252.
1960)
HeinOnline -- 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 99 1960
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 2. A register shall be kept of all Swedish ships of 20 tons
Register burden or upwards intended for use in merchant shipping
or for the conveyance of passengers and shall contain for each such
ship all the details which are deemed requisite for its identification, as
well as information respecting ownership, the nature of the acquest by
the registered owner and the time when the ship was registered or
when change of ownership was entered; and a certificate shall be issued
to every ship when entered in the Register, and such certificate shall
accompany the ship.
When an application for the registration of a ship is made, a cer-
tificate shall be produced showing when, where, and by whom the ship
was built, or, in the event of the ship having been foreign property,
it shall be proved that the right of the foreign owner has been trans-
ferred to the person requiring to be registered as owner thereof. On
the registration of a ship a certain number shall be allotted to the
ship, and that number may not subsequently be altered or allotted to
any other ship .... If notice is given of a change in the ownership of
a ship entered in the Register, but if it is found that the alleged owner
thereof cannot be entered in that capacity, an entry shall nevertheless
be made in the Register setting forth his name, the nature of his
acquest, and the date of the notice so given. No ship entered in the
Register may be removed from the same except when the ship has been
lost, or broken up, or otherwise destroyed, or may, in accordance with
(article 258) be considered lost, or, after having sustained damage, is
condemned, or has ceased to be Swedish. 2
At the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, Mr. Breuer, a
delegate of the German Federal Republic, stressing the desire of his govern-
ment to attain an "exact definition" of the genuine link, made this ob-
servation:
Rules should be drawn up concerning the registration of ships, for
it was registration which established the link between State and ship.215
282Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships, op. cit. note 226 above, at 162-163.
The Chinese Shipping Registration Act of 1930 (as amended in 1946 and 1947) is even
more explicit:
"Article 2. A ship shall be registered by the shipping office of its home port.
"Article 3. All matters relating to the preservation, creation, transfer, variation,




"Article 4. A registerable claim relating to a ship shall not lie against a third
party unless it has been registered." Ibid. at 24.
Compare also corresponding acts of Finland (p. 50), Greece (p. 68), Ethiopia (p. 47),
Norway (p. 124).
283 4 Official Records 67. It is possible that the International Court of Justice may
give an opinion on the significance of registration for national character in connection
with the decision of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) on constituting its Maritime Safety Committee. The IMCO decided at its
inaugural session in 1959 that for purposes of membership on this Committee the re-
quirement of its constitution that at least eight members must be the "largest ship-
owning nations" -was not to be interpreted to refer to the amount of tonnage registered
but rather to the amount of tonnage owned by a state or its nationals. The practical
effect of this decision was to exclude Panama and Liberia from membership on the
Committee. The IMCO then agreed to ask the International Court for an advisory
opinion on the question whether the Committee had been constituted in accordance
[Vol. 51
HeinOnline -- 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 100 1960
9AINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER AT SEA
Unfortunately, this sound suggestion for determining the national character
of vessels was not accepted in the Convention on the High Seas.
B. Claims with Respect to Documentation
The fact of a state attributing its national character to a vessel as ex-
pressed in registration is commonly recorded in documents kept on board
the vessel. The importance of this documentation as convenient evidence
of registration is attested again by practice centuries old. Thus the Treaty
of Peace and Friendship of 1667 between Great Britain and Spain refers
to a "passport or sea-papers" which vessels of the contracting parties
should keep on board to be protected from "molestation." 234 Similarly,
in the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce concluded in 1713 between
France and England, reference is made to a ship's "sea letters or pass-
ports" as a mode of attesting the national character of the vessels belong-
ing to the parties.-2 35  References to a ship's documents as evidence of its
national character can be found in countless subsequent bilateral and
multilateral agreements concluded by many other states, including the
peace treaties following World War I. Gidel cites the following as a
typical example of a provision relating to documentation in treaties con-
cluded between France and a number of other states:
La nationalitM des navires sera reconnue par les deux H.P.C. con-
formiment aux lois et r~glements de chacune d'elles et sera constat~e
d'aprhs les documents et patents se trouvant a bord et 6tablis par les
autorit~s comptentes.
23 6
The great practical importance of documents is illustrated by a decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the Merritt case, a controversy in-
volving an American-owned, foreign-built vessel without documents, which
was engaged in commerce between Canada and the United States. Mr.
Justice Hunt bluntly declared:
The ease does not show that the Merritt has any of the evidences of
being a British ship. She produces no register, or certificate, or docu-
ment of any kind to entitle her to make that claim....
The documents a vessel carries furnish the only evidence of her
nationality.
2 37
A vessel without documents can hardly engage in any kind of lawful
activity; 238 it may not only be denied entry to foreign ports, but it runs
a serious risk of being suspected of piracy. 39
with the IMCO Convention. See Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea," 59 Columbia Law Rev. 234, 257 (1959).
234 2 Chalmers, A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and Other Powers
13-14 (1790). 235 2 ibid. at 404.
232 1 Gidel, op. cit. note 173 above, at 89-90.
237 81 U. S. (17 Wall.) 582, 587 (1873).
138 Art. 6 of the Shipping Act of Japan of 1899, amended to 1954, contains a typical
provision: I ... no Japanese ship may wear the Japanese national flag or be operated
before the certificate of nationality . . . has been applied for and obtained." Laws
Concerning the Nationality of Ships, op. cit. note 226 above, at 91.
239 1 Gidel, op. cit. note 173 above, at 84. In Badger v. Gutierez, Mr. Justice Miller
said: "It is to be understood that every vessel of the United States, which is afloat, is
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Each state is free to determine for itself the number and character of
ship's documents.240  In time of peace such documents enjoy international
recognition and will in nearly all cases be sufficient and reliable proof of
the true national character of the vessel. 24 1  Moreover, as the case of The
Virginius illustrates, the state which has issued the documents in proof of a
ship's national character is appropriately regarded as the sole judge when
it comes to deciding whether they have been lawfully obtained.
Despite the admitted practical importance of documentation, the ease
of falsification and alteration suggests that documentation alone ought not
to be regarded as determining national character. Yet this seems to be the
import of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which provides in Article
5, as did the recommendation of the International Law Commission, that:
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right
to fly its flag. Ships shall have the nationality of the State whose flag
they are entitled to fly.
After reference to a "genuine link," the article continues: "Each State
shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag docu-
ments to that effect."
Although by no means unambiguous, since the first sentence appears to
envisage conditions for the grant of nationality other than the right to fly
the flag, the meaning of this appears to be that ships must be regarded as
having the nationality of the state issuing documents that a ship is entitled
to fly the flag shown. The documents are thus not merely made evidence
of the attribution of national character; they appear to be considered con-
clusive of that question.
C. Claims with Respect to Flag
The most conspicuous evidence of the attribution of national character
to a vessel, though obviously it cannot be conclusive, is the display of a
national flag. It is well established in the customary law of nations that
each state has full freedom in deciding what shall be its national colors
and who shall be accorded the right to fly its flag.24 2  It is an equally
bound to have with her, from the officers of her home port, either a register or an en-
rolment. . . . If found afloat, whether by steam or sail, without one or the other of
these, and without the right one with reference to the trade she is engaged in, or the
place where she is found, she is entitled to no prot~etion under the laws of the United
States, and is liable to seizure for such violation of the law, and in a foreign jurisdiction
or on the high seas, can claim no rights as an American vessel." 111 U. S. 734, at
736-737 (1884).
24OColombos, op. cit. note 133 above, at 221; Fedozzi, "La Condition Juridique des
Navires de Commerce," 10 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 5, 49-50 (1925, V); 1
Oppenheim, op. cit. note 175 above, at 596.
241 One of the reasons for the high reliability of ship's documents is the severe
penalties which national shipping laws provide for fraudulently obtaining and falsify-
ing such documents. 18 U.S.C. § 507 (1958) ; 46 U.S.C. § 60 (1952).
242 1 Oppenheim, op. cit. note 175 above, at 595; see also decision in the Montijo
dispute between the United States and Colombia, 2 Moore, Digest of International
Arbitrations 1421 (1898), discussed below, p. 113.
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firmly established rule of customary law that every vessel sailing on the
high seas and entering foreign waters must fly a flag belonging to a state.
Most national shipping laws expressly impose the duty upon all registered
vessels to fly the flag of the state of national character. Thus, the Israeli
Ships (Nationality and Flag) Ordinance of 1948, Article 3(a), reads:
Every ship registered in the State of Israel shall have the right and
the duty to fly the flag of the Merchant Marine of the State of Israel.
24 3
The Geneva Convention states that "each State shall fix the conditions ...
for the right to fly its flag" and requires that ships must sail "under the
flag of one State only."
In view of both the ease with which flags can be changed and historic
experience providing numerous examples of abuse of flag, the flag estab-
lishes only a prima facie outward evidence of a ship's national character;
it is not conclusive.2 44  Since on the high seas the flag will in most cases
be accepted as a correct indication of a ship's national character, states'
regulations concerning the use of a national flag provide severe penalties
for unlawful use of the national flag. Thus the British Merchant Ship-
ping Act, 1894, declares in Section 69(1) :
If a person uses the British flag and assumes the British national
character on board a ship owned in whole or in part by any persons
not qualified to own a British ship, for the purpose of making the ship
appear to be a British ship, the ship shall be subject to forfeiture .... 245
The abuse or unauthorized use of a flag is treated in most countries as a
criminal offense. 2"4
D. Claims with Respect to Name of the Vessel
Even the name of a vessel is considered important for purposes of
identification both on the high seas and in foreign waters, as well as for
registration. The change of a ship's name is in all maritime countries a
matter which requires authorization of a responsible state organ. Un-
authorized change of a vessel's name results in severe penalties and, for
example, as provided in the Shipping Act of Chile, may result in the ship
being deprived of its national character.247  The statement by Oppenheim
well expresses the practice of the majority of states in the matter:
Every State must register the names of all private vessels sailing
under its flag, and it must make them bear their names visibly so that
every vessel may be identified from a distance. No vessel may be
allowed to change her name without permission and fresh registra-
tion.
24 8
243 Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships, op. cit. note 226 above, at 86.
244 Thus, Higgins says: "Le pavillon n'est que le signe 6vident de la nationalit6 du
navire, il ne suffit pas pour la prouver."1 Higgins, Zoc. cit. note 225 above, at 20.
245 Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships, op. cit. note 226 above, at 184.
246 Colombos, International Law of the Sea 218 (3rd ed., 1954).
247 Art. 30(2), Shipping Act, 1878. Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships, op.
cit. note 226 above, at 20.
248 1 Oppenhein, op. cit. note 175 above, at 597.
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The mere exhibition of a name quite obviously offers no conclusive evidence
of a ship's national character and has never been so regarded.
E. Claims with Respect to "Genuine Link"
It is most unfortunate that the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
though it introduces, in the requirement of Article 5 that "there must exist
a genuine link between the State and the ship," a wholly new provision
hitherto unknown either to the customary and treaty law of the sea or to
the national shipping laws of any particular country, nowhere attempts
to define what is meant by "genuine link" or to indicate by what pro-
cedures a definition might be attained. It is hardly less unfortunate that
when one turns to the immense volume of travaux pr6paratoires, including
both the proceedings of the International Law Commission and the pro-
ceedings of the Geneva Conference itself, one finds only darkening confusion
mounted upon darkening confusion. The fact that so many of the world's
experts on maritime law, having such extended opportunity to engage in
clarification, made so little contribution to creating an unambiguous, work-
able reference for the words "genuine link" suggests that rational reference
may be hard to come by. Indeed it remains for anyone even to suggest,
much less clarify, an unambiguous reference for the words which can be
regarded as either adequately serving the necessary function of evidencing
states' attributions of national character or expressing acceptable policies
for overriding states' attributions in the inclusive interests of the general
community of states.
The earliest proposals made in the International Law Commission to
limit the competence of states to attribute their national character to vessels
can be found in the first report of the Special Rapporteur:
The attribution of an identity and a nationality to sea-going ships is
the corollary of the principle of the free use of the high seas. Gen-
erally speaking, it is for every sovereign State to decide to whom it will
give the right to fly its flag and to establish the regulations governing
the granting of the right. In order that the legislation of a State on
this subject should be effective, in all circumstances, however, it should
not depart too far from the principles which have been adopted by
the greater number of States and which may therefore be considered
to constitute an element of international law in that connexion.
24 9
By the time the Special Rapporteur presented his second report in 1951,
what a year earlier constituted only "an element of international law"
had become a set of "principles that have been adopted by nearly all
States" and " 'constituting the basis of the international law on this
matter.' ,,250 According to this report, for purposes of recognition of a
vessel's national character by other states, the following requirements must
be fulfilled:
249 Frangois, Report on the High Seas 6 (U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/17) (Report to Int. Law
Commission, 1950).
250 Fran~ois, Second Report on the High Seas 4 (U.N. Doc. A/0N. 4/42) (1951).
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1. Iore than one-half of the vessel should be owned by:
(a) Nationals or persons domiciled in the territory of the State to
whom the flag belongs;
(b) A partnership or commandite company in which more than
half the partners with personal liability are nationals or persons
established in the territory of the State to whom the flag belongs;
(c) A national joint-stock company which has its head office in
the territory of the State to whom the flag belongs;
2. The captain should possess the nationality of the State to whom
the flag belongs.
251
The provisional text of the prescription relating to nationality of ships
adopted by the Commission at its 1951 session roughly corresponds to the
above draft except for the requirement regarding the captain, which had
been omitted as "too strict." 252
Few changes appeared in the draft adopted by the Commission in 1955.258
At its Eighth Session held in 1956, after the advent of the Nottebohm
decision, the Commission, however, suddenly decided to replace the above
elaborate scheme, perfected after more than five years of labor, with the
following new text, which was subsequently placed before the Geneva
Conference:
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right
to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they
are entitled to fly. Nevertheless, for purposes of recognition of the
national character of the ship by other States, there must exist a
genuine link between the State and the ship.
2 4
The best evidence of what the Commission intended and of the policies
it sought to serve by this innovation of "genuine link" must be found in
the Commission's proceedings. We quote extensively the relevant parts
of the discussions as reported in the summary records of the Eighth Ses-
sion 215 of the International Law Commission:
251 Ibid. at 7-8.
252 U.N. General Assembly, l1th Sess., Agenda Item 53, p. 29 (1956-1957).
253 "Article 5. Right to a Flag. Each State may fix the conditions for the registra-
tion of ships in its territory and the right to fly its flag. Nevertheless, for purposes of
recognition of its national character by other States, a ship must either:
1. Be the property of the State concerned; or
2. Be more than one-half owned by:
(a) Nationals or persons legally domiciled in the territory of the State con-
cerned and actually resident there; or
(b) A partnership in which the majority of the partners with personal liability
are nationals of or persons legally domiciled in the territory of the State concerned and
actually resident there; or
(c) A joint stock company formed under the laws of the State concerned and
having its registered office in the territory of that State." International Law Com-
mission Report, U.N. General Assembly, 10th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 9, at 4
(U.N. Doe. A/2934) (1955); 50 A.J.I.L. 190, at 196 (1956).
254 International Law Commission Report, U.N. General Assembly, 11th Sess., Official
Records, Supp. No. 9, at 24 (U.N. Doe. A/3159) (1956); 51 A.J.I.IL. 154, at 168 (1957).
255 We cite page numbers in the text from 1 International Law Commission Yearbook,
1956 (Sales No.: 1956, V. 3. Vol. 1).
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Mr. FRANCOIS, Special Rapporteur . . . recalled the difficulties the
Commission had encountered in formulating the conditions for recogni-
tion of the national character of a ship by other States. (p. 37.)
Mr. SALAMANCA.... Behind the stress on the necessity for "genuine
connexion between the State and the ship" was probably the fear of
competition from States with very liberal registration laws. Intro-
duction of detailed conditions might have some effect on the freedom
of the high seas. Such details should therefore be avoided. (p. 37.)
Mr. SPRmopouLos said that the issues raised by the article were
highly complex and defied codification. (p. 37.)
Mr. AmADO said that the problem was complicated by its various
aspects: that of registration, which was the Netherlands approach;
that of the flag, which the United Kingdom preferred; and that of the
general principle of connexion between the State and the ship, which
was stressed in the Netherlands proposal .... (p. 38.)
Mr. ZouREK [stated] that many States regarded registration as
such [genuine] link. (p. 66.)
Mr. FRANgoIs, Special Rapporteur, said that that did not meet the
Commission's intentions. (p. 66.)
Faris Bey el-KinouR pointed out that, although not specifically de-
fined, there was an adequate link between State and ship provided by
the flag of the Member State. (p. 66.)
Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE .... Although perhaps it was the best that
could be achieved in the absence of expert advice on the extremely
complicated problems of nationality and registration, the articles as
now drafted contained many obscurities. (p. 67.)
Article 5 seemed harmless and was acceptable, although there codd
exist a genuine link between the ship and more than one State.
However, he saw no way of overcoming that difficulty, except by
adopting the United Kingdom criterion of effective control.
The question of nationality, unlike the question of jurisdiction to
which the vessel is subject, was not of primary importance to the law
of the high seas. (p. 68.)
Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE reaffirmed his view that the correct prin-
ciple for the recognition of nationality was that of effective control.
Consequently he would have preferred the third sentence in paragraph
I to have read: "Nevertheless, for the national character of the ship to
be recognized by other States, the flag State must be in a position to
exercise effective control over the ship." (p. 262.)
Mr. ZOUREK .... In spite of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's advocacy, he
remained convinced that the fundamentally important question of
nationality, which was intimately linked with the freedom of the high
seas, must be dealt with in the draft, since otherwise ships would be
free to change flags even during a single voyage. (p. 69.)
Mr. AmADO did not think that Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had offered
any real reason for omitting a provision concerning nationality. He
also wondered what the genuine link between the State and the ship
would be if Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's amendment . . . were adopted.
Perhaps the very change of flag itself might constitute a link. (p. 69.)
Mr. SCELLE .... Surely the aim must be to eliminate the fictitious
system of flags of convenience practiced by vessels claiming, for ex-
ample, Panamanian or Liberian registry. (p. 68.)
Mr. SALAMANCA said it would be extremely difficult to determine
what was a genuine link between a ship and its State of registry; per-
haps the introduction of such a concept would go further than was
required and would raise certain problems of ownership. States,
particularly those with small merchant fleets, which had to follow a
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fairly liberal policy, might be apprehensive of transfers of registry-
a point which the Commission should take into account. (p. 69.)
Faris Bey el-KHouRi proposed the deletion of the second sentence of
article 5 reading "Nevertheless, for purposes ...between the State
and the ship," because only States themselves could decide whether a
genuine link existed and only they could lay down the conditions for
the registration of ships. The Commission must not seek to impose
such control or sanctions in the present draft. (p. 69.)
Mr. PADILLA-NERVO.... wished to make clear, however, that he was
not wholeheartedly in favour of retaining the third sentence of article
5, paragraph 1, because he considered that the link between the State
of registration and the ship was created precisely by the grant of na-
tionality. . . . [I]t was not niade clear on whom lay the burden of
proving that the link was genuine. The requirement that there must
be such a link before other States were bound to recognize the na-
tionality of the vessel was not justified by international practice.
There were fourteen treaties between the United States and other
countries and thirty-eight between the United Kingdom and other
countries, by virtue of which the signatory States recognized the na-
tionality of vessels of the other signatory States as granted under
the municipal law of the flag State. There were also seventy-three
treaties which laid down that the nationality of ships was determined
by the laws of the State to which they belonged. Consequently the
third sentence in article 5, paragraph 1, was not only useless, but
imight conflict with international practice. (p. 70.)
Mr. SCELLE. It would be for third States to decide whether a
genuine link existed between the ship and the State of new registra-
tion and consequently whether the ship was entitled to fly its flag.
The situation was analogous to a disagreement between two States over
the nationality of an individual. (p. 71.)
Faris Bey E_.-KnouI. . . .confirmed the view he had expressed at
the previous meeting that the third sentence in article 5, paragraph 1,
should be omitted, becanse it was for States themselves to establish
whether there was a genuine link between them and the ship whose
owner was seeking registration. States should not be suspected of
fraudulent practice in that regard. (p. 71.)
Mr. SALAMANCA reiterated the view that nothing had been gained
by adopting the third sentence of paragraph 1, because the requirement
that there must be a genuine link between the State and the ship was
altogether too vague and imprecise. (p. 72.)
Upon such a record, full of basic disagreements and abounding in con-
fusion and irrelevancy, 52 8 it was thus decided that states should be given
authority to decide unilaterally "for purposes of recognition" whether
there exists a genuine link between a given ship and the state of attribu-
tion.*-" A limitation of undefined content, such as genuine link, of which
256 As an indication of the confusion, the principal commentator on this aspect of the
work of the Commission, Mr. Watts, apparently interpreted the Commission's references
to a genuine link as meaning "ownership." Thus, rejecting the nationality of ships as
the "basis for protection," he concluded: "Since the right of a State to protect a
vessel depends upon its owner being a person whom that State may protect, any par-
ticular question concerning the right to protect a given ship can only be answered by
considering the exact standing of its owner." Watts, "The Protection of Merchant
Ships," 33 Brit. Yr. Bk. Int. Law 79 (1957).
-57 Voted upon separately, the requirement of genuine link received in the Commission
9 affirmative votes against 3 negative ones and 3 abstentions. 1 Yearbook, op. cit. note
255 above, at 72.
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exclusive unilateral interpretation is authorized, is of course the most
severe and arbitrary limitation upon national competence, short of com-
plete prohibition, that could be devised.
The Geneva Conference, as is known, adopted the substance of the Com-
mission's draft, including the requirement of a genuine link. Extended
debate among the delegates failed to bring much needed clarification to the
meaning of the mysterious "genuine link." Quite to the contrary, the
issue was even further confused by introduction of new elements into the
elastic frame of reference of "genuine link." Thus, Mr. C. W. Jenks,
speaking on behalf of the International Labor Organization, stated:
With regard to the reference in article 29 to a "genuine link" between
the flag state and the ship, the Commission had drawn special attention
to the obligation of the flag state to exercise control over such matters
as safety regulations and labour conditions. The ILO had devoted
considerable attention to the problem, and the Preparatory Technical
Maritime Conference it had held in 1956 ... had adopted a resolution
urging that the country of registration should accept the full obliga-
tions implied by registration, and should exercise effective control.
Among those obligations were securing the observance of internationally
accepted safety standards, establishing government-controlled agencies
to supervise the signing on and signing off of seafarers, ensuring that
the service conditions of crews conformed with generally accepted
standards, freedom of association for seafarers, proper repatriation ar-
rangements and satisfactory arrangements for the examination of
candidates for certificates of competency and for the issue of such
certificates. In brief, the resolution stipulated as a minimum con-
sequence of the registration of vessels that the country concerned
should assume direct responsibility for ensuring that each vessel
registered complied with safety standards, was properly manned and
was navigated by competent persons.... It was to be hoped that if the
Conference on the Law of the Sea attempted to define the genuine link
more precisely those factors would be taken into account.258
Mr. Frangois, acting in Geneva as the Expert to the Secretariat of the
Conference, further elaborated upon this same theme in the attempt, as he
put it, to "shed light on the Commission's intentions on certain points or
dispel any misunderstanding that might exist as to the interpretation of
certain articles of the draft":
Some delegations do not agree with article 29, which requires the
existence of a genuine link between the ship and the state whose flag
it flies. It had been urged that the freedom of the seas subsumes the
sovereign right of states to grant authority to fly their flag. The
International Law Commission does not share that view. It admits
that a system under which any state can grant its flag to all ships apply-
ing for it is in fact the acme of freedom. That conception of freedom
is, however, incompatible with the interests of the international com-
munity. . . . The essential corollary to the freedom of the seas must
be that states exercise the same jurisdiction over ships sailing the high
seas under their flag as they exercise in their own territory .... This
regime is based on the notions that the ship must in the main belong to
nationals of the flag state; that the owners must be domiciled in that
258 4 Official Records 26.
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state; that the officers and at least the major part of the crew must
be nationals of that state; that in foreign ports the consular officers
of the flag state shall exercise the necessary control over such ships
putting in at those ports and, where appropriate, grant them such
protection as they may need; and, finally, that the ships shall return to
their home ports at regular intervals. That is what the International
Law Commission understands by the link between the ship and the
flag state. If that link no longer exists, the entire system collapses,
and a situation will arise on the high seas which some may regard as
the ideal state of freedom, but which others-including the Interna-
tional Law Commission-regard as contrary to a sound conception
of the freedom of the seas, and hence to the interests of the interna-
tional community. The natzre of this genine link, and the con-
sequences of its absence, will have to be specified; and there is little
likelihood that the present conference, which is already over-burdened,
will be able to deal with the matter. It is important, however, that it
should come out in favour of the principle, the details of which will
be studied subsequently.
2- ,1
Subsequent discussion in the Second Committee, however, failed to pro-
duce any greater clarity and consensus with respect to the content of a
genuine link. Mr. Seyersted (Norway), emphasizing "the greatest im-
portance" which his government attached to the "genuine link" require-
ment, insisted that "effective jurisdiction and control were an indis-
pensable feature of the genuine link," and continued:
There were others, such as the nationality or domicile of the owner,
his principal place of business, the nationality of the officers and crew
and the extent to which parties suing the shipowners could effectively
have recourse to the courts of the flag State, but it would be difficult
to single out any one of them as indispensable. It was the sum total
of all those elements which mattered. 
2
6
Mr. Edelstam of Sweden, in contrast to the vast majority of other dele-
gates, found the issue perfectly clear and declared:
... the principle of the genuine link was almost self-evident, since
without it ships on the high seas would not be subject to the authority
of any State.
26'
Mr. Van Panhuys (Netherlands), in disregard of all history, was emphatic
in his support of the "genuine link" requirement:
He could not subscribe to the contention that the term used by the
Commission was too general and would lead to confusion. On the
contrary, without the principle of the genuine link there would be a
legal vacuum, since the counterpart of freedom of navigation must be
the obligation of the flag State to maintain order on the high seas.-
6
-
259 ]bid. 34-35. 260 Ibid. 62.
.,a8 Ibid. 64.
262Ibid. Another recent exercise in interpretative frustration with respect to the
content of genuine link is provided in Brajkovic and Pallua, "Les conditions dans
lesquelles les Etats accordent aux navires le droit d'arborer le pavillon national," In-
ternational Academy of Comparative Law, Vth International Congress of Comparative
Law, Sec. IV. C. 1, General Report, Bruxelles (1958). Having established that the
genuine link formula requires " comparative investigation" (p. 7), the authors, referring
to the vagueness of the available and suggested criteria, note: "Le fait qW'on n'a pas
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Admiral Colelough of the United States, after correctly observing that
all the talk about the perils to the freedom of the seas totally lacked evi-
dence of instances where effective jurisdiction had not been exercised,
summarized as follows:
The only principle which had been advanced as the basis for the
concept of non-recognition was that of the "genuine link." But the
International Law Commission itself had admitted that the genuine
link was a vague criterion, and that vagueness was not removed by the
addition of the words "effective jurisdiction and control." Effective
jurisdiction and control did not constitute a criterion, but an objective,
and hence did nothing to clarify the term "genuine link."
In effect, it was proposed that States should be told at one and the
same time that the Conference did not know what the genuine link
was, but that if they found that the genuine link did not exist, in a
particular case, they were free not to recognize the nationality of the
ship concerned.
263
In a publication after the adoption of the Convention on the High Seas,
Professor Sorensen has also attempted, despite the failures of the Inter-
national Law Commission and the Geneva Conference, to give a content to
the "genuine link" requirement. This is his interpretation:
The Commission made no attempt, however, to define a "genuine
link." It felt-as did the Geneva Conference-that the legislation
of traditionally maritime states was too divergent to permit of any
internationally binding definition. Among the criteria that may be
used are nationality or domicile of the owner, his principal place of
business, nationality of officers and crew. In the case of ships owned
by joint-stock companies, the criteria may include nationality or
domicile of the shareholders or of a certain proportion of them.
264
Referring to the words of Article 5: "In particular, the State must effec-
tively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and
social matters over ships flying its flag," Professor Sorensen further
explains:
This sentence . . . in effect relates the "genuine link" not only to
the qualities of the ship and its owner, but also to the legal possibilities
of the state to control the ship. If such possibilities are absent, the
state is not entitled to enter or to maintain the ship on its register.-I,
No elaborate dissection, however enjoyable it might be, of these exten-
sive quotations is required to demonstrate that neither official nor un-
official commentators have succeeded in suggesting a possible definition of
a genuine link which is either clear or acceptable by criteria of community
interest.
Turning from contemporary controversy to the historic requirements of
states in their national shipping legislation, it is equally impossible to find
a meaningful reference for "genuine link" which would serve the general
community interest either in evidence of states' attributions of national
d~fini ces limites d'une fagon stricte permet une assez grande libert6 de choix des
crit~res admissibles." Ibid. at 16. 2634 Official Records 64-65.
264 S~rensen, The Law of the Sea 204 (International Conciliation, Pamphlet No. 520,
1958). 265 Tbid. at 205.
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character or in policies overriding their competence to attribute. The
words of a renowned French lawyer of the 19th century, Ortolan, are still
fully applicable:
Les vations, dans l'itablisselent de ces conditions, seront jvi-
dennizent pls ou zoizs faciles, plus ou moins rigoureases, selon ce
qz'elles croiront le pluts de leur intfrct; selon l'6tat de prosperitg, de
dveloppeine t, d'enzfance, ou de d6cadence o t se trouvera lezur marine;
sivant le degr6 de leurs ressources maritimes en mnatiriel ow en
personnel.
266
It will be recalled that these traditional national requirements are related
to the ownership of the vessel, nationality of the crew and place of the
ship's construction.
(a) Ownership
That a state may attribute its national character only to vessels owned
by its nationals has never been a requirement of international law. After
a careful analysis of the historic practice of states, Rienow concludes:
There is actually no correlation between ownership and nationality;
the treaties and correspondence of States do not indicate the need for
national ownership; and although some States refuse to consider as of
their own respective nationalities, vessels, the titles to which are not
held by nationals, their practice indicates that they do not deny other
States the privilege of dispensing with this requirement. Moreover,
the bare fact of national ownership does not impress upon a vessel a
closer connection with the State of the owner's nationality than with
any other State..
2 6 7
This freedom from inclusive restraint characterizes international treaties
relating to navigation, which are uniform in considering the question of
ownership as irrelevant. On the basis of a study of 150 such treaties,
Professor Hawkins reached this conclusion:
While national laws do commonly limit national registry to vessels
owned by the nationals of the country concerned, it is not this re-
quirement but the fact that the vessel has been admitted to national
registry that is significant from the treaty standpoint....
Under such treaty provisions, nationality of the vessel is determined
solely by the state of registry irrespective of the nationality of the
owner.
268
2660 Ortolan, Rlgles internationales et diplomatie de la mer 167 (4th ed., 1864). For
a modern statement with respect to these policies see Van Bogaert, I'Le Droit que
PossMe l'Etat pour D6terminer les Conditions d'apr~s Lesquelles les Navires ont le
Droit d'Arborer son Pavilon," 35 Rev. de Droit International et de Droit Compar6 485,
at 486-487 (1958).
267 Rienow, The Test of the Nationality of a Merchant Vessel 116 (1937).
-6RHawkins, Commercial Treaties and Agreements 6 (1951). Writing on the same
subject, Walker states: "A vessel, by definition, is deemed to have the nationality of
the country whose flag it lawfully flies, without reference to such questions as who owns
it or where it was built . . ." Walker, "Provisions on Companies in United States
Commercial Treaties," 50 A.J.I.L. 373, at 382 (1956).
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The late Professor Hyde is similarly unequivocal when he states:
It is probably a sound proposition that a vessel registered under the
laws of a State and possessed of a certificate of registry may be deemed
in an international sense to belong to that State, and to justify it in
giving it the privilege of flying its flag, regardless of the nationality
of the owners of the ship.
269
The requirement of national ownership is most obviously a requirement
of exclusive policy, which has its roots in conditions of a distant past, long
ago profoundly changed.2 7 0  Thus, when ships were scarce and the most
highly prized assets of national bases of power, and when secrecy surround-
ing the art of shipbuilding was equal to the present-day secrecy enveloping
the art of rocketry, the requirement that only vessels wholly owned by
nationals could be attributed a national character was entirely rational
and universally employed. With the disappearance, however, of the con-
ditions which prompted the introduction of this criterion, the latter's
strictness and universal application have also changed. The development
of modern capitalism with all its refined and complex forms of corporate
organization transcending state boundaries, the growing practice of foreign
investment, and the pressing need for capital in the newly emerging under-
developed states-all these have contributed to changes in national policies
of many countries. Today only a minority of states requires that the
vessels having their national character be wholly owned by their nationals.
Some traditionally maritime countries, such as, for example, Italy, France,
The Netherlands and Sweden, are satisfied with their nationals having the
controlling interest in the ship. Other states, on the other hand, have no
requirements relating to ownership at all. It must not be overlooked,
further, that even in states with the strictest and most complete require-
ments relating to ownership by nationals, "national" often includes a
"nationally incorporated" association, which of course allows non-na-
tionals to have an ownership interest in vessels having the national char-
acter of these countries.271 This practice was known to and approved by
Dr. Lushington more than a hundred years ago, as is clearly demonstrated
by the following statement made in The Johanna Emilie:
269 1 Hyde, International Law 810 (2d rev. ed., 1945).
270 An 18th-century author had this to say with respect to the policies which were to
be promoted by the enactment of the British Navigation Act of 1651: "The great
object of jealousy at the time of passing this Act was the immense carrying trade pos-
sessed by the Dutch.... The portion of the carrying trade with our colonies, which the
Dutch had obtained, was the most serious grievance, and that which the nation bore
with least patience. . . .The ordinance sets out with a regulation that was to strike at
this abuse." Reeves, History of the Law of Shipping and Navigation 37 (1792). See
also a more recent appraisal, Chorley and Giles, Shipping Law 3 (3d ed., 1952).
271 Thus Professor Smith writes: "English law requires the complete legal owner-
ship to be vested in British subjects, but this requirement is of less value than might
appear, since it does not exclude ownership by a British company in which the controlling
interest is held by foreigners." The Law and Custom of the Sea 64 (3d ed., 1959).
Higgins puts it this way: ''Lorsque, comme c'est souvent le cas, le navire est la
propri~t6 d'une socit6, il n'est pas toujours ais6 de d6terminer la nationalit6 de cette
societ6." Loc. cit. note 225 above, at 21.
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• . . it is perfectly notorious that the merchants of Great Britain
have repeatedly, at various times, been owners of foreign vessels
sailing under foreign flags,-a privilege of which they would be very
sorry to be deprived-a privilege . . . they are entitled to exercise.
"72
(b) National Build
That a state may attribute its national character only to vessels which
have been built within its territory has never been a requirement of inter-
national law.2 7 3  This again is a matter of national policy, and equally in
regard to this requirement the practice of states is today vastly different
from what it was a couple of centuries ago. Such stipulation does not seem
to be even a national requirement any longer except in the shipping laws
of the United States, Portugal and France. Among these, it appears that
the United States alone most strictly adheres to this commonly regarded
anachronistic policy.
2 74
It is gratifying to note that the records do not reveal that national build
has ever been considered as a potential "genuine link" by either the Inter-
national Law Commission or the Geneva Conference.
(e) National Crew
The requirement that all or a fixed proportion of ship's personnel be
nationals of the flag state similarly has never been a requirement of inter-
national law.27 5 On the contrary, it has always been and still remains a
matter of national policy with respect to which every state fully exercises
an exclusive competence. Any doubt that may have existed in this respect
must have been eliminated by the decision in the Montijo controversy be-
tween the United States and Colombia.27 The umpire, Robert Bunch,
British Minister Resident in BogotA, rejecting the Colombian contention
that the Montijo could not claim the national character of the United
States, since the composition of its crew was not in accord with the relevant
American requirements, asserted that the alleged violation of American
law was "rather a question for the Government of the United States than
for this tribunal of arbitration." 277 Further, the umpire declared that
he could "not go behind the undoubted fact that the Government of the
United States considers the Montijo as an American ship," and concluded
that "On this point it is the sole judge." 278
272 Quoted in Rienow, op. cit. note 267 above, at 92.
273 Ibid. at 24-49.
274 See 46 U.S.C. § 11 (1952). However, foreign-built vessels may be registered but
are not allowed to engage in United States coastwise trade. Ibid. With respect to
both France and Portugal, the statutes of these countries which require national con-
struction contain escape-clauses making this requirement rather illusory. For France,
see 1 Ripert, Droit Maritime 301 (4th ed., 1950) ; for Portugal, compare Arts. 2 and 3(1)
of the Shipping Act of 1863, in Laws Concerning the Nationality of Ships, op. cit. note
226 above, at 145-146. 275 Rienow, op. cit. note 267 above, at 73.
276 The Montijo, 2 Moore, Digest of International Arbitrations 1421 (1898) (Deci-
sion of the Umpire of July 25, 1875). 277 Tbid. at 1433.
27s Ibid. at 1434.
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An attempt made by some members of the Institute of International Law
more than sixty years ago to limit the competence of states in this regard
was rejected by the majority of the members and resulted in the adoption
of the following recommendation:
Article 4. Each State shall determine the conditions to be fulfilled
in order to be appointed captain or first officer of a merchant ship: but
the nationality of the captain or that of the members of the crew shall
not be a condition of acquiring or forfeiting the right to the national
flag.
2 79
Thus, historic experience, exhibiting vast differences in the shipping laws
of various countries with respect to the composition of ships' crews, demon-
strates that this, too, is a requirement expressing only exclusive national
policies.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF CONCLUSION FOR CONCLUSIVENESS
The high degree of conclusiveness which states have in the past uniformly
accorded in mutual tolerance to their attributions of national character to
ships has contributed inestimably, as our review of past trends in decision
has demonstrated, to their securing shared use of, and shared competence
over, the great common resource of the oceans. By their mutual tolerance
states have achieved co-operative action on an ever-expanding scale in the
joint production of the greatest net values for all. Indeed, it is this model
of co-operation which is commonly regarded as the most relevant experi-
ence for shaping the preliminary outlines of an emerging law of outer
space.
Conversely, the high degree of conclusiveness which states have re-
ciprocally accorded their respective attributions of national character to
vessels has not impeded the rational handling of problems and controversies
arising from interactions across boundaries in which their common interests
in the shared use and competence over the oceans are only incidentally at
stake. The fact that a state may have attributed its national character to
a vessel has been, as we have seen, regarded as an appropriate factor for
consideration in many of these controversies, but it has been regarded as
merely one factor among many to be appraised in context for clarifying
relevant community policy. In the disposition of these problems, the sig-
nificance of attributions of national character to vessels has been in their
bearing upon the traditional tasks of "private international law," de-
terminations of "reasonableness" and the requirements of "security" and
"comparative justice."
The introduction into this rational process of decision of the new-found
contrivance of genuine link could do incalculable harm. It could make state-
lessness commonplace when so far it has existed only as an extreme rarity;
it could undermine, if not render worthless, an enormous number of bi-
lateral treaties of commerce and navigation, which require recognition of
unilateral competence to determine national character; it could result in
279 Aunnuaire 202 (1896) (translation from U.N. General Assembly, Official Records,
Agenda Item 53, at 29).
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assertions of an unrestricted right of visit and search against vessels
navigating on the high seas suspected of the absence of a genuine link with
the state whose flag they otherwise lawfully fly; it could encourage arbi-
trary and uncontrollable discrimination by states against vessels of other
states; it could create international tension by authorizing unilateral inter-
ferences in matters hitherto regarded as of strictly national competence, to
wit: the comprehensiveness or appropriateness of a state's shipping legisla-
tion; it could introduce destructive uncertainty into commercial intercourse
between states and between individuals as well; it could affect most ad-
versely all forms of foreign investment by creating expectations that the
genuine link doctrine might suddenly be extended from shipping to other
industries; it could deprive of work thousands of seamen of all nationalities
and, perhaps, an even greater number of workmen employed in related
industries; it could deny for all practical purposes access to the oceans to
states which presently lack capital and skills indispensable for independent
maritime industry; and so on, in realistic horribles in expectation.
It is yet to be demonstrated that any conceivable good for the common
interest of peoples could attend the introduction of this new-found require-
ment of genuine link. It has not been established that it would be an
economic technique for achieving the laudable aims of labor for more suit-
able working conditions and higher standards of living. It has not been
established that it is an economic technique for remedying the ills that
business interests find in competition, even if it be assumed that these ills
are entirely real and not hypochondriacal. Finally, it has not been estab-
lished that safety of navigation or any other shared interest in common
use of the oceans would in any way be improved. It has not, in sum,
been established that the proposed innovation would serve any common
interest which might counterbalance the very grave risks and dangers which
it would entail. On the contrary, it would seem reasonably clear that the
only purposes it would serve are those of disruption, controversy and
anarchy.
280
Registration alone, accordingly, recommends itself, as has been demon-
strated in detail above, as the most appropriate "link," in attribution of
national character, between state and ship. It serves best both the exclu-
sive interests of states in freedom to determine their own maritime develop-
ment and the inclusive interests of the general community of states in
simple, economic modalities for identifying the national character of ships.
When accompanied by necessary documents issued by competent authorities
of the state which has attributed its national character to the vessel, it may
be relied upon as best suited to secure both types of shared interests.
:,o A foretaste of the wide possibilities for abuse which the doctrine of genuine link
provides is afforded by a news item reporting the first concrete application of this in-
novation. The report states that the U.S.S.R. has issued an order which imposes upon
all ships flying supposed flags of convenience harbor fees approximately three times
higher than those applicable to vessels of traditional maritime countries. New York
Times, Aug. 31, 1958, § 5, p. 11. Since it is commonly known that some 40 percent of
these ships are owned by American corporations, it is easy to see that the genuine link's
first practical test has taken place on the cold-war battlefield.
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The conclusion to which we, therefore, inevitably come is that the states
of the world should reject this segment of Article 5. This could be done
by making appropriate reservation upon any ratification of Article 5 or by
stating in advance its only acceptable interpretation. The agreement by
all ratifying states upon appropriate reservation, interpretation, or, best
of all, deletion, would of course be the procedure most economically de-
signed to secure the common interest. 81
281 Some degree of recognition of the perils inherent in the "genuine link" doctrine
is to be seen in the outcome of the vote taken in the Plenary Session of the Geneva
Conference upon the words "for purposes of recognition of the national character of
the ship by other States." These words received the support of only 15 states, whereas
30 states voted against them, and 17 abstained, out of a total of 86 states attending the
conference. 2 Official Records 20.
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